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Summary 
Emotional clarity as the ability to label, describe and distinguish among one’s own 
emotions has consistently been found to be beneficial for affect regulation, well-being and 
psychological health. Therefore, it has received certain attention in recent years. However, most 
research on emotional clarity has stuck to correlational analyses and self-report measures of trait 
emotional clarity so that knowledge of this concept is limited. Therefore, the present project 
aimed at a more comprehensive exploration of affective clarity by realizing experimental and 
quasi-experimental settings and utilizing self-report measures of trait and state clarity as well as 
more indirect instruments that do not rely on self-insight. With regard to the beneficial 
associations of emotional clarity, the first aim of this project was to develop training 
interventions to foster emotional clarity. The second aim of the dissertation was to explore the 
role of emotional clarity in affect regulation. An additional goal of this thesis was to develop 
alternative measures of affective clarity to the well-used self-report scale of trait experience.  
This thesis consists of two parts: In part 1, a synopsis provides a theoretical introduction 
to the topic and the research aims, an overview of the four conducted studies and a summarizing 
discussion. Part 2 contains three original papers, which are outlined in the following.  
Paper 1 presents two studies aiming at developing and evaluating trainings that enhance 
affective clarity. In study 1, a direct approach - an intervention training the skills defining clarity 
- and an indirect approach - a mindfulness training with formal and informal meditation 
exercises - were realized. Each training had a duration of one hour. In study 2, the indirect 
approach to train mindfulness and a second indirect approach to train self-reflection were 
implemented. These trainings were divided into two sessions of one and a half hours each. In 
both studies, the experimental interventions were compared with each other and with a control 
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intervention. Interventions were evaluated with (a) self-report instruments of state and trait 
emotional clarity, (b) an indirect measure of emotional clarity, (c) certainty ratings, and (d) an 
emotion recognition test. In study 1, both experimental groups indicated significant changes 
within groups on different measures. In view of the very short training duration of one hour, this 
result gives tentative support to the idea that emotional clarity can be fostered by training. In 
study 2, neither of the experimental groups showed significant pre-post differences. This was 
mainly ascribed to the trainings’ focus on distress and its regulation rather than on emotional 
clarity. Thus, it seems promising to follow the approaches chosen in study 1. Future studies 
should profit from keeping the focus on emotional clarity, extending the training duration, 
working with volunteers, implementing diaries as intervention and evaluation instrument, and 
realizing a follow up-measurement some months after the interventions.  
Papers 2 and 3 of this dissertation each report one quasi-experimental study exploring the 
role of emotional clarity in affect regulation. In both studies state emotional clarity and affective 
state were measured at the beginning of the experiment, right after an affect induction and after a 
recovery phase. Both variables were related to each other and trait emotional clarity. Paper 3 
additionally investigated these relations after a re-induction. Whereas paper 2 engaged in anxiety 
that was induced by film, paper 3 dealt with global positive and negative affect in connection 
with the induction of negative affect through an ostensible intelligence test with unsolvable 
items. With regard to trait clarity, both studies confirmed previous research on individual 
differences. Persons with high trait clarity generally reported more positive affect and less 
negative affect and anxiety than persons with low trait clarity. Furthermore, high clarity persons 
demonstrated advantages in recovery from induced negative affect and anxiety compared to the 
low clarity persons. In contrast, no significant differences between persons high and low in trait 
emotional clarity were found in affective state after the induction and after the re-induction when 
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prior affect ratings were controlled. With respect to state emotional clarity, both studies 
confirmed its positive relations to trait emotional clarity and positive affect and its negative 
associations with negative affect and anxiety. However, state clarity surprisingly hardly changed 
in the course of the experiment. Future studies should consider indirect instruments of state 
clarity that are not biased by global self-evaluations and therefore more sensitive to changes.  
With regard to the alternative measures utilized in this thesis, the new self-report scales 
demonstrated adequate capability to distinguish between state and trait experience and were 
correlated with each other and measures of affect in the expected manner, but they did not prove 
sensitivity to changes. The new indirect measure captured marginal differences between groups 
in one study and was positively correlated to the self-report scales, but did not map changes. The 
certainty measure demonstrated convergent correlation to self-report clarity, mapped changes 
within one group, and moreover, is easy to apply.  
In summary, this doctoral thesis provides some support to the idea that emotional clarity 
can be fostered by short training interventions. Especially, the direct approach to train the 
abilities defining emotional clarity and the indirect approach to foster mindfulness are worth 
further studying. Furthermore, the present dissertation presents new self-report scales of trait and 
state clarity and a new indirect measure of emotional clarity. Continuative research is necessary 
with regard to these instruments’ validity and sensitivity to changes. With respect to the role of 
emotional clarity in affect regulation, the present research confirmed the associations of 
emotional clarity to greater positive and lower negative affect as well as advantages in recovery 
from induced negative affect. Future studies with indirect measures of emotional clarity and 
multiple data points during the recovery phase should help to further explore the exact role of 
emotional clarity in the regulation process.  
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Part 1: Synopsis 
Introduction and Theoretical Framework  
In the past two decades, the concept of emotional intelligence (EI) has received growing 
interest both in science as well as in general public (Petrides & Furnham, 2001). Concerning the 
latter, Goleman (1995) is the most famous representative who can take credit for establishing 
emotional intelligence and pointing out the advantages of being emotional intelligent with regard 
to health, relationships and work performance. With respect to science, Salovey and Mayer 
(1990) were the first who proposed a theoretical model of emotional intelligence.  
In the following, Salovey, Mayer and colleagues pursued two different approaches. On 
the one hand, they further developed their model of EI and presented in 1997 an ability model of 
EI (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) that emphasizes a cognitive definition of EI and measures it with 
maximum performance test (Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale; MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 1999; Mayer-Salovey-Caruso- Emotional Intelligence Test; MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey,  
& Caruso, 2002). Thereby, they clearly delineated their model from mixed models of EI (e.g., 
the most prominent one by Bar-On, 1997) that incorporate noncognitive abilities as well as a 
wide range of personality variables and utilize self-report instruments.  
On the other hand, Salovey, Mayer and colleagues presented the Trait Meta-Mood Scale 
(TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995) as a self-report measure of 
“perceived emotional intelligence” (Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002) or “trait EI” that is 
embedded in personality research (Petrides & Furnham, 2001). The TMMS measures relatively 
stable qualities (trait) of the reflective processes that accompany affective experience (meta-
mood), namely the degree of attention persons spend to their affective experience (attention), the 
clarity of this experience (clarity) as well as the degree to which it is regulated (repair).  
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The trait meta-moods and in particular the emotional clarity received certain attention in 
recent years because of their predictive validity with regard to the recovery from a distressing 
event (Salovey et al., 1995). In subsequent studies, affective clarity was consistently found to be 
positively related to well-being, mental and physical health and other variables that are related to 
quality of life (Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 2005; Gohm & Clore, 2002). These beneficial 
associations make affective clarity an interesting variable that shall be explored by this research.  
Before describing the concrete aims of this project, it is outlined what is known about 
emotional clarity from previous research. Affective clarity is defined as the ability to identify, 
describe and distinguish between the own emotions (Salovey et al., 1995; Gohm & Clore, 2000). 
Apart from its associations with eligible variables, negative associations to variables like anxiety, 
depression (Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2006) and distress (Salovey et al., 1995) were 
consistently reported. More generally, it was positively related to positive affect and negatively 
related to negative affect (e.g. Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Mayer & Stevens, 1994; Ramos, 
Fernández-Berrocal, & Extremera, 2007).  
In line with Salovey and colleagues (1995; 2002), Lischetzke et al. (2005) as well as 
Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) postulate that these associations of emotional clarity are 
mediated by affect regulation. Based on cybernetic models of affect regulation (e.g. Larsen, 
2000), they suggest that high emotional clarity permits individuals to recognize an undesirable 
level or kind of affective state early and hence enables them to implement appropriate regulation 
strategies quickly. In line with these ideas, studies that realized an affect induction and a 
recovery phase consistently reported that individuals high in clarity compared with those low in 
clarity were associated with greater recovery from induced affect (Fernández-Berrocal & 
Extremera, 2006; Lischetzke, Cuccodoro, Gauger, Todeschini, & Eid, 2005; Salovey et al., 
1995).  
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Some of these experimental studies found evidence also for a greater reactivity of persons 
with high emotional clarity (Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006, anger condition; Salovey et 
al., 2002), whereas some did not (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006, sadness and amusement 
conditions; Salovey et al., 1995). From a theoretical perspective, a positive relation between 
affective clarity and reactivity could result from increased sensitivity to emotion-laden stimuli 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2003). However, a negative relation is likewise possible and based on the 
idea that high clarity persons can initiate antecedent-focused affect regulation before the affect 
has developed (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). A nonsignificant relation could follow from the 
interaction of both mechanisms.  
Only two experimental studies engaged in differences between high and low clarity 
persons with regard to habituation (Ramos, Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2007; Salovey et 
al., 2002). High clarity persons in contrast to low clarity persons indicated a significant decline 
in ruminative thought after a distressing event (Salovey et al., 1995). As rumination is an 
indicator for the discrepancy between the primary cognitive schemata and the distressing event 
(Horowitz, 1997), persons high in affective clarity seem better in integrating a stressful 
experience into their cognitive schemata and therefore should respond to a lesser extent to re-
experience of the same event than individuals low in emotional clarity (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 
2000). However, both studies could not confirm this expectation.  
Apart from these few experimental studies, most other research utilized cross-sectional 
designs that stick to correlational and regression analyses. Another deficit is concerned with the 
very few studies engaging in emotional clarity as a state variable (Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; 
Lischetzke et al, 2005; Lischetzke, Angelova, & Eid, 2011; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Mayer & 
Stevens, 1994). Of the experimental studies investigating the role of emotional clarity in affect 
regulation only two utilized trait as well as state measures (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Lischetzke et 
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al., 2011). Nevertheless, applying state measures of clarity is particularly important to learn more 
about its role in affect regulation processes over time.  
Almost all studies employed the clarity subscale of the TMMS or translated versions 
respectively as a measure of trait clarity (e.g., German version by Otto, Doering-Seipel, Grebe, 
& Lantermann, 2001; Spanish version by Fernández-Berrocal, Extremera, & Ramos, 2004). This 
instrument captures a quite global evaluation of whether individuals think to be usually clear 
about their affective experience. This requires self-insight, is affected by social desirability bias 
and often made without recalling any trait-relevant behavior or experience (Robinson & 
Neighbors, 2006). In this sense, it would be promising to study emotional clarity not only via 
self-report but also with more indirect measures. To this date, this was only done by Lischetzke 
et al. (2005; 2011).  
Altogether, very little is known about emotional clarity apart from its associations to 
other constructs. No study at all employed some kind of training intervention aiming at the 
enhancement of emotional clarity. This is remarkable with regard to the positive evaluation of 
the concepts that affective clarity is associated with. Furthermore, developing interventions that 
foster emotional clarity would help to gain a better understanding of it. There are training 
programs that engage in the enhancement of emotional intelligence (e.g. Brackett & Katulak, 
2007; Ciarrochi, Blackledge, Bilich, & Bayliss, 2007; Stohl, Dangerfield, Christensen, Justice, & 
Mottonen, 2007), but they include several components of EI in the same program so that it is not 
possible to conclude, which of the training modules were effective with respect to discrete 
components and which were not. Furthermore, none of the trainings explicitly included 
emotional clarity and none was evaluated with regard to this specific component of EI. 
Therefore, the aims of this thesis were to contribute to a bigger picture of what emotional 
clarity is. Specifically, it aimed at (a) developing trainings that can foster emotional clarity 
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(studies 1 and 2) and (b) exploring the role of affective clarity in affect regulation from a process 
perspective (studies 3 and 4). An additional goal of the intervention studies was to develop 
alternative instruments measuring emotional clarity. In the following, the methods that were 
utilized to investigate the research questions as well as the results are summarized. 
Enhancing Students’ Emotional Clarity by Training: An Intervention Study (Manuscript 1) 
Two studies with 178 university students investigated the question whether emotional 
clarity can be enhanced by training intervention. In both studies, two experimental interventions 
were compared with each other as well as with a control intervention. All trainings used 
activating constructive methods. In study 1, a direct and an indirect approach were realized. For 
the direct approach, an intervention that trains the skills defining clarity was developed. For that 
purpose, we designed exercises to increase the factual and experiential knowledge of two 
specific emotions and their distinctness with regard to associated feelings, sensations, thoughts 
and expressions. This was realized by providing information, inducing these emotions and 
requesting the participants to describe their experiences (Ekman, 2003). For the indirect 
approach, the participants took part in a mindfulness intervention, as mindfulness is positively 
associated with emotional clarity (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2006). We 
therefore developed an intervention with formal meditation practices like walking meditation 
and sitting meditation as well as an informal mindfulness meditation as it can be practiced 
throughout the day in everyday life. Both trainings lasted for one hour.  
In study 2, both interventions aimed at indirectly enhancing affective clarity. This time, a 
mindfulness training and a self-reflection training were implemented. The self-reflection 
approach followed the idea that introspection and structured self-reflection should enhance the 
ability to label and to clearly talk about the own emotions (Lyubomirski, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 
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2006; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). To foster solution-focused self-regulation, the participants 
trained self-reflection by reflecting on objects and their meaning to the ideal and the real self as 
well as on a distressing experience. Furthermore, the training provided knowledge about the 
distinction between rumination and constructive reflection as well as guiding questions for 
systematic reflection. With regard to mindfulness, formal as well as informal meditations were 
chosen again to practice it. Compared to study 1, the training duration was extended to 3 hours 
and divided into two sessions of one and a half hours each. This should foster the elaboration of 
the training contents and their transfer to everyday life.  
In both studies, the interventions were evaluated with (a) self-report instruments of state 
as well as trait emotional clarity, (b) an indirect measure of affective clarity, (c) certainty ratings 
and (d) an emotion recognition test. (a) In study 1, the subscale clarity of the TMMS (Salovey et 
al., 1995) was applied to assess trait experience. Its items were adapted to ask for state 
experience; that way a self-report scale of state emotional clarity was developed. For the study 2, 
new self-report scales were developed to cover a broader definition of emotional clarity by 
utilizing matching items from other scales that capture affective clarity (Gohm & Clore, 2000). 
(b) To measure emotional clarity indirectly, the participants were requested to label their 
affective state, to describe their affective experience in detail and to describe the source of their 
affective state. Two independent judges rated the answers with regard to how accurate and how 
matching they were. (c) Additionally, we asked for the participants’ certainty regarding their 
answers. By this, we followed an idea of Otto et al. (2001) and Lischetzke et al. (2005). (d) 
Finally, an emotion recognition test was applied, because theoretical considerations as well as 
empirical results suggest that affective clarity is positively associated with the performance in 
such tests (Otto et al., 2001). Here, we adapted a test procedure used by Otto et al. (2001; 
pictures by Merten, 2003; 2005).  
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The results of study 1 show that both experimental groups indicated significant changes 
from pre- to posttest on the within-group level, while the control group did not. The 
experimental groups changed significantly on different instruments. On the between-groups 
level, a significant difference between the group that participated in the direct intervention 
clarity and the control group was found in the emotion recognition test; the group clarity 
significantly increased their performance in this test whereas the control group hardly changed. 
In study 2, no significant changes from before to after the interventions were found for the 
experimental groups. On the between-groups level, the experimental groups tended to differ 
significantly from the control group with regard to their accuracy of the provided affect 
information (indirect measure). The control group reported a marginal decrease, whereas the 
experimental groups indicated marginal increases. Altogether, study 1 gives tentative support to 
the idea that affective clarity is improvable by intervention.  
The Role of Emotional Clarity in Affect Regulation: A Process Perspective 
(Manuscripts 2 and 3) 
We conducted two quasi-experimental studies with 258 participants to investigate the 
relation of emotional clarity to affect before and after an affect induction as well as after a 
recovery period. In study 4, we additionally explored the relation after re-induction of affect. 
Whereas we studied the specific emotion anxiety in study 3, we investigated global positive and 
negative affect in study 4. In both studies, the following procedure was applied: At the 
beginning, the participants rated their dispositional clarity, their state clarity (both by self-
developed instruments; cf. study 2) and their momentary level of anxiety (study 3; subscale state 
anxiety of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; German 
version by Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981) or positive and negative affect 
(study 4; Positive and Negative Affective Schedule; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; German 
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version by Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996). Subsequently, they were exposed to an 
affect induction. To induce anxiety (study 3), the participants saw a clip of the movie “The 
silence of the Lambs” (Hewig, Hagemann, Seifert, Gollwitzer, Naumann, & Bartussek, 2005). In 
study 4, negative affect was induced by asking the participants to complete an intelligence test 
that consisted of mostly unsolvable problems (Langens, 2006). Right after the induction, the 
participants again rated their state clarity and their affective state. In study 3, a three-minute 
recovery phase followed, after which state clarity and anxiety were measured a third time. In 
study 4, state clarity and affect were collected for the third time at a second experimental day. 
Right after that, negative affect was re-induced in the participants with a test parallel to the first 
one. To test for differences in habituation, the momentary levels of positive and negative affect 
as well as emotional clarity were measured after the re-induction for a fourth time. 
With regard to trait clarity, both studies showed consistent results. The participants were 
classified as high in dispositional clarity and low in dispositional clarity with respect to the 
median on this variable. In the beginning of the experiments, the High Clarity and the Low 
Clarity group significantly differed from each other. The persons with high dispositional clarity 
reported more positive affect and less negative affect and anxiety than the persons with low trait 
clarity. With regard to affect after the induction, no significant differences between groups were 
found when baseline affect was taken into account. After the recovery period, the groups 
significantly differed with regard to negative affect and anxiety respectively when the prior 
affect ratings were accounted for. The high clarity persons indicated a slightly greater decrease 
from before to after the recovery period in negative affect and anxiety than the low clarity 
persons. With regard to habituation, study 4 found no difference between groups regarding 
positive or negative affect.  
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With respect to state emotional clarity, the results are a bit more heterogeneous. In both 
studies, the relation of state clarity to trait clarity was positive, significant correlation indices 
ranging from .50 to .71. Both studies also confirmed the positive relation of momentary clarity to 
positive affect and the negative association with negative affect and anxiety. However, the level 
of state clarity unexpectedly hardly changed in the course of both experiments.  
Discussion 
The aim of this project was to contribute to a broader picture of emotional clarity. Four 
studies were conducted to answer two research questions: (a) Is it possible to enhance emotional 
clarity by training intervention, and (b) what is the role of emotional clarity in affect regulation? 
An additional goal was to develop alternative instruments measuring emotional clarity. In the 
following, the results are discussed with respect to the research questions. The discussion 
concludes with a consideration of limitations and future perspectives.  
Research Question 1: Is it Possible to Enhance Emotional Clarity Through Intervention? 
With regard to the first research question, the here presented studies were the first dealing 
with the development of training interventions aiming at the enhancement of emotional clarity. 
Therefore, three different approaches were tested, of which one was direct and two were indirect. 
These interventions were kept short to allow for clear conclusions about the interventions’ 
effectiveness with regard to the exclusive enhancement of emotional clarity as one specific 
aspect of EI. This is in contrast to other EI interventions, which train several EI components with 
a variety of exercises so that it remains unclear which of the training components are effective 
and which are not. The interventions’ effectiveness was evaluated not only by a self-report 
measure of trait emotional clarity, but also with direct and indirect measures of state clarity as 
well as an external criterion. 
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What have we learned with regard to the first question? Study 1 gives small support to 
the idea that affective clarity is possible to enhance by training intervention. With an intervention 
duration of one hour only, significant changes of the experimental groups on the within-group 
level were found. Study 2 brought no encouragement for the hypothesis that affective clarity can 
be fostered by training. The reason for that probably lies in the interventions’ focus on affect 
regulation and distress rather than on affective clarity. This modification had been implemented 
to improve the participants’ motivation to actively take part in the training by better illustrating 
the benefit from and the application of emotional clarity. Together, it seems promising to follow 
up the intervention concepts that were applied in study 1, that is, the direct intervention clarity 
and a mindfulness training.  
With somewhat longer durations of the training interventions it could be possible to 
effect greater changes within groups that also differ significantly from that in a control group. 
The here realized duration of one hour left very little time to go into the subject of emotions. It 
was obvious that the participants, who took part in the training as a course requirement, were 
very sceptical in the beginning and had problems to make themselves familiar with the sensitive 
subject, the other participants and the trainers. Future interventions should take some time for 
that. Moreover, it is probable that affective clarity as a trait variable is not easy to change 
(Salovey et al., 1995; Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2006) and that learning processes continue to work 
after the interventions have ended (Kirkpatrick, 1998). Therefore, future studies should realize a 
follow up measurement some months after the training to test for changes in emotional clarity 
after the intervention.  
Structured diaries could help to support learning processes that were initiated by the 
trainings (e.g. Perels, Otto, Landmann, Hertel, & Schmitz, 2007) and to transfer training contents 
to everyday life. In study 2, the participants received such diaries that asked for emotion-laden 
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situations, use of strategies and conclusions for the period of the week between the two 
intervention sessions. Future studies should employ diaries not only during intervention time but 
also some weeks after that. The data gained by the diaries could be used also for evaluation as 
they allow for time series analyses (e.g. Perels et al., 2007) and offer information about how 
affective clarity developed. By this, it would be possible to explore the development of 
emotional clarity from before to directly after the intervention and in the time after the 
intervention. 
However, one has to keep in mind that the self-report measures deployed in study 2 were 
newly developed. It is therefore uncertain whether the trainings in study 2 did not effect changes 
or whether the instruments could not map them. Because both scales exclusively consist of items 
from validated scales of emotional clarity, it is not probable that the instruments are less 
sensitive to differences than the original scales. Nevertheless, further research has to prove the 
instruments’ sensitivity to changes. All deployed measures will be discussed in detail in the third 
section of the discussion. 
Research Question 2: What is the Role of Emotional Clarity in Affect Regulation? 
To investigate the second research question, that is, the role of emotional clarity in affect 
regulation, we conducted two quasi-experimental studies with multiple data points. In study 4, 
four measurement points were implemented to investigate the affect not only before and after an 
affect induction but also before and after a re-induction, which was done that systematically for 
the first time. Again, we utilized measures of trait as well as of state clarity, which was only 
realized by Lischetzke et al. (2005; 2011) before. State clarity was collected as a process variable 
at all data points.  
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What have we learned with regard to the second research question? Interestingly, we 
found consistent results in both studies despite of the differences in the implemented affect 
induction, the deployed affect measures and the duration of recovery periods. We could confirm 
previous research with regard to the significant relation of affective clarity to negative affect 
after a recovery period when prior affect was accounted for. In connection with previous 
research, the results indicate that persons high in clarity are better in recovering from induced 
negative affect than those low in clarity.  
No evidence was found for a greater reactivity of persons high in clarity to affect 
induction. Some previous studies found evidence for this greater reactivity (Fernández-Berrocal 
& Extremera, 2006, anger condition; Salovey et al., 2002) whereas some did not (Fernández-
Berrocal et al., 2006, sadness and amusement conditions; Salovey et al., 1995). Thus, an 
interesting question for future research could be to investigate the conditions when this relation 
is found and when it is not.  
We also found no evidence for differences between persons high and low in clarity with 
regard to habituation. Though this was congruently found in the two studies investigating this 
question formerly, the theoretical considerations speak in favour of such a relation. The results of 
Salovey et al. (1995) that high and low clarity persons significantly differed in their decline of 
ruminative thought within the first 30 minutes after a distressing experience suggest that persons 
high in clarity are not necessarily better but rather faster in integrating a stressful event into their 
cognitive schemata than persons low in clarity (Horowitz, 1997). Based on the idea that the 
degree of habituation corresponds with the degree of how much a stressful experience was 
integrated in existing cognitive schemata (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000), it therefore might be 
possible to find a significant difference between high and low clarity persons with regard to 
habituation if a shorter recovery phase of some minutes would be realized.   
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At the beginning of the experiments significant differences between groups regarding 
affect were found. This was consistently found for global positive and negative affect as well as 
the specific emotion anxiety. Though contradictory to previous research with comparable design, 
this is in line with the constantly found significant correlations of affective clarity to affect in 
correlational studies.  
With regard to state clarity, we found the expected associations to trait clarity and affect. 
The finding that the participants’ state clarity hardly changed in the course of the two 
experiments, whereas the participants indicated significant changes in affect with every data 
point, was surprising and needs further exploration. It is in contrast to the result of Lischetzke et 
al. (2005), who found that state clarity significantly decreased after an induction and 
significantly increased again after the recovery period. This might have two reasons.   
On the one hand, in the study of Lischetzke et al. (2005) mixed affect was induced, 
whereas unambiguous affect was induced in the present studies. As Lischetzke et al. point out, it 
should be particularly difficult to become clear about the own affect, when the situation induces 
both positive and negative affective stimuli. Correspondingly, they found that their measure of 
emotional clarity was positively related to an index of mixed affect. In this sense, significant 
changes in state clarity might be easier to find if the induced affect is rather mixed than 
unambiguous. 
On the other hand, Lischetzke et al. (2005) measured state clarity indirectly by employing 
the persons’ response latencies to state affect items. As described above, self-reports are often 
made without effectively recalling relevant behavior or experience (Robinson & Neigbors, 
2006). That suggests that persons who perceive themselves as generally being very clear about 
their feelings, would probably agree to the statement “I know exactly how I am feeling.” and yet 
might have problems to actually rate their affective state. An indirect measure of emotional 
PART 1: SYNOPSIS 
17 
 
clarity is not biased by such global self-evaluations and therefore should be more sensitive to 
changes in actual state affective clarity. Future studies investigating the role of affective clarity 
therefore should profit from the utilization of an indirect measure in addition to self-report 
measures.  
Additional Goal: Developing Measures of Emotional Clarity 
For the present research, several instruments were deployed to measure not only trait 
emotional clarity but also state emotional clarity by self-report and more indirect measures and 
an external criterion. Therefore, a self-report scale of state clarity and an indirect measure of 
emotional clarity were developed and optimized; furthermore, certainty ratings and an emotion 
recognition test were adapted from previous research (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Otto et al., 2001). 
Moreover, a new self-report scale of trait emotional clarity was developed to cover a broader 
definition of the concept than the well-used subscale of the TMMS (Salovey et al., 1995).  
The indirect measure of emotional clarity was implemented in studies 1 and 2. The 
participants were asked to label their affective state and to describe their feelings, sensations, 
thoughts and impulses as well as the source of their affective state. By this, we requested from 
the participants to explicitly apply the abilities they report to have according to the self-report 
measures. The idea was that persons who are clear about their affective experience should 
provide more accurate and detailed information regarding their affective experience than less 
clear ones. Moreover, the labeled affective state and the description of the affective experience 
and the described source of high clarity individuals should fit to each other. Accordingly, two 
independent judges rated the participants’ answers with respect to how accurate and detailed and 
to how matching the descriptions were. This instrument has all advantages over self-report 
measures that were described above. Compared to the instrument by Lischetzke et al. (2005), it 
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assesses more aspects of clarity. Whereas the present indirect measure covers the ability to label 
and to describe the own affective experience and its source, the one by Lischetzke et al. only 
captures the ability to label one’s own affective state - or rather to do that quickly. Moreover, the 
present approach in contrast to that of Lischetzke et al. does not depend on the availability of 
specialized software for the exact measurement of response latencies. On the other hand, 
assessing the response latencies is a completely objective measure, whereas the present method 
relies on the judgement of two raters. Moreover, the rating procedure is complex and time-
consuming; the final interrater reliabilities were adequate but needed two rating sessions. In this 
sense, both approaches have their pros and are worth further studying. In particular, the present 
approach needs further research with regard to the instrument’s properties and validity as well as 
to its ability to map changes, whereas that by Lischetzke et al. already proofed good 
psychometric properties (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Lischetzke et al., 2011).  
Further research is also necessary on the psychometric properties and in particular the 
sensitivity to changes of the newly developed self-report measures of state and trait clarity, 
which were used in the studies 2, 3 and 4. Both measures were not able to map significant 
changes in affective clarity. This might be due to lack of meaningful changes, but it remains 
unclear whether the instruments are capable of mapping changes. Apart from that, the internal 
consistence of both instruments was good in all three studies. Both scales were correlated with 
each other and with various affect measures in the expected way. With regard to trait clarity, the 
associations to affect measures before and after the manipulations were consistent with the 
literature and previous empirical data. Moreover, the groups’ means indicated that the two 
instruments adequately distinguished between trait and state experience.  
Another instrument that was deployed in studies 1 and 2 to assess affective clarity on a 
state level was the degree of certainty with regard to the information provided in the indirect 
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measure. By this, we followed an idea of Lischetzke et al. (2005) that greater clarity about the 
own affective state should lead to greater certainty concerning the own affect ratings. Though 
more indirect than a questionnaire, Lischetzke et al. classified the measure as a self-report 
instrument. In fact, it does not rely on the ability to report on the own affective clarity but still 
requires self-insight and is probably prone to social desirability bias. In the present research, the 
measure indicated changes within the group mindfulness in study 1. In studies 1 and 2, it 
suggested validity by correlating significantly with the self-report measures of emotional clarity 
in a positive manner. Moreover, the measure is very easy to administer. However, one has to 
keep in mind that this instrument cannot be applied alone but always together with another 
measure and therefore is always given in the context of this other instrument. Thus, it is unclear 
how comparable different certainty measures like the one presented here and the one presented 
by Lischetzke et al. (2005; 2011) are. Together, this instrument is worth further studying as an 
alternative measure of affective clarity. 
Finally, we measured the ability to recognize emotions in other peoples’ faces as external 
criterion in studies 1 and 2. This approach based on the idea that people can identify emotions in 
others, because they unconsciously imitate other persons’ emotional expressions, and that 
persons high in clarity should be better in correctly identifying the feeling that was induced by 
imitation (Frith, 2009; Otto et al., 2001). Consequently, Otto et al. found a small but significant 
correlation between emotional clarity and the performance in an emotion recognition test (r = 
.17, p = .05). However, in both present studies the performance in the emotion recognition test 
was unrelated to trait and state self-report measures of affective clarity. Hence, future studies 
should rely on measures of well-being, mental and physical health, social adjustment or affect, 
which are all positively related to affective clarity, as external criteria (e.g. Kotsou, Nelis, 
Gregoire, & Mikolajczak, 2011).  
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Limitations 
Most participants were students, mainly psychology students. Therefore, it is possible 
that the results are not valid for students of other subjects or non-students. It rather seems that 
young students are not the most suitable sample to conduct research on emotional clarity with. In 
the first training study (study 1) the trainers received the impression that the students did not see 
a need to improve their emotional clarity; they obviously perceived no problems with their 
affective clarity in everyday life. Therefore, it might be promising to work with persons who see 
a benefit in dealing with emotional clarity because they daily rely on it, like for example teachers 
(Brackett & Katulak, 2007). This is of course particularly relevant for training studies.  
Nevertheless, the idea that young students do not experience themselves as having 
deficits in affective clarity has implications also to the usefulness of self-report measures. As 
discussed above, they reflect a global self-evaluation that might not be congruent with the 
effective ability. In fact, Lischetzke et al. (2005; 2011) found only small to moderate 
convergence between self-reported affective clarity and indirectly measured clarity (rs = .15 - 
.25, ps > .10 and < .05). Therefore, it is important to investigate emotional clarity not only with 
self-report instruments but also with indirect measures. Insofar, another limit of the here 
presented research is that studies 3 and 4 exclusively are based on self-report scales.  
Conclusion and Future Perspectives 
In view of the important role of emotional clarity in affect regulation and its positive 
associations with eligible variables in the field of health and life satisfaction, the concept is 
worth a more comprehensive investigation than realized in most previous studies. The present 
research contributes to that by developing four training approaches to enhance emotional clarity 
(studies 1 and 2). Furthermore, it explores the role of emotional clarity in affect regulation in two 
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quasi-experimental studies with multiple data points that deploy not only measures of trait clarity 
but also of state clarity (studies 3 and 4). Finally, alternative measures of emotional clarity 
assessing trait and state experience via self-report and indirect instruments were developed.  
The training studies give little support to the idea that relatively short training 
interventions can enhance emotional clarity. The approaches of study 1 to train the defining 
abilities of emotional clarity directly and to train mindfulness seem to be the most promising. 
Empirically, the group that participated in the mindfulness training showed a significant increase 
in emotional clarity on some of the measures. From a theoretical point of view mindfulness 
should virtually involve emotional clarity. However, one has to keep in mind that mindfulness is 
not easy to grasp and even more difficult to apply in everyday behavior and experience. Also the 
group that participated in the intervention that trains the abilities defining emotional clarity, 
which might be seen as a more technical approach, showed significant increases on some 
measures of emotional clarity. From a theoretical perspective, this approach should provide a 
basis for enhancing emotional clarity by offering factual and experiential knowledge about 
emotions and associated feelings, sensations and forms of expression. Based on this, it is 
probably essential that the probands deliberately practice to identify, label and describe their 
affective experience and its source in their individual daily routine. It is conceivable that such 
practice requires enhanced attention to one’s own emotional experience and situational cues 
eliciting the affective experience. Without doing so, it should be difficult to become clear about 
it (Brown & Ryan, 2003). As this is what mindfulness means, future trainings studies should 
profit from a combination of both approaches.  
As both approaches supposably require extensive and deliberate practice by the 
participants, it appears explainable that the trainings developed in study 2 had no effect on 
emotional clarity as they put focus on distress and its regulation rather than on emotional clarity. 
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If the participants did not explicitly know that they should improve their emotional clarity they 
hence would not be able to practice it deliberately. Apart from explicitly focusing emotional 
clarity, future trainings should also benefit from an extended training duration and the 
distribution of the training on at least two sessions. That would allow to further elaborate the 
training contents and to build on the practice and experience the participants gained in the 
meantime. Improvement of emotional clarity could be further fostered by diaries, which ask 
participants for emotional situations, use of strategies and insights on a daily basis. This way, the 
diaries would support deliberate practice. For evaluation of the trainings’ effectiveness the 
diaries’ data should be analyzed with time series analyses; furthermore, a follow up 
measurement should be realized. This could capture increases in emotional clarity that took place 
after the training interventions.  
Future studies should take place outside the usual class schedule and work with 
volunteers who constantly depend on their emotional clarity. This should be especially the case 
for therapists and other persons working in social counselling. These persons should be able to 
consciously identify emotions elicited in them by clients while these talk about their concerns. 
This would allow them to make therapeutic use of the information that is transported by the 
emotions (Schwarz, 1990). Also teachers should be clear about emotions elicited by a student’s 
attributes or behavior in order to be able to separate emotions from facts when evaluating a test 
or a presentation. Bracket & Katulak (2007) point out that teachers experience a wide range of 
emotions while teaching and interacting with students and that those having problems regulating 
their emotions tend to have students who experience more negative emotions. As emotional 
clarity is beneficial to effective affect regulation (e.g. Lischetzke et al., 2005), teachers should 
hence especially depend on emotional clarity.  
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Studies with persons who see a personal need for dealing with emotional clarity would 
have two major advances: First, they would be very motivated to take part in the training, and 
second, they would have situations available, in which they have problems with their emotional 
clarity. These situations could be used to apply the training strategies to concrete cases that have 
reference to the participants’ daily life. This would foster the illustration of the strategies’ 
application and would ease the transfer from the training situation to everyday life. 
With regard to the role of emotional clarity within affect regulation, studies 3 and 4 
confirmed previous research with regard to individual differences between persons high and low 
in trait emotional clarity (e.g. Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Lischetzke et al., 2005; 
Salovey et al., 1995). Persons with high trait clarity generally reported more positive affect and 
less negative affect and anxiety than persons with low trait clarity. Furthermore, the former 
demonstrated advantages in recovery from induced negative affect and anxiety compared to the 
latter. However, research on state emotional clarity is necessary to further investigate the role of 
emotional clarity from a process perspective. This would allow to explore in more detail how 
emotional clarity is associated with affect before and after affect induction and after a recovery 
period. State measures would also help to capture small changes affected by short training 
interventions.  
In studies 2 to 4, a newly developed self-report measure of state emotional clarity was 
utilized. However, the probands’ state emotional clarity hardly changed in all studies, although it 
was measured at two, three and even four measurement points. It is unlikely, that the state 
emotional clarity did not change over multiple data points that were partly realized on different 
days. This suggests that the self-report measure was not able to map changes in effective state 
emotional clarity and that the concept should not be measured exclusively by self-report. This 
idea is supported by general criticism on self-report instruments in respect to the finding that 
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these measures do not necessarily rely on relevant behavior or experience (e.g. Robinson & 
Neighbors, 2006). Therefore, future studies should include indirect and unbiased measures 
assessing the effective abilities defining clarity. The indirect measure presented in studies 1 and 
2 might be an interesting option as it captures several aspects of emotional clarity. However, it 
requires further studying. Another option is the indirect measure of Lischetzke et al. (2005; 
2011) that already proved predictive validity and sensitivity to changes. It covers only one aspect 
of emotional clarity, though. 
Apart from that, it would be interesting to implement even more data points, especially in 
the recovery period, and to analyze them with time series analyses (e.g., Schmitz, 1989) in order 
to get a better picture of how both state emotional clarity and the affective state change. It would 
be especially interesting to utilize time-lagged correlations. From a theoretical point of view, 
emotional clarity should be a prerequisite for effective affect regulation and therefore should be 
present first (Lichetzke et al., 2005). Time-lagged correlations would allow to determine the time 
lag between two data points at which the association between emotional clarity and affect would 
be the greatest.  
Research on emotional clarity should also benefit from exploring situations in that it is 
relatively easy to be clear about one’s own affective state, and situations in that this is more 
difficult. Lischetzke et al. (2005) argued that it should be especially difficult to become clear 
about one’s own affect in situations that induce “mixed affect”, that is, a mixture of both positive 
and negative affect. Correspondingly, the indirectly measured emotional clarity decreased in 
their study after the induction of such mixed affect. More generally, the emotional clarity 
presumably increases with higher apparentness and clearness of the situational cues, which elicit 
the affective state. Correspondingly, it supposedly decreases with higher ambiguity and less 
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evidence of these cues. A therapy session, for example, does not necessarily induce mixed affect 
but contains a variety of cues that might not be apparent on first sight.  
With regard to measures of emotional clarity, this research developed a variety of 
alternatives. To be able to cover a broader definition of emotional clarity than the well-used 
clarity subscale of the TMMS (Salovey et al., 1995) does, a new self-report scale of trait 
emotional clarity was created. Also a new self-report scale of state emotional clarity that 
assesses all aspects of this broader definition was developed. Furthermore, an indirect measure 
was designed that captures many aspects of emotional clarity. This is in contrast to the indirect 
instrument by Lischetzke et al., (2005; 2011), which only measures the ability to label one’s own 
affective state. As discussed above, all new measures need further studying with respect to their 
validity and their sensitivity to changes. As self-report and indirect measures of the same 
construct are typically only weakly to moderately correlated (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003; 
Robinson & Neighbors, 2006), future studies that engage in the validation of measures of 
emotional clarity should especially analyze their ability to predict relevant outcomes (Lischetzke 
et al., 2005). 
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Abstract 
Emotional clarity, defined as the ability to label, describe, and distinguish among one’s 
own emotions, has been consistently found to be beneficial to affect regulation, well-being, and 
psychological health (Lischetzke, Angelova, & Eid, 2011). Thus, it is surprising that no research 
has yet engaged in the enhancement of affective clarity. The present research aimed to fill this 
gap by developing trainings that foster emotional clarity. In two studies with 178 university 
students, four short trainings were evaluated and compared to a control group using various 
measures of emotional clarity. In Study 1, both experimental groups reported significant within-
group changes on some of the measures. In Study 2, no significant changes were found. 
Altogether, the results give small support to the idea that emotional clarity can be enhanced by 
training. Further research is required to explore the optimal duration and focus of trainings and to 
optimize and validate measures of clarity.  
 
Keywords: emotional clarity, training intervention 
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Introduction 
Emotional clarity is defined as the ability to identify, describe, and distinguish among 
one’s own emotions (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). Since Salovey et al. 
(1995) reported that persons high in emotional clarity are more likely to recover from induced 
negative mood than low clarity persons, growing interest has led to a number of studies that have 
consistently found emotional clarity to be beneficial to affect regulation, well-being, and 
psychological health (Lischtzke, Angelova, & Eid, 2011). Therefore, the concept seems worth 
further study.  
However, most research has been based on correlational data only. No studies at all have 
been published yet with regard to the enhancement of emotional clarity. This is surprising in 
view of the concept’s beneficial associations with variables that can be considered to be related 
to quality of life. There are training concepts aimed at the enhancement of emotional intelligence 
(EI), but they foster several EI components at once so that it is not possible to evaluate which 
training moduls are effective with regard to which EI components. None of these trainings 
contain moduls that are aimed explicitly at the enhancement of emotional clarity as one aspect of 
trait EI (Salovey et al., 1995; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002). Moreover, with the 
exception of the studies by Lischetzke and colleagues (Lischetzke, Cuccodoro, Todeschini, & 
Eid, 2005; Lischetzke et al., 2011), all research on emotional clarity has been based on self-
report scales of trait emotional clarity, mostly the subscale clarity by Salovey and colleagues. In 
this sense, almost all research has built on a quite global self-evaluation of what the participants 
think about the usual clarity of their affective experience (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). In 
summary, very little is known about affective clarity apart from its associations with other 
concepts.  
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Therefore, the present experimental research aimed to further explore emotional clarity. 
The first goal was to fill the research gap with respect to the enhancement of emotional clarity. 
As the concept has consistently been shown to be beneficial to affect regulation, health, and 
well-being, the present study engaged in the development of training interventions that foster 
affective clarity. Consequently, a second goal was to evaluate the trainings with regard to their 
effectiveness and to question which intervention serves this goal best. An additional goal was to 
search for and develop direct and indirect measures of affective clarity as a state variable. State 
measures are more sensitive to changes than trait measures (Zuckerman, 1983) and therefore 
should be able to capture training effects better. Indirect measures should be applied to avoid 
dependence on self-insight (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). Before describing the method 
utilized to answer the research questions, we want to give an overview about what is known 
about emotional clarity, its enhancement, and its measurement so far.  
Emotional clarity is an important characteristic of meta-mood experience, which refers to 
reflective processes that go along with most affective states (Salovey et al., 1995). Mayer and 
Gaschke (1988) showed that individuals not only experience their affective states but also 
monitor, evaluate, and regulate them. Whereas Mayer and Gaschke (1988) focused on moment-
by-moment changes in reflections about ongoing mood (state meta-moods), Salovey et al. (1995) 
concentrated on more stable attitudes (trait meta-mood). 3  
                                                
3 Kokkonen & Pulkkinen (2001) point out that Mayer and colleagues use the term “meta-
experience of mood” (Mayer & Stevens, 1994) as well as “meta-experience of emotion“ (Mayer 
& Salovey, 1995) and do not seem to distinguish sharply between the concepts of emotion and 
mood. 
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The ability to reflect upon and regulate one’s emotions is an important aspect of 
emotional intelligence (Salovey et al., 2002). Because it is measured by self-report, Salovey and 
colleagues (2002) argue that it should be considered “beliefs about emotional intelligence” or 
perceived EI rather than emotional intelligence per se, which is measured by performance tests. 
With this, they are in line with Petrides and Furnham (2000, 2001), who proposed a consequent 
distinction between trait EI, which is measured by self-report and embedded within a personality 
framework, and ability EI, which is assessed with maximum-performance tests in the tradition of 
cognitive intelligence tests.  
As mentioned above, emotional clarity is correlated with a variety of variables that are 
related to quality of life. Significant positive relations have been found, for example, with life 
satisfaction (Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2005; Palmer, Donaldson, & Stough, 2002), 
well-being and an adaptive style of coping (Gohm & Clore, 2002), lower cortisol release during 
stress (Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002), and self-reported ability to repair negative 
affect (Lischetzke & Eid, 2003; Salovey et al., 1995; Salovey et al., 2002). Negative correlations 
have been reported for anxiety and depression (Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2006) as well 
as distress (Salovey et al., 1995). Moreover, emotional clarity has been consistently linked to 
greater positive and less negative affect (e.g., Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Mayer & Stevens, 
1994; Ramos, Fernández-Berrocal, & Extremera, 2007).  
Most authors postulate that these relations are mediated by affect regulation: Salovey and 
colleagues (1995) propose that individuals who are emotionally clear do not need to engage in 
prolonged rumination in order to figure out what they feel exactly and therefore can turn their 
attentional resources toward effective affect management. Similarly, Lischetzke and colleagues 
(2005) as well as Wilkowski and Robinson (2008), based on cybernatic models of affect 
regulation (e.g., Larsen, 2000), suggest that high emotional clarity permits the individual to 
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recognize an undesirable level or kind of affective state early and so to implement appropriate 
regulation strategies before too much time has passed. In line with these ideas, studies that 
measured affect before and after an affect induction and after a recovery phase have consistenly 
reported that individuals high in clarity indicate lower levels of negative affect after the recovery 
phase than those low in clarity when prior affect ratings were taken into account (Fernández-
Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Lischetzke et al., 2005; Salovey et al., 1995).  
Affective clarity has also been linked to performance. Grässer (2003) studied the effect of 
clarity on tennis players’ performance and found that low emotional clarity was correlated with a 
higher probability for performance variation in connection with inappropriate motivational 
states. Otto, Döring-Seipel, and Lantermann (2002) investigated the effects of emotional clarity 
on problem solving in a complex environment. Subjects with a high clarity disposition used 
more appropriate problem-solving strategies and showed better performance than subjects low in 
clarity. Thereby, clarity predicted performance independent of processing capacity as an 
indicator of cognitive intelligence. 
Enhancement of Emotional Clarity 
With regard to the enhancement of emotional clarity, no studies dealing with this topic 
have been published yet. There are training programs designed to improve emotional intelligence 
(e.g., Brackett & Katulak, 2007; Ciarrochi, Blackledge, Bilich, & Bayliss, 2007; Stohl, 
Dangerfield, Christensen, Justice, & Mottonen, 2007), and most of them include exercises 
designed to enhance abilities that have some overlap with emotional clarity (perception of 
emotion and understanding of emotion in Brackett & Katulak, 2007; identifying emotions and 
understanding emotions in Kornacki & Caruso., 2007; emotional awareness in Ciarrochi et al., 
2007; emotional self-awareness in Stohl et al., 2007). However, none of these programs was 
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explicitly designed to enhance affective clarity and none was evaluated with regard to this 
specific component of EI. These programs rather train sets of abilities and thus contain many 
different exercises that aim at various components of emotional intelligence so that it remains 
unclear which of the training components are effective with respect to discrete components and 
which are not. It was therefore the aim of this study to develop a short training intervention that 
focuses exclusively on increasing participants’ affective clarity.  
Basically, one might distinguish a direct approach from indirect approaches to foster 
affective clarity. Our direct approach aims to enhance the concrete skills that define emotional 
clarity, that is, the ability to identify, describe, and distinguish among one’s own emotions. For 
this purpose, knowledge about emotions should be taught to the participants (Ekman, 2003; 
Saarni, 2007). This knowledge should contain information about feelings, sensations, thoughts, 
and forms of expression that are associated with the emotions. Furthermore, the participants 
should not only learn theoretically about emotions but should also experience them so that 
practical learning is possible (Ekman, 2003). By describing their experiences with the terms that 
were learned theoretically, the participants should learn to describe what they are feeling and to 
label these feelings. Also, the ability to distinguish between emotions should be trained. The 
latter could be further fostered by working out the differences between specific emotions from a 
theoretical as well as a practical perspective. This is especially important for such emotions that 
are easily confounded.  
As an indirect approach, mindfulness training appears a promising way to increase 
emotional clarity. Mindfulness is defined as conscious attention to and awareness of one’s 
ongoing subjective experience. Most authors further emphasize a nonjudgmental, accepting 
attitude toward this experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Grossmann, Niemann, Schmidt, & 
Walach, 2004; Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007). Enhanced attention and awareness can be spent 
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on one’s own thoughts, emotions, and feelings as well as things in the environment, other 
persons, and tasks. For example, when drinking a glass of water, one can be highly attentive to 
the taste experience, the water running down one’s throat, and the increasing fullness in one’s 
stomach. This receptive awareness can be contrasted with consciousness that is restricted in 
some way, for example, by rumination, absorption in the past, anxieties about the future, or 
simply by behaving automatically. Thereby, mindfulness offers a pure record of what is taking 
place.  
How do mindfulness and emotional clarity relate to each other? One could postulate that 
mindfulness quasi-implies affective clarity. If awareness of an individual’s affective experience 
is enhanced (i.e., of affective states, the triggering situations, the accompanying feelings, 
sensations, and cognitions), then the person should be clear about what he or she is feeling and 
why. With a growing routine of paying attention to one’s own affective experience, the ability to 
describe what is taking place should increase also. In line with this idea, Nielsen and Kaszniak 
(2006) suggest that years of meditation training4—which means years of training the attention to 
focus on one’s own emotional states and their discrete components, how they appear, change, 
and disappear—should lead to an increased ability to discriminate emotional phenomena in 
everyday life. Correspondingly, Nielsen et al. (2006) reported that long-term meditators with 
more than 10 years of meditation practice report greater emotional clarity than controls. Among 
meditators, years of practice was positively correlated with clarity, although not significantly. 
However, a significant relation was found by Brown et al. (2003): In three studies with 
psychology students, mindfulness was significantly related to affective clarity (rs = .45 - .50).  
                                                
4 Here, meditation means a formal way of practicing mindfulness. 
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Another promising approach with respect to the indirect enhancement of affective clarity 
is to foster one’s ability to reflect on the self, one’s own actions, and one’s own experience. Self-
reflection refers to self-focused attention that can be directed to one’s thoughts, emotions, and 
actions as well as to the self (Phillips and Silvia, 2005; Silvia & Phillips, 2011). Thereby, 
research has shown contradictory results with regard to the benefit of analyzing one’s own 
emotions (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). On the one hand, understanding one’s own affective 
experiences after a distressing event fosters adaptive coping and is related to mental and physical 
health. On the other hand, the attempt to analyze one’s own affective experience can lead to 
rumination that usually goes along with an increase and prolongation of negative affect.  
To solve this paradox, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) proposed a distinction between a 
ruminative and a reflective type of self-focus and attained promising results. According to this 
idea, reflection refers to “reflections on the self motivated not by distress about the self but by 
epimistic curiosity, that is, pleasurable, intrinsic interest in abstract or philosophical thinking” (p. 
292), whereas the ruminative style is defined as “recurrent thinking or ruminations of the self 
prompted by threats, losses, or injustices to the self” (p. 292) and “uncontrollable problem 
‘scanning’ and analysis that is unproductively repetitive” (p. 295). We agree with Trapnell and 
Campbell that a reflective style, which is associated with improved affect as well as mental and 
physical health, should be explicitly distinguished from a ruminative style of self-attention that is 
unproductive and associated with increased and prolonged negative affect. In contrast to 
Trapnell and Campbell, we suggest that reflection can be motivated not only by epimistic 
curiosity but also by some kind of trigger such as a distressing event or the wish to develop and 
change. The important difference from rumination then is that the reflections are productive, 
goal-oriented, and solution-focused. By this, we follow the conception of self-reflection with 
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regard to how it is used in the context of coaching or brief solution-focused therapy (e.g., Grant, 
2003).  
How may self-reflection and emotional clarity relate to each other? One would assume 
that reflecting on one’s own affective experience, especially when this is done regularly, should 
lead to increased emotional clarity. Also a good knowledge of the real self, which refers to how a 
person actually is, acts, thinks, and feels, as well as the ideal self, which refers to how a person 
wants to be, should enhance the clarity of what one is feeling and why. However, to our 
knowledge, only Greif (2008) has explicitly addressed the relation between self-reflection and 
emotional clarity. He suggested that coaching, as guidance for solution-focused self-reflection, 
should help to increase emotional clarity. He refers to Grant (2003) who found that participants’ 
insight significantly increased from before to after a coaching program. Thereby, the insight 
scale (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002) shows interesting overlap with the clarity scale 
(Salovey et al., 1995); four out of eight items of the insight scale deal with the respondents’ 
affective experience and strongly resemble the items of the clarity scale. Accordingly, Grant et 
al. (2002) define insight as “the clarity of understanding of one’s thoughts, feelings and 
behavior” (p. 821).  
Some further support for the idea that solution-oriented self-reflection should foster 
emotional clarity comes from research on expressive writing. Writing about distressing or even 
traumatic experiences is benefical to affect, well-being, and health if the writing involves 
organizing, integrating, and analyzing the distressing experience in a solution-focused way, 
which resembles our idea of self-reflection (Esterling, L’Abate, Murray, & Pennebaker, 1999; 
Lyubomirski, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006). Lyubomirski et al. (2006) point out that writing (or 
talking) about distressing experiences also helps individuals to label and in turn to understand 
their emotions, which are core components of emotional clarity. This is in line with Salovey and 
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Mayer (1990), who postulated that learning about emotions depends in part upon speaking 
clearly about them, which in turn depends on the ability to introspect and to form coherent 
propositions on the basis of introspection.   
Measuring Emotional Clarity 
As mentioned above, almost all studies on emotional clarity are based on self-report 
measures. Most of these studies deployed the clarity subscale of the TMMS or translated 
versions respectively (e.g., German version by Otto, Doering-Seipel, Grebe, & Lantermann, 
2001; Spanish version by Fernández-Berrocal, Extremera, & Ramos, 2004), which capture quite 
a global evaluation of whether individuals believe they are usually clear about their affective 
experience.   
Self-report measures have a number of disadvantages. They require self-insight and rely 
on the ability to (verbally) report the construct of interest (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006; Lucas 
& Baird, 2006). Moreover, self-report judgments are affected by a social desirability bias and are 
made without recalling any trait-relevant behavior or experience (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). 
This suggests that persons who perceive themselves as generally being very clear about their 
feelings would probably agree with the statement “I am able to describe my present mood,” and 
yet might have problems actually describing their affective state when requested to do so. For 
these reasons, indirect (or implicit) instruments of emotional clarity, which measure performance 
that is related to the respective variable, should help to provide a more objective and less biased 
picture of an individual’s affective clarity. Furthermore, such a measure should be more sensitive 
to changes in momentary affective clarity because of its insusceptibility to biases. Again, 
Lischetzke and colleagues (2005, 2011) are the only ones to have developed and tested an 
indirect and objective instrument of emotional clarity by measuring the response latencies of 
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state affect ratings. Despite this instrument’s good psychometric abilities and validity, our 
criticism is concerned with the fact that it captures only the ability to label one’s own affective 
state and therefore assesses only one defining aspect of affective clarity.  
The aim of the present paper was therefore to develop an indirect instrument that captures 
more aspects of emotional clarity. Our approach was to request the demonstration of specifically 
those abilities that define affective clarity, that is, to label their affective state and to describe the 
associated feelings, sensations, thoughts, and forms of expression as well as the source of their 
affective state. The idea was that persons who are clearer about their affective experience should 
provide more accurate and detailed information regarding their affective state, the associated 
feelings, sensations, and expressions as well as the source. Furthermore, the affective state and 
the feelings, sensations, and thoughts as well as the source of high clarity persons should fit with 
each other.  
With only a few exceptions (Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Lischetzke et al., 2005, 2011; 
Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Mayer & Stevens, 1994), research has dealt with emotional clarity only 
as a trait variable. Nevertheless, applying state measures of clarity is particularly important to 
learn more about the role of clarity within affect regulation processes over time. For a short 
training intervention also, it is important to apply state measures of clarity because they are more 
sensitive to changes than trait measures and therefore should be able to indicate even small 
changes (Zuckerman, 1983).  
This study therefore deployed different measures of state clarity. Apart from the indirect 
measure, which also measures clarity on a state level, a self-report questionnaire assessing the 
state experience was deployed. Furthermore, the participants’ certainty about their affect 
information provided in the indirect measure was collected. By this, we followed an idea of 
Lischetzke et al. (2005, 2011), who assessed participants’ certainty regarding their affect ratings. 
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This is based on the idea that the clearer persons are about their affective state, the more certain 
they should be about information they provide with respect to it. Although more indirect than a 
questionnaire, Lischetzke et al. (2005) classified the measure as a self-report instrument. In fact, 
it does not rely on the ability to report one’s own affective clarity, but still requires self-insight 
and is probably prone to social desirability bias. Lischetzke et al. (2005, 2011) found a moderate 
relation between the degree of certainty and dispositional clarity measured via self-report (rs = 
.25 - .27, ps < .05). 
Another approach was to measure the ability to recognize emotional expressions in other 
persons’ faces. Research on empathy postulates that people can identify emotions in another 
person because they unconsciously imitate the other person’s emotional expression (Frith, 2009). 
In this sense, persons high in clarity should be better in correctly identifying the feeling that was 
induced by imitation (Otto et al., 2001). Consequently, Lischetzke, Eid, Wittig, and Trierweiler 
(2001) found high correlations between self-reported clarity about one’s own emotions and about 
the emotions of others. Otto et al. (2001) found a small but significant correlation between 
emotional clarity and performance on an emotion recognition test (r = .17, p = .05).  
Present Research 
We present two studies that develop four training interventions each aimed at the 
improvement of the participants’ emotional clarity. In both studies, we evaluated the trainings’ 
effectiveness on various measures of affective clarity or related variables to answer the following 
research questions: Do the participants of the experimental groups indicate greater clarity after 
the trainings than before? Do the experimental groups indicate greater increases in clarity than 
the control group? Does one experimental group indicate greater training effects than the other? 
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Do the experimental groups indicate different training effects on the diverse measures? Our 
hypotheses regarding these research questions are presented separately for each study.  
Study 1 
The aim of the first study was to develop a direct intervention called clarity, which trains 
the defining skills of emotional clarity, and an indirect intervention called mindfulness, which 
trains the participants to be mindful to enhance their emotional clarity. Both interventions were 
evaluated with regard to their effectiveness in fostering emotional clarity. We hypothesized that 
the individuals who took part in one of the experimental interventions would report increased 
emotional clarity after the training compared to before the training. By contrast, we expected the 
control group not to improve its clarity from the pretest to the posttest. We further postulated that 
the training effects on emotional clarity would be greater for the clarity group that received 
direct training compared to the mindfulness group that received indirect training. This was 
expected to apply especially to the indirect measure of clarity as well as to the emotion 
recognition test because the abilities assessed with these instruments were trained explicitly in 
the clarity training but not in the mindfulness intervention. 
Method  
Participants 
Altogether, 119 students took part in a training intervention and completed the state 
measures of affective clarity and the emotion recognition test directly before and after the 
training. Of these, four persons were excluded from the analyses because they had too many 
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missing values or because they were univariate outliers.5 The remaining 115 participants were all 
students attending courses in educational psychology. They were either psychology students or 
they studied other subjects with the aim of receiving a teacher certificate. Of these, 74% were 
female, which is a representive proportion regarding the partcipants’ subjects of study. The mean 
age was 24.88 (SD = 6.96).  
Participation in the study was a course requirement. For practical reasons, completely 
randomized assignment was not possible. The participants of three courses in educational 
psychology, designed especially for students who want to enter the teaching profession, formed 
the control group, whereas the participants of another course in educational psychology for 
students of psychology as a main subject were randomly assigned to the two intervention groups. 
Thirty-five subjects formed the intervention group clarity, 46 subjects the intervention group 
mindfulness, and 34 subjects the control group. 
Only 74 of the 115 participants filled out the trait questionnaire that was given in the very 
first (pretest) and the very last (posstest) sessions of the course because some students missed 
one or both of these seminar sessions.. Of these 74 participants 86.5% were female. Their mean 
age was 24.22 (SD = 6.81). Twentysix participated in the clarity intervention, 25 subjects in the 
mindfulness intervention, and 23 subjects in the control intervention. 
                                                
5 Persons were excluded from the analysis if they missed more than 10% of all items. 
That was true for two persons. Following Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), persons were defined as 
univariate outliers if they had a standardized score (z score) in excess of 3.29. We also checked 
for multivariate outliers but there were none. 
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Procedure  
In this intervention study, a one-factorial quasi-experimental design was realized. All 
groups took a pretest with a trait measure at the beginning of the term. All groups received 
training that was given 1 to 4 weeks later (depending on the groups’ class schedule). Directly 
before and after the intervention, all groups took part in a pretest and a posttest with state 
measures and tests (n = 115). At the end of the term, all groups again filled out the trait 
questionnaire (n = 74).  
Interventions  
Two experimental groups received interventions, which were designed to enhance the 
subjects’ emotional clarity. The experimental group clarity explicitly exercised the skills 
defining clarity, that is, the ability to identify, describe, and distinguish among emotions. The 
experimental group mindfulness exercised mindfulness, that is, an enhanced awareness of their 
current experience with a nonjudgmental attitude. The control group trained its presentation 
skills. All interventions lasted for 1 hour.  
In all trainings, we emphasized the transfer of the training contents to situations in 
everyday life. Therefore, the participants were directed to work out the main points themselves 
and had the opportunity to practice. Input by the trainers and activities of the participants 
alternated. Before inputs, the participants were asked for their prior knowledge. This was 
intended to facilitate the integration of new knowledge into existing knowledge and to further 
promote the participants’ motivation and self-efficacy.  
Apart from that, we made sure the participants felt comfortable in and after the training 
situations. Therefore, each exercise was followed by a short reflection in which the participants 
could speak about their experiences. In the clarity intervention, in which negative emotions were 
induced in some exercises, we utilized amusing games directly after these exercises and an 
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imaginary journey at the very end of the session to make sure the participants felt relaxed and 
positive again.  
The beginning was the same in both experimental interventions. They started with a 
welcome by the trainers and a warm up with the aim of getting to know the others. After an 
introduction to the training goals and agenda, the trainers explained the concept of emotional 
clarity and its benefits. 
In the clarity intervention, the participants then gathered knowledge about two selected 
specific emotions with regard to associated feelings, sensations, thoughts, and forms of 
expression. Furthermore, these specific emotions were induced onto the participants so that they 
deliberately experienced these emotions. The participants were then asked to describe their 
experiences in detail with regard to senstions, feelings, and expressions. Finally, the trainers 
elaborated upon the differences between the two specific emotions. The contents of the trainings 
as well as the utilized methods are displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Contents and Methods of Clarity Intervention (Study 1) 
Contents Method 
Feelings, sensations, thoughts, and forms 
of expressions associated with (a) anger 
and (b) anxiety 
1) Group work (some groups worked on 
anger, some on anxiety),  
2) Presentation to plenum, amendment, 
and categorization by trainers 
(a) Experiencing anxiety, describing the 
experience in great detail 
1) Induction of anxiety (autobiographical 
recollections methodology),  
2) Description in writing, open format plus 
guiding questions 
(b) Experiencing anger, describing the 
experience in great detail 
1) Induction of anger (autobiographical 
recollections methodology),  
2) Description in writing, open format plus 
guiding questions 
Differences between anxiety and anger Input by trainer 
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In the mindfulness intervention, the trainers first provided information about the concept 
and its effects. Then the participants practiced mindfulness with different exercises. We chose 
formal meditation practices such as a walking meditation and a sitting meditation as well as an 
informal mindfulness meditation as it can be practiced at all times in everyday life. The 
participants then brainstormed about how mindfulness could be integrated into their everyday 
lives and chose one activity that they would practice daily. Finally, the group elaborated on how 
mindfulness might enhance emotional clarity. The contents of the trainings as well as the utilized 
methods are displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Contents and Methods of Mindfulness Intervention (Study 1) 
Contents Method 
Concept and the effects of mindfulness Input by trainers 
(a) Examining an object mindfully 
(b) Walking mindfully 
(c) Watching thoughts mindfully 
(sitting meditation) 
Individual exercises; trainers instructed 
repeatedly to watch feelings, sensations, 
and thoughts in a nonjudgmental attitude 
Integration into everyday life Brainstorming; choice of one activity 
Relation to emotional clarity Discussion 
 
In the control intervention, the group talked about criteria that distinguishes good from 
poor presentations, discussed the structure of a presentation, and practiced how to design the 
various parts of a presentation so that they would be attractive. They further received guidelines 
for preparation and dealt with important aspects of performance.  
Measures 
Trait clarity. Emotional clarity as a disposition was measured by the subscale clarity of 
the widely used Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995). Here, the German 
version (Otto et al., 2001) was applied. The scale comprises nine items. Subjects have to indicate 
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on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with the items. A sample 
item is: “I almost always know exactly how I am feeling.” The clarity subscale demonstrated 
good reliability in this study with ! = .86. 
State clarity. To measure emotional clarity on a state level, the items of the trait clarity 
scale were modified so that they asked for the person’s present instead of usual experience. For 
economical reasons, three items that are very similar to other items but have lower factor 
loadings were left out. A sample item is “At the moment I am confused about how I feel” 
(reversed). The scale was internally consistent with ! = .93.  
Emotion recognition ability (ERA). To measure the ability to recognize emotions in 
others, the participants were presented with 14 color photos showing seven young men and 
seven young women expressing each one of the emotions happiness, fear, disgust, surprise, 
anger, sadness, and contempt (Merten, 2003, 2005; Otto et al., 2001). Thereby, the emotions 
were displayed by one man and one woman each. For the posttest, a set parallel to the pretest 
was used. All pictures were presented in the same randomized order to all participants. The 
photos were presented for only 1/5 s each to facilitate the detection of interindividual differences 
(Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, Raroque, & Kooken, et al., 2000). The subjects were 
instructed to choose for each picture the corresponding emotion from a list containing all seven 
possible emotions (forced-choice format). 
Accuracy of affect information. To measure emotional clarity indirectly, we induced a 
specific emotion by film (Gross & Levenson, 1995) and then asked the participants to rate their 
affective state, to describe what they are feeling, sensing, and expressing as well as the source of 
their affective state. The answers were rated by two independent raters. Therefore, judges first 
rated the accuracy, detailedness, and profoundness of the description of the feelings, sensations, 
and expressions. Second, this was done likewise for the description of the source. Third, raters 
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evaluated how the indicated affective state and the description of feelings, sensations, and 
expressions fit with each other. Fourth, they did likewise for the affective state and the source. 
All ratings were given on a scale ranging from 0 (not accurate/fitting) to 3 (very accurate/great 
fit). 
After this first rating, the judges discussed all cases that showed a discrepancy between 
the two ratings greater than or equal to 2. After that, both judges rated these cases for a second 
time independently of each other. The final intraclass correlations indicated adequate interrater 
reliability for each rating category (!s = .60 - .74). Thus, we formed one average measure for 
each category out of the single measures of both judges. Then we calculated one mean value out 
of the four rating categories. This overall accuracy scale was internally consistent with ! = .75. 
Certainty regarding affect information. The participants were asked how certain they 
were that the information they provided with respect to their affective state, to their feelings, 
sensations, and expressions, and to the source was true. They were asked to rate their certainty 
on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. One mean value out of all certainty ratings was formed; the 
internal consistency was acceptable with ! = .62. 
Results 
Correlations Between Measures 
First, we investigated the convergent correlations between the measures of emotional 
clarity as well as the emotion recognition test. Expectedly, trait clarity was significantly 
correlated with state clarity (r = .20, p = .04). In contrast to the assumptions, the correlations 
with performance on the ER test and the accuracy of emotion descriptions were not significantly 
different from zero (ER test: r = .03, p > .10; accuracy: r = .02, p > .10); the correlation with the 
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person’s certainty regarding the descriptions was small and only tended toward significance (r = 
.16, p = .09). 
The correlations of state clarity with performance on the ER test as well as the accuracy 
of emotion descriptions were small and only tended toward significance (ERA: r = -.13, p = .08) 
or were not significant (accuracy: r = .10, p > .10). However, state clarity was significantly 
related to certainty regarding the emotion (r = .26, p = .00). 
Intervention Effects  
First, we used t-tests to determine whether there were significant training effects within 
groups. Second, we analyzed differences between groups. Therefore, we tested for pretest 
differences on all measures first. Significant differences between groups before the interventions 
were found on the self-report measures of trait and state clarity as well as on the emotion 
recognition test. Analyses of means showed that the conrol group and the mindfulness 
intervention group indicated similar values on state and trait clarity, whereas the clarity 
intervention group reported lower levels of clarity on both measures. On the emotion recognition 
test, the performances of all three groups differed from each other. Thus, there were meaningful 
differences between the groups but there were no systematic differences between the 
intervention groups on the one hand and control group on the other. We chose ANCOVAs with 
posttest values as dependent variables and pretest values as covariates to check for differences 
between groups while taking pretest differences into account. 
Trait clarity. As evident from the means in Table 3, both intervention groups slightly 
increased their emotional clarity whereas the control group hardly changed. The t-tests showed 
that the clarity group increased their trait clarity significantly, t(25) = 2.65, p = .01, "2 = .22, 
whereas the increase of the mindfulness group only tended toward significance, t(24) = 1.65, p = 
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.06, "2 = .10. As expected, the control group did not change, t(22) = 0.46, p > .10. However, 
there were no significant differences between groups, F(2, 70) = 0.72, p > .10.  
State clarity. Again, the means in Table 3 indicate very small changes of both 
intervention groups in the expected direction but not of the control group.  
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Measures in Both Studies 
Measure Group Study 1 Study 2 
  Mean (SD) 
pre 
Mean (SD) 
post 
Mean (SD) 
pre 
Mean (SD) 
post 
Trait clarity Self-reflection - - 3.58 (.77) 3.76 (.86) 
 Clarity 3.42 (.65) 3.79 (.67) - - 
 Mindfulness 3.98 (.59) 4.15 (.63) 3.48 (.76) 3.60 (.60) 
 Control 3.87 (.63) 3.91 (.54) 3.40 (.95) 3.56 (.79) 
State clarity Self-reflection - - 4.01 (.90) 4.01 (.79) 
 Clarity 3.47 (.97) 3.70 (.74) - - 
 Mindfulness 3.87 (.79) 4.10 (.66) 3.75 (.89) 3.83 (.72) 
 Control 3.95 (.97) 4.02 (.93) 3.83 (1.00) 3.78 (.66) 
ERA Self-reflection - - 7.44 (1.26) 7.81 (1.38) 
 Clarity 6.66 (1.64) 8.00 (1.48) - - 
 Mindfulness 7.26 (1.72) 7.50 (1.68) 6.72 (2.16) 7.11 (1.41) 
 Control 7.15 (2.05) 6.97 (1.59) 6.84 (1.14) 6.96 (1.34) 
AI accuracy Self-reflection - - 1.97 (.69) 2.05 (.71) 
 Clarity 2.25 (.34) 2.29 (.52) - - 
 Mindfulness 2.06 (.44) 2.14 (.66) 2.34 (.45) 2.49 (.35) 
 Control 1.98 (.72) 2.11 (.71) 2.25 (.48) 2.19 (.56) 
AI certainty  Self-reflection - - 12.01 (2.52) 12.68 (2.16) 
 Clarity 12.61 (1.51) 12.70 (2.38) - - 
 Mindfulness 12.39 (2.13) 13.07 (2.19) 11.61 (1.92) 12.28 (1.59) 
 Control 13.04 (2.42) 13.32 (2.13) 10.97 (2.76) 12.12 (1.93) 
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The t-tests showed that the mindfulness group increased their state clarity significantly, 
t(45) = 2.04, p = .02, "2 = .08, whereas the increase of the clarity group only tended toward 
significance, t(34) = 1.46, p = .08, "2 = .06. Expectedly, the control group did not change, t(33) = 
0.43, p > .10. Still, no significant differences between groups were found, F(2, 111) = 1.21, p > 
.10.  
Emotion recognition test. Here, we used the number of correctly recognized pictures 
(expert rating). The first three pictures each were treated as exercise material and excluded from 
the analyses because the participants had problems with the shortness of the presentation at the 
beginning of the test. The t-tests showed that the clarity group increased its performance 
significantly, t(34) = 4.34, p = .00, "2 = .36, whereas the mindfulness group hardly changed, t(45) 
= 1.46, p > .10. In accordance with the hypotheses, the control group also hardly improved, t(33) 
= 0.42, p > .10. The ANCOVA confirmed that the groups differed significantly in their 
performance, F(2, 111) = 3.80, p = .03, "2  = .06. The different changes of the groups are 
displayed in Figure 1. Contrasts show that the clarity group significantly differed from the 
control group (p = .01), but not from the mindfulness group (p > .10). 
 
Figure 1. The level of Emotion Recognition Ability (ERA) at the two measurement points of the 
Clarity Group (n = 26), the Mindfulness Group (n = 25) and the Control Group (n = 23). Error 
bars represent standard deviation.  
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Accuracy of affect information. We found slight increases for all three groups. 
Consequently, all three t-tests did not reach significance, clarity: t(34) = 0.37, p > .10; 
mindfulness: t(45) = 1.01, p > .10; control: t(33) = 1.33, p > .10, and the groups did not differ 
significantly from each other, F(2, 111) = 0.03, p > .10.  
Certainty regarding affect information. All groups indicated improved certainty with 
regard to their provided affect information. Whereas the increases of the clarity group and the 
control group were rather small and not significant, clarity: t(34) = 0.26, p > .10; control: t(33) = 
0.82, p > .10, that of the mindfulness group was moderate and significant, t(45) = 3.02, p = .00, 
"2 = .17. The groups did not differ significantly from each other, F(2, 111) = 0.84, p > .10.  
Discussion  
Our aim was to develop two interventions, a direct and an indirect one, that are able to 
foster emotional clarity. We expected that the participants of the experimental interventions 
would increase their emotional clarity, whereas the control group would not. We further 
hypothesized that the training effects would be greater for the direct intervention and that this 
would especially apply to the indirect measure of clarity as well as to the emotion recognition 
test.  
With regard to our first expectation, we found significant changes in emotional clarity 
within both intervention groups and no changes within the control group. Thus, the results 
indicate that the two experimental interventions have effects on measures of affective clarity. 
However, the three groups did not differ in their levels of emotional clarity after the training 
when baseline clarity was taken into account. Only on the emotion recognition test were 
significant differences found between the clarity group and the control group. Therefore, the 
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effects of the experimental interventions compared to a control intervention are not meaningful. 
However, they are promising with regard to the short duration of the interventions.  
Concerning the second research question, the two experimental groups showed 
significant changes within groups on different measures. As expected, we found a significant 
increase in emotion recognition ability within the clarity group but not within the mindfulness 
group. We further found significant changes within only one of the two experimental groups on 
all other measures. As the only exception and against our expectations, neither group increased 
its performance on the indirect measure. However, the differences between the two experimental 
groups were not significant and must not be overestimated.  
Interestingly, the only significant difference between groups was found for the emotion 
recognition test. However, performance on the emotion recognition test was uncorrelated with 
self-report clarity. Based on Otto et al. (2001), we would have expected a weak to moderate 
correlation. In this sense, the result cannot be interpreted with respect to the question of whether 
emotional clarity was enhanced. Nevertheless, it was expected that the clarity intervention would 
foster emotion recognition abilities because components of this ability were implicitly trained by 
this intervention. That the ability to recognize emotions in other peoples’ faces is possible to 
train in 1 hour was already demonstrated by Matsumoto and Hwang (2011). The trait variable 
emotional clarity is probably far less easy to foster (Salovey et al., 1995; Nielsen & Kaszniak, 
2006). 
The fact that no significant differences between the groups were found on measures of 
affective clarity might be due to the very short duration of the trainings. The interventions lasted 
1 hour, so there was very little time to delve into the subject of emotions. It was obvious to the 
trainers that the participants were very sceptical in the beginning of the interventions and that 
they had problems dealing with their own emotions in the context of a course that was attended 
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by people whom they hardly knew. For this reason, we think that future interventions should 
take more time to help participants feel comfortable with each other and the trainers as well as 
with the intervention topic.  
Another problem was that the participants did not seem to see the benefit of increasing 
their emotional clarity although it was explicitly pointed out. Here also, extending the duration of 
the training should help to illustrate more extensively the relevance of emotional clarity for 
everyday life. The transfer of the learned strategies into everyday life should further be promoted 
by dividing the training into two sessions. This way it would be possible for the participants to 
apply the acquired strategies to their daily routines, test them, come back to the training, and 
discuss their experiences, problems, and benefits. 
Another criticism concerns the measures that were used in this study. The trait and state 
self-report measures of emotional clarity did not seem to capture differences between general 
and actual experience. Within all groups, the mean values for trait and state clarity were almost 
the same, although the measures were applied at different points in time. This is comprehensible 
because the state scale consists of six items that were taken from the trait scale and only changed 
in their time reference (general vs. actual experience). Interestingly, the convergent correlation 
between the two measures was rather small compared to those for trait and state instruments of 
other constructs (e.g., for the Big Five: rs = .39 - .77, Schutte, Malouff, Segrera, Wolf, & 
Rodgers, 2002; for anger expression: rs = .37 - .48, Porter, Stone, & Schwartz, 1999; for self-
regulation: rs = .53 - .69, Hong, 1995). Apart from that insufficiency, the two measures did not 
cover all relevant aspects of emotional clarity. According to the definition of clarity, emotional 
clarity includes the ability to identify and label one’s own emotions, to distinguish between 
them, to describe one’s own affective experience, and to know the source of it (Gohm & Clore, 
2000; Salovey et al., 1995; Taylor, Ryan, & Bagby, 1985). By contrast, the clarity subscale of 
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the TMMS (Salovey et al., 1995) covers only the abilities to identify and label one’s own 
emotions; the abilities to describe and to understand one’s own affective experience are not 
explicitly requested. Another criticism of the scale is that some of the items use specifications of 
frequency that can be problematic. One item, for example, asks for an affective experience that 
happens “sometimes,” which might lead to agreement by persons of high as well as of low 
clarity (Lischetzke et al., 2001). Another item asks for an experience that “never” happens, 
which usually is done for scales assessing social desirability (e.g., Crowne & Marlow, 1960). For 
all these reasons, we decided to develop new self-report measures of emotional clarity for Study 
2.  
The indirect measure of clarity was uncorrelated with the self-report scales of trait and 
state clarity. Based on literature about convergent correlations between indirect and direct 
measures of the same construct, it was expected that the instruments would not be correlated or 
would be only weakly correlated with each other (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003; Robinson & 
Neighbors, 2006). However, it was unexpected that no significant changes within any of the 
groups would be found. This was especially surprising concerning the clarity intervention 
because some of the concrete skills that were requested by the instrument had been trained 
explicitly. We assume that one reason lay in the fact that many of the answers were very short 
and rather cryptic and sometimes hardly fit with the question. Therefore, it was impossible to 
distuinguish between persons who could not accurately describe their feelings and the source and 
those who simply did not because they were unmotivated. We addressed this issue in Study 2 by 
providing even more exact instructions and by stressing the request to respond as accurately and 
in as detailed a manner as possible.  
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The certainty measure captured a significant change within the mindfulness group and 
was moderately correlated with the trait and state self-report measures of affective clarity. By 
this, the instrument showed the expected convergent correlation (see Lischetzke et al., 2005).  
Altogether, the fact that significant changes within groups were found with this short 
intervention duration of 1 hour was promising, but many optimizations were needed. In the 
following, we present Study 2, which implemented these optimizations.  
Study 2 
In this study, we aimed to develop two indirect approaches for enhancing emotional 
clarity. On the one hand, we trained the participants in mindfulness as was done in the first 
study; on the other hand, we coached the participants with regard to self-reflection. As in Study 
1, the effectiveness of the trainings with respect to the enhancement of emotional clarity was 
evaluated. 
To respond to the results of the first study, a number of changes were implemented. First, 
the interventions were now comprised of two sessions of 1.5 hours each. By this, it was possible 
to extend the training time compared to Study 1 and furthermore to provide the opportunity for 
participants to transfer the training contents to their everyday lives and then to come back to the 
training and discuss their experiences, problems, and benefits. This was further supported by 
explicitly asking the participants to actively practice mindfulness and self-reflection, 
respectively, and to record their experiences in a structured diary that they received for this 
purpose. 
 Second, we changed the focus of the trainings. Instead of directly aiming at emotional 
clarity, which had proven not to be very attractive in Study 1, we emphasized one important 
benefit of affective clarity for everyday life, that is, improved emotion regulation and reduced 
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negative affect and distress (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Salovey et al., 1995). By this, we wanted to 
illustrate application and personal gain and thus to enhance the participants’ motivation to 
deliberately take part in the training. 
Third, we realized some changes with regard to the instruments measuring clarity. On the 
one hand, we optimized the instructions of the indirect measure. We now requested the 
participants to label their current affective state via a free-response format instead of providing 
rating scales to avoid giving any restrictions or support to the participants. Moreover, the 
instructions now stressed even more clearly the request to answer as accurately and in as detailed 
a fashion as possible. To tell participants what we wanted to know as clearly as possible and to 
keep them from writing mindless answers, we also formulated guiding questions and told the 
participants to provide an accordant comment if they could not answer the question.  
On the other hand, we developed new self-report measures for this study to meet the 
criticisms of the instruments deployed in Study 1. For the trait questionnaire, we combined items 
from the clarity subscale of the TMMS (Salovey et al., 1995) with items from other approved 
scales measuring emotional clarity (see Gohm & Clore, 2000; i.e., subscale Difficulty 
Identifying Feelings of the TAS; Taylor et al., 1985; subscale Labeling of the MAS; Swinkels & 
Giuliano, 1995; further, subscale Clarity of Feelings by Lischetzke & Eid, 2003) so that all 
postulated aspects of clarity were represented by at least one item. Moreover, all items were 
formulated so that they each asked for an experience that happens “often,” “usually,” or “almost 
always” to meet the criticsms of the items with problematic specifications of frequency.  
The state questionnaire was developed independently of the trait questionnaire to foster 
the participants’ distinction between statements on trait and state experiences. Therefore, we 
adapted the clarity subscale of the Meta-Mood Experience Scale (MMES) by Mayer and 
Gaschke (1988), which measures state meta-mood experience, by taking those items that showed 
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the highest and most distinct factor loadings and modifying them so that they were similar in 
style to the items of the trait questionnaire but asked for the person’s present experience. We 
added two items from other scales (subscale Labeling of the MAS, Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995; 
subscale Clarity of the TMMS, Salovey et al., 1995) to be able to cover all postulated aspects of 
emotional clarity.  
As in Study 1, we postulated that the experimental groups would increase their affective 
clarity from pretest to posttest, whereas the control group would not. With regard to the 
differential training effects, we assumed that mindfulness quasi-involves affective clarity and 
therefore does not require “extra work” or additional resources to figure out one’s own affective 
state. By contrast, self-reflection is intentional and requires control by the self and hence 
resources (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). In this sense, we expected the 
mindfulness group to have advantages over the self-reflection group.  
Method  
Participants 
The study took place within the scope of a course attended by most first-year students; 
participation in the study was a course requirement. Altogether, 80 students took part in the 
study. Of these, 16 had to be excluded from the analyses because they missed a course meeting 
in which the first (n = 14) or the second (n = 2) training session took place. Along the lines of 
Study 1, another four persons were excluded because they were univariate or multivariate 
outliers6; one more person was excluded because of too many missing values. Thus, the data of 
59 students were included in the analyses. All participants were first-year students of 
                                                
6 Following Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), persons were defined as multivariate outliers if 
their Mahalanobis’ distance was significant at p < .001.  
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psychology. Of these, 76.3% were female, which is a representative proportion regarding the 
participants’ study subject. The mean age was 23.34 (SD = 4.79). All participants were randomly 
assigned to three groups: two experimental and one control group. Thereby, 16 subjects formed 
the experimental group self-reflection, 18 subjects the experimental group mindfulness, and 25 
subjects the control group.  
Procedure 
Again, a one-factorial quasi-experimental design was realized. All groups got an 
intervention of two sessions lasting 1.5 hours each. The two sessions took place on two 
consecutive weeks. All groups took part in a pretest at the beginning of the first training session 
and a posttest at the end of the second session. 
Interventions 
The two experimental groups received interventions, which were designed to enhance the 
subjects’ emotional clarity. One experimental group exercised self-reflection, especially with 
regard to affect and distressing experiences. The other experimental group exercised 
mindfulness, that is, giving enhanced attention to one’s current experience with a nonjudgmental 
attitude. The control group was trained to take helpful notes during lectures.  
As in Study 1, the training conceptions emphasized the transfer of the training contents to 
situations in everyday life by utilizing methods of activation and providing the opportunity to 
practice. The transfer was further promoted by dividing the training into two sessions and 
explicitly encouraging the participants to practice in between. Again, each exercise was followed 
by a short reflection in which the participants could speak about their experiences to make sure 
that the participants felt comfortable in and after the training situations.  
The beginning of the first session was the same for both experimental interventions. They 
started with a welcome by the trainers and the introduction of the goals and the agenda of the 
ENHANCING EMOTIONAL CLARITY BY TRAINING 
64 
 
training. This was followed by a warm up with the aim of getting to know the others. At the end 
of each first session, the participants were encouraged to implement the learned techniques in 
everyday life. They received diaries, in which they could record on a daily level the situations in 
which they had applied the techniques as well as their experiences in doing so. The second 
sessions each began with a welcome, the presentation of the goals and the agenda, as well as a 
short recapitulation of what had been learned in Session 1. It followed a discussion of how 
successful the participants had been in implementing the learned techniques in everyday life, 
whether they had profited from it, which problems had arisen, and how these could be overcome. 
For the mindfulness intervention, we again chose formal as well as informal meditations 
for practicing mindfulness. As a formal meditation, we chose a body scan; as informal 
meditations, the participants were asked to examine objects as though they had never seen them 
before. We further encouraged the informal meditation practice in everyday life by discussing 
occasions to be mindful, obstacles that keep one from being mindful, and how these could be 
overcome. Another exercise addressed the issue by contrasting a mindful mindset with the usual 
attitude in distressing everyday situations. The intervention’s contents and methods can be seen 
in Table 4.  
In the self-reflection intervention, the participants worked out the definition of self-
reflection and its differentiation from rumination, the use of wh-questions for solution-oriented 
self-reflection (when, where, what, who, why), benefits gained from self-reflection, and an 
example of successful self-reflection in a distressing situation. Furthermore, the participants 
trained systematic self-reflection by reflecting on a chosen object, on their real and ideal self, as 
well as on a distressing experience. All reflections were carried out in writing and supported by 
guiding questions to foster an outcome-oriented instead of a ruminative style of reflection. The 
intervention’s contents and methods can be seen in Table 5.  
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Table 4 
Contents and Methods of Mindfulness Intervention (Study 2) 
Contents Method 
  Session 1 
Concept and the effects of mindfulness Input by trainers 
Examining a chosen object mindfully Individual exercise; instructions to act 
as though coming from another planet 
Mindfulness and its benefits for stress 
reduction 
Trainer-plenum-dialog 
Examining a tangerine mindfully Individual exercise; instructions to act 
as though coming from another planet 
Integration into everyday life Discussion in plenum about occasions, 
obstacles, and overcoming 
Session 2 
Use in everyday life and benefit Use in everyday life and benefit 
Body Scan Meditation Body Scan Meditation 
 
Table 5 
Contents and Methods of Self-reflection Intervention 
Contents Method 
Session 1 
Reflecting on a chosen object Individual exercise; open format and 
guiding questions 
Reflecting on real and ideal self 1) Individual exercise; open format and 
guiding questions 
2) Partner exercise; asking for 
spontaneous external view 
Definition of self-reflection; benefits of 
self-reflection; example for a successful 
self-reflection; reflection by use of wh-
questions; differentiation from rumination 
1) Group work 
2) Discussion of results in plenum 
Session 2 
Benefits of self-reflection Presentation of empirical data 
Reflecting on a distressing experience 1) Induction of distress (anticipation of 
participation in a unknown task) 
2) Individual reflection on experience 
(open format and guiding questions) 
3) Discussion in plenum about how the 
reflection helped to reduce the distress 
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In the control intervention, the participants worked on effective strategies for taking 
helpful notes and practiced these strategies both in the training situation as well as in a university 
lecture. They compared these notes with notes they had taken quasi-naively at the beginning of 
the training and discussed advantages of and problems with the new strategies. 
Measures 
State clarity. As described above, we adapted seven items of the clarity subscale of the 
MMES (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) and added two items from other scales (subscale Labeling of 
the MAS, Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995; subscale Clarity of the German version of the TMMS, 
Otto et al., 2001). The resulting nine items were randomized for presentation. A sample item is: 
“I am able to describe my present mood.” Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point 
Likert scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The scale was 
internally consistent with ! = .93. The wording of the items’ English translations can be found in 
the Appendix. 
Accuracy of affect information. We used the same approach as in Study 1 to assess the 
ability to accurately and fittingly describe one’s own affective state. For this study, we 
implemented a few optimizations that were described above. The rating procedure was the same 
as in Study 1. Again, the intraclass correlations indicated adequate interrater reliability after the 
second rating for each rating category (!s = .58 - .77). We formed one average measure for each 
category out of the single measures of both judges. Then we calculated one mean value out of 
the four rating categories. The overall accuracy scale was internally consistent with ! = .81. 
Certainty regarding affect information. The same procedure as in Study 1 was used. The 
scale formed out of all three certainty ratings proved reasonably reliable (! = .65).  
Emotion recognition ability (ERA). We applied the same procedure as in Study 1.  
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Trait clarity. As described above, we developed a trait scale by taking items of various 
approved scales measuring emotional clarity (Gohm & Clore, 2000). Some of the items were 
recoded so that half of the items were positively keyed and half were negatively keyed. All 12 
items were randomized for presentation. A sample item is “Often, I can’t tell how I feel” 
(reversed). Instructions informed respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with each statement (cf TMMS; Salovey et al, 1995). The scale 
showed internal consistency with ! = .91. The items’ English translations can be found in the 
Appendix. 
Results 
Correlations Between Measures 
First, we analyzed the convergent correlations between measures. Expectedly, trait clarity 
was significantly related to state clarity (r = .40, p = .00), accuracy of emotion descriptions (r = 
.49, p = .00), and certainty ratings of emotion descriptions (r = .69, p = .00). In contrast to the 
assumptions, the correlation with performance on the emotion recognition test was not 
significantly different from zero (r = .05, p > .10).  
In line with the results for trait clarity, state clarity was significantly related to accuracy 
of emotion descriptions (r = .39, p = .00) and certainty ratings of emotion descriptions (r = .49, p 
= .00) but uncorrelated with ERA (r = .05, p > .10). 
Intervention Effects  
Along the lines of the first study, we first used t-tests to assess significant intervention 
effects within groups. We then tested for pretest differences between groups. The groups differed 
significantly on the indirect measure of clarity; the control group and the mindfulness group were 
rated as more accurate than the clarity group. Subsequently, we calculated ANCOVAs with the 
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posttest values as dependent variables and the pretest values as covariates to check for 
differences between groups.   
State clarity. As evident from the means in Table 3, the means indicate that all groups 
hardly changed their state clarity. Accordingly, t-tests showed no significant differences between 
pretest and posttest for any group,7 and we found no significant differences between groups, F(2, 
55) = 0.49, p > .10.  
Accuracy of affect information. We found slight increases in the experimental groups and 
a slight decrease in the control group. The groups tended to differ significantly from each other, 
F(2, 55) = 2.90, p = .10, "2 = .10.   
Certainty regarding affect information. All groups indicated moderate increases in their 
certainty regarding their provided affect information. The control group’s increase was 
somewhat greater than those of the experimental groups and reached significance on the t-test, 
t(24) = 2.46, p = .02, "2 = .20. However, the differences between groups were not significant, 
F(2, 55) = 0.17, p > .10.  
Emotion recognition ability. Again, all groups increased in their performance on the 
emotion recognition test to a similar very small degree. Correspondingly, there were no 
significant differences between groups, F(2, 55) = 1.47, p > .10.  
Trait clarity. All groups increased in their trait clarity to a similar and slight degree. 
Consequently, t-tests showed no significant differences between the pretest and posttest for any 
group and the ANCOVA indicated no significant differences between groups, F(2, 55) = 0.21, p 
> .10.  
                                                
7 In the following, we report the t-tests only when the pre-post differences were 
significant.  
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Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to develop two experimental interventions that foster 
emotional clarity. We expected that the two experimental groups would show significant 
changes on measures of emotional clarity, whereas the control group would not. We further 
assumed that the mindfulness group would have some advantages over the self-reflection group.  
These hypotheses could not be confirmed. None of the groups demonstrated a significant 
change on any of the variables. Only the control group showed a significant increase in its 
performance on the emotion recognition test, which was unexpected. In correspondance with the 
lack of significant changes, no significant differences between groups were found. Only on the 
indirect measure of clarity did the experimental groups tend to differ significantly from the 
control group in the expected way.  
Therefore, the results give no support to the idea that affective clarity can be enhanced by 
such training interventions such as those that were realized in this study. This is unexpected 
regarding the fact that in Study 1, some significant changes within groups were found. However, 
it is not possible to explicitly ascribe the results to the intervention concepts implemented in this 
study. The otpimizations realized from Study 1 to Study 2 are concerned not only with the 
interventions’ contents, focus, and duration, but also with the utilized instruments. 
With respect to the interventions, we think that it is unlikely that extending the training 
duration to 3 hours and splitting it into two sessions had negative effects. Concerning the 
intervention contents, it is possible that the self-reflection training did not have the expected 
effects on emotional clarity. However, it is not probable that the mindfulness intervention was 
completely ineffective in this study given that it effected significant changes within the 
experimental group in Study 1.  
ENHANCING EMOTIONAL CLARITY BY TRAINING 
70 
 
By contrast, we think it is possible that the interventions’ focus on affect regulation and 
distress instead of on affective clarity might have impaired the interventions’ effectiveness with 
regard to the actual goal of enhancing emotional clarity. This modification had been 
implemented to illustrate the application of emotional clarity and hence to improve the 
participants’ motivation to actively take part in the training. However, it is possible that we lost 
sight of the interventions’ aim. It is plausible that improving emotional clarity in such a short 
time is possible only if the participants explicitly work on it.  
With regard to the instruments, the modifications of the indirect measure of affective 
clarity seem to have had the desired effect. Here, marginal differences between the control group 
and the experimental groups in the expected direction were found, whereas in the first study, no 
differences were indicated. Still, the difference between groups was marginal, and no changes 
within groups were detected. Further research with this measure is necessary to test its ability to 
map changes in the ability to accurately describe one’s own affective state.  
In contrast to Study 1, the indirect measure’s convergent correlations with state and trait 
self-report clarity were rather strong in this study. Because the correlations between direct and 
indirect measures are usually only weak to modest, this was somewhat unexpected. A reason for 
this might lie in the fact that all three instruments now cover a broader definition of emotional 
clarity and therefore have greater overlap. However, the significant correlation provides a first 
indication that the indirect instrument captures emotional clarity. Still, it needs further validation 
with approved measures of affective clarity and by testing its ability to predict relevant 
outcomes.  
In contrast to the indirect measure, the new self-report measures of trait and state clarity 
did not map any differences in emotional clarity between data points or between groups. It 
remains unclear whether there simply were no differences or whether the instruments could not 
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map them. However, both scales consist exclusively of items from validated scales of emotional 
clarity. It is therefore not probable that the instruments are less sensitive to differences than the 
original scales. Nevertheless, further research with these instruments is necessary to investigate 
their psychometric properties and their sensitivity to differences. What was improved is the 
instruments’ ability to distinguish between trait and state experience. The groups’ mean values 
concerning state and trait clarity are more distinct from each other now. The convergent 
correlation between the two measures was on an expected level in this study (Schutte et al., 
2002; Hong, 1995; Porter et al., 1999).  
The convergent correlations between certainty and self-report measures of emotional 
clarity were considerably higher than in the first study and than those reported by Lischetzke et 
al. (2005, 2011). Because the certainty rating refers to the provided answer of the indirect 
measure, this might be due to the high correlation between this indirect measure and the self-
report measures. By contrast, the correlations between performance on the emotion recognition 
test and the self-report measures were not different from zero. This is in line with the results 
found in Study 1.  
In sum, this study does not support the idea that emotional clarity is enhanceable by short 
training interventions. The main reason for this finding might be the interventions’ focus on 
distress and regulation instead of affective clarity itself. However, the utilized instruments need 
further investigation with regard to their psychometric properties and sensitivity to differences 
between data points and groups.  
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General Discussion 
The present research examined the questions of whether affective clarity can be enhanced 
through training interventions and which kind of intervention serves this goal best. An additional 
goal was to develop instruments measuring clarity.  
Altogether, the two studies at hand give small support to the idea that emotional clarity is 
changeable through a short intervention. In Study 1, significant changes from pretest to posttest 
were reported within the experimental groups but not within the control group. However, no 
such changes within the experimental groups were indicated in Study 2; in both studies, no 
significant differences between groups were found. Only concerning the indirect measure of 
affective clarity were the control group and the two experimental groups marginally distinct 
from each other in Study 2.  
With regard to the question of which intervention has the greatest effects on emotional 
clarity, the clarity intervention and the mindfulness intervention (as they were designed for the 
first study) were the most promising. Both experimental groups from Study 1 that took part in 
these trainings reported significant increases in affective clarity on some of the measures. 
Because no significant differences between the experimental groups were found, it is not 
possible to favor one of the interventions developed in Study 1. In Study 2, both intervention 
groups reported no significant increases on any variable. Thus, the interventions designed for 
Study 2 seem less applicable, although one has to keep in mind that this might be due to the 
interventions’ focus on distress and its regulation.  
Despite the fact that significant changes of the experimental groups in Study 1 could be 
found only on the within-subjects level, the results are promising given the trainings’ very brief 
duration of 1 hour. Generally, affective clarity can certainly be learned and enhanced, but as a 
personality trait, not easily and rapidly (Salovey et al., 1995). The finding of Nielsen and 
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Kaszniak (2006) that long-term meditators reported significantly greater clarity than 
nonmeditators gives some support to this postulation. It is reasonable to assume that training 
programs can initiate learning processes with regard to emotional competence, but that the newly 
acquired skills have to be practiced daily to change stable attitudes. In fact, knowledge acquired 
in training interventions can require up to 6 months until it is employed in everyday life (e.g., 
Kirkpatrick, 1998).  
Therefore, future studies should realize a follow-up evaluation to show increases in 
affective clarity that were initiated by the training and take place after it has ended. Furthermore, 
subsequent studies should profit from an extention of the training duration and its division into at 
least two training sessions. The advantage from this is that the initiated learning processes can 
take effect already between training sessions so that it is possible in the second training session 
to build on the knowledge and experience that was acquired in the meantime. In Study 2, this 
approach was realized but did not have the expected effect. However, this might be ascribed to 
the interventions’ focus on distress and regulation instead of emotional clarity. 
Further support of the learning processes initiated by the trainings could come from 
structured diaries (e.g., Perels, Otto, Landmann, Hertel, & Schmitz, 2007). In the second study, 
the participants received such diaries that asked for emotion-laden situations, use of strategies, 
and outcomes or conclusions for the period of the week between the two intervention sessions. 
Future studies should employ diaries not only during intervention time but also for several weeks 
afterwards to foster the transfer of learned strategies into the person’s daily routine. The so-
gained data should further be used for evaluation as it would allow for time series analyses (e.g., 
Perels et al., 2007) and would offer information not only about whether affective clarity has 
changed but also about how it changed. By this, it would be possible to explore the development 
of emotional clarity on a daily basis over a longer period of time. 
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Future studies should profit from the recruitment of voluntary participants instead of 
requiring participation from course members. Probably, the interventions would have better 
effects on participants who deliberately take time to participate in training sessions because they 
see a personal gain in improving their emotional clarity. Most students who participated in the 
present studies did not seem to see the need to improve their emotional clarity. Obviously, they 
felt no deficits with regard to affective clarity in their personal everyday lives. Therefore, it 
could be promising to address persons who are more interested in being emotionally clear, such 
as teachers (Brackett & Katulak, 2007).  
Deployed Measures 
In Study 1, the well-used clarity subscale of the TMMS (Salovey et al., 1995) and a scale 
to measure state clarity, which was deduced from the trait instrument, were deployed. They were 
able to capture significant changes in emotional clarity within groups but differentiated poorly 
between state and trait experience. They further did not cover all postulated aspects of emotional 
clarity. Therefore, we developed new self-report measures of state and trait clarity for Study 2. 
These better distinguished trait from state experience and were correlated in the expected manner 
with each other. However, they did not map any changes. As discussed above, this might be due 
to the focus of the trainings.  
We further developed an indirect measure of emotional clarity that covers a broad 
definition of emotional clarity. That is an advantage over the indirect measure developed by 
Lischetzke et al. (2005, 2011) that captures only the ability to identify the present affective state. 
By contrast, the instrument by Lischetzke et al. is an objective measure of affective clarity, 
whereas the intrument presented here relies on the judgments of two raters. Our instrument was 
optimized from Study 1 to Study 2 and then showed marginal differences between groups. The 
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correlations of the optimized instrument with the self-report measures of affective clarity were 
significantly positive, which may serve as a first indicator of its validity. Still, it has not proved 
sensitivity to changes yet.  
Another instrument that was deployed to assess affective clarity was the degree of 
certainty with regard to the information that one provided with respect to one’s own affective 
state. This measure was able to map the changes within the mindfulness group in Study 1. In 
both studies, it was significantly positively correlated with the deployed self-report measures. It 
is a measure that is very easy to apply and therefore is worth further studying as an alternative 
instrument of affective clarity. One has to keep in mind that this instrument cannot be applied 
alone but must always be used in context with another measure. In that sense, it is always 
dependent on the context that it was linked to. Thus, the comparability of different certainty 
measures like the one presented here and the one presented by Lischetzke is not clear.  
Finally, we measured the ability to recognize emotions in other people’s faces as an 
external criterion and found that this ability was significantly enhanced in the first study by the 
clarity intervention. However, performance on the emotion recognition test was unrelated to self-
report measures of affective clarity in both studies. Hence, this ability has not been verified as an 
external criterion of emotional clarity. Future studies should profit from including other external 
criteria as measures of well-being, mental and physical health, social adjustment, or affect, 
which are all positively related to affective clarity (e.g., Kotsou, Nelis, Grégoire, & Mikolajczak, 
2011).  
Conclusion 
With regard to the important role of affective clarity within affect regulation and its 
positive associations with several variables in the field of health and life satisfaction as well as 
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performance, we think the concept is worth more comprehensive study than realized in most 
previous studies. The present research contributes to that by developing different approaches to 
how emotional clarity could be enhanced. Moreover, it presents alternative instruments for 
measuring emotional clarity not only as a trait variable and not only via self-report but also as a 
state variable and indirectly. With regard to the enhancement of emotional clarity, the conducted 
studies give small support to the idea that it is possible to foster affective clarity via short 
interventions. Thereby, the direct approach, that is, training the defining abilities of emotional 
clarity, and the indirect approach of training mindfulness seem to be the most promising. Future 
studies should extend the training duration to two sessions of at least 1.5 hours each and work 
with voluntary participants who depend on their ability to clearly perceive their affective state 
daily. The instruments that were developed for the present studies all need further study, in 
particular with regard to their abilities to map differences between groups and changes within 
groups. Neverthless, this research provides a variety of approaches for how emotional clarity 
could be measured apart from the established trait self-report scales.  
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Appendix 
Items of the Trait Clarity Scale (Study 2) 
English translations 
I almost always know exactly how I am feeling. 
I often have trouble explaining my feelings. (r) 
When I am upset, I usually know what I am feeling. 
I am usually very clear about my feelings. 
I often have trouble describing my feelings. (r) 
I usually know why I am feeling like I do. 
I usually know my feelings about a matter. 
When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry. (r) 
I often can’t make sense of my feelings. (r) 
Often, I am suddenly strained or in a bad mood apparently without reason. (r) 
Often, I can’t tell how I feel. (r) 
Ususally, I have no problems labeling my feelings. 
Note. Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither nor, 4 = 
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree. (r) = Items are reverse scored.  
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Items of the State Clarity Scale (Study 2) 
English translations 
I know exactly how I’m feeling. 
I am unable to describe how I’m feeling. (r) 
I am very clear about my present emotion. 
I have a hard time labeling my feelings. (r) 
I know my feelings about this current situation. 
I understand why I’m feeling the way I do. 
At the moment I can’t tell what my emotions are. (r) 
I am able to describe my present mood. 
I don’t know why I’m feeling this way. (r) 
Note. Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither nor, 4 = 
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree. (r) = Items are reverse scored.  
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Abstract 
This research investigated the role of emotional clarity within anxiety regulation. Therefore, its 
relation to state anxiety was analyzed in a quasi-experimental study with 52 students of a 
university in Germany. This was done before and after an anxiety induction via film as well as 
after a short recovery phase. We analyzed the relationship of anxiety not only to trait clarity but 
also to state clarity. Furthermore, we explored how trait and state clarity relate to each other. We 
found that persons high and low in trait clarity differed significantly in their level of anxiety at 
the beginning of the experiment and in their degree of recovery from the induced anxiety. 
However, they did not react differently to the induction itself. Accordingly, state clarity was 
negatively related to state anxiety at the beginning and the end of the experiment but not right 
after the anxiety induction. Surprisingly, the level of state clarity hardly changed in the course of 
the experiment. Its relation to trait clarity was expectedly positive. Taken together, this research 
provides a good approach toward a better understanding of the emotional experience and 
regulation of people with high and low trait clarity from a process perspective. Future 
experimental research should benefit from including measures for state clarity; moreover, we 
recommend utilizing several data points measured close together in time.  
Keywords: emotional clarity, emotional reactivity, emotional recovery, affect regulation 
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How Does Emotional Clarity Relate to Emotional Reactivity and Recovery? 
A Process Perspective on the Relevance of Emotional Clarity in Anxiety Regulation 
Emotional clarity has been found to be associated with a range of outcomes that are 
related to health and well-being or more generally to quality of life (Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 
2005; Gohm & Clore, 2002). Significant positive relations have been found, for example, with 
life satisfaction (Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2005; Palmer, Donaldson, & Stough, 2002), 
social functioning, vitality, mental and physical health (Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2006), 
well-being, a functional style of coping, and an internal, stable, global attributional style for good 
events (Gohm & Clore, 2002). Negative correlations have been found, for example, with anxiety 
and depression (e.g., Extremera & Fernández-Berrocal, 2006; Ghorbani, Bing, Watson, Davison, 
& Mack, 2002). Thus, it seems worthwhile to further study the concept of emotional clarity. 
Clarity of emotions is defined as the ability to “identify and distinguish specific 
emotions” (Gohm & Clore, 2000, p. 497). Whereas some people are usually quite confident 
about their feelings, experience certainty regarding their affective states, and are able to label and 
describe their feelings, others often tend to be confused about their affective states, do not know 
exactly what they feel, and have difficulty naming their feelings (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
Turvey, & Palfai, 1995; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995).  
Emotional clarity is considered to be an important characteristic of meta-mood 
experience.1 Individuals not only experience their feelings, but also evaluate and regulate them 
                                                
1 Kokkonen & Pulkkinen (2001) point out that Mayer and colleagues use the term “meta-
experience of mood” (Mayer & Stevens, 1994) as well as “meta-experience of emotion” (Mayer 
& Salovey, 1995). Thus, like many researchers, they do not seem to make a sharp distinction 
between the concepts of emotion and mood.  
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(Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). Thus, “meta-mood” refers to “reflective processes that accompany 
most mood states” (Salovey et al., 1995, p. 127).  
The ability to reflect upon and manage one’s emotions is an important aspect of 
emotional intelligence (EI; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002). Because the quality of 
meta-experience is measured by self-report, Salovey and colleagues (2002) argue that it “should 
not really be considered emotional intelligence per se, but rather beliefs about emotional 
intelligence” (p. 624). Consequently, the meta-experience of mood is considered to be 
“perceived emotional intelligence” (PEI) or trait EI and is explicitly distinguished from abilty EI, 
which is assessed with maximum-performance tests (Petrides & Furnham, 2000, 2001). 
Following this differentiation, meta-mood experience is commonly seen as trait EI, which is 
concerned with cross-situational consistencies in behavior and is embedded within a personality 
framework. 
Whereas Mayer and Gaschke (1988) concentrated on moment-by-moment changes in 
reflections about ongoing mood (state meta-moods), Salovey and colleagues (1995) focused on 
more stable attitudes about moods (trait meta-moods). Both research groups found emotional 
clarity to be one of the meta-mood dimensions. However, most researchers have dealt with 
emotional clarity as a stable attitude. Only a few exceptions have engaged in state clarity 
(Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Lischetzke Cuccodoro, Gauger, Todeschini, & Eid, 2005; Mayer 
& Gaschke, 1988; Mayer & Stevens, 1994). The relation between state and trait clarity2 was 
studied only by Lischetzke and colleagues (2005). Thus, there is very little knowledge so far 
                                                
2 They employed the terms “momentary clarity” and “dispositional clarity” for state and 
trait clarity. In the following, we will use state clarity as synonymous with momentary clarity 
and trait clarity as synonymous with dispositional clarity. 
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about emotional clarity as a state variable and the relation between how clear people report being 
about their feelings and how clear they actually are. 
A lot of correlational data have demonstrated a strong positive correlation between 
emotional clarity and positive affect as well as a strong negative relation between clarity and 
negative affect in general and between clarity and anxiety in particular (for data regarding state 
clarity, see Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Lischetzke et al., 2005; Mayer & Stevens, 1994; for 
data regarding trait clarity and anxiety, see, e.g., Fernández-Berrocal, Alcaide, Extremera, & 
Pizarro, 2006; Ghorbani et al., 2002; Goldman, Kraemer & Salovey, 1996; Mennin, Heimberg, 
Turk, & Fresco, 2005; Salovey et al., 2002). However, most studies on the relations between 
clarity, affect, and regulation of affect are based on correlational data only. Very few studies 
have employed experimental settings with two or more data points (Lischetzke et al., 2005; 
Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Ramos, Fernández-Berrocal, & Extremera, 2007; 
Salovey et al., 1995; Salovey et al., 2002). The study by Lischetzke and collaborators (2005) is 
the only one with multiple points of measurement investigating not only trait clarity but also 
state clarity. Typically, these studies comprise three phases: At the beginning of the experiment 
(Time 1), emotional clarity and the affective state of the participants are measured. At Time 2, 
some kind of affect is induced or the participants are exposed to a stressor. Directly after that, the 
affective state is assessed again (reactivity). At Time 3, after some kind of rest period, the 
participants’ affective state is collected again (recovery). In the following, we want to outline the 
results of these studies with regard to negative affect ordered by the three phases.3 
                                                
3 Because there has been only one study assessing emotional clarity as a state variable 
(Lischetzke et al., 2005), the term “emotional clarity” usually refers to dispositional clarity. 
Otherwise, it is called “momentary clarity.”  
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Emotional Clarity and Previous Affective State (Time 1) 
Fernández-Berrocal et al. (2006) as well as Salovey et al. (1995) found no effect of 
emotional clarity on affect at the beginning of their experiment. Lischetzke et al. (2005) reported 
a significant positive correlation between momentary clarity and joy but no significant relation 
of clarity to negative affect. The other studies cited above did not report any results concerning 
this phase of the experiment. 
Emotional Clarity and Reactivity (Time 2) 
At first glance, the findings regarding reactivity to affect induction seem contradictory. 
Whereas some researchers found a negative relation between clarity and negative affect after 
induction, others found a positive relationship. Some studies, on the other hand, reported that the 
two variables were unrelated.  
At a second glance, it becomes clear that in some studies baseline affect was controlled, 
but in others, it was not. Taking this into account, a more consistent picture emerges: If baseline 
affect was controlled, the relation between clarity and negative affect was either positive or not 
significant. When baseline affect was not accounted for, the relation was negative. In the 
following, we reflect upon the results of previous research in detail.  
Fernández-Berrocal and colleague (2006) found in the anger induction condition that 
high clarity participants indicated also higher levels of negative affect (NA) than low clarity 
participants after controlling for baseline affect. However, for the amusement and the sadness 
induction conditions, they found that the level of NA was unrelated to clarity when baseline 
affect was taken into account.  
The result that clarity is related to higher levels of NA after controlling for baseline affect 
was also found by Salovey, et al. (2002) after the induction of stress. Salovey et al. (1995), on 
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the other hand, like Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera (2006), reported that clarity was not able 
to predict affect after an affect induction when baseline affect was taken into account for the 
amusement and sadness conditions. 
By contrast, Ramos et al. (2007) reported that higher levels of clarity were associated 
with lower levels of depression and fatigue following a stressful film. Lischetzke et al. (2005) 
also found that high clarity participants were in a more positive and in a less negative affective 
state after a tragicomical film. However, these two studies did not control for baseline affect. 
Emotional Clarity and Recovery (Time 3) 
Most authors have postulated that the relation between emotional clarity and affect is 
mediated by affect regulation: Salovey et al. (1995) proposed that individuals who are 
emotionally clear do not need to engage in prolonged rumination in order to figure out what they 
feel exactly and therefore can turn their attentional resources toward effective affect 
management. Similarly, Lischetzke et al. (2005) as well as Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) 
based on cybernatic models of affect regulation (e.g., Larsen, 2000), suggest that high emotional 
clarity permits the individual to recognize an undesirable level or kind of affective state early 
and thus to quickly implement appropriate regulation strategies.  
In line with theses ideas, Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera (2006) found that after a 
recovery phase, high clarity was associated with lower levels of NA in all conditions when affect 
measured at the beginning of the experiment was taken into account. Salovey et al. (1995) 
reported that recovery from NA was predicted by clarity when affect before and after the 
induction were taken into account. Highly clear individuals were more likely to rebound from 
the induced affect. Likewise, Lischetzke et al. (2005) found that higher momentary clarity right 
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after the induction was associated with lower levels of sadness and unpleasant affect after the 
recovery phase when affect before and after the induction were controlled.  
The Present Research 
In summary, very little is known thus far about the relation between emotional clarity and 
affect when affect is manipulated. The small number of experimental studies that have been 
conducted has demonstrated inconsistent results with regard to the time after an affect induction. 
Hence, the present study further explored the relation between clarity and affect in this phase. 
Furthermore, this study aimed to contribute to the picture of the role of state clarity within affect 
regulation. Though anxiety is an important variable in the clinical context as well as in learning, 
there have been no experimental studies that have reported results with regard to emotional 
clarity and the regulation of anxiety. Therefore, we chose anxiety as the dependent variable. 
Specifically, our hypotheses were: 
According to previous research with regard to clarity and negative affect before an 
induction, we hypothesized that participants high in trait clarity would not differ from those low 
in clarity in their level of anxiety at this phase of the experiment. 
On the basis of the inconsistent results concerning clarity and affect after an induction, 
we expected that our participants high in dispositional clarity would report a similar or a higher 
level of anxiety compared to those low in clarity at this time when baseline affect was controlled.  
In line with the theoretical ideas and the consistent empirical evidence for affect after a 
recovery phase, we postulate that participants high in trait clarity would report less anxiety than 
those low in clarity at this measurement point when affect at Time 2 was taken into account.  
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Based on the results of Lischetzke et al. (2005) regarding an indirect measure of state 
clarity, we expected this variable to be negatively related to anxiety at all three phases of the 
experiment.  
Based on the literature dealing with convergent correlations between trait and state 
measures of the same construct (e.g., Schutte, Malouff, Segrera, Wolf, & Rodgers, 2003), we 
expected that participants high in dispositional clarity would report greater momentary clarity 
than participants low in dispositional clarity. 
Method 
Participants  
Altogether, 52 students from the University of Trier, Germany, participated in this study. 
They were acquired via placards. All participants received goodies at the end of the experiment; 
the psychology students (78.8%) additionally obtained course credit. The mean age of 
participants was 21.88 years (SD = 2.39); 36 (69.2%) of the subjects were female.  
Procedure 
Data were collected in group sessions. First, participants rated their dispositonal clarity, 
their momentary level of anxiety, and their momentary clarity.4 Second, they were exposed to a 
clip of the movie “The silence of the Lambs,” which had proven to induce the specific emotion 
anxiety (fear) without eliciting another emotion to a similar degree (Hewig, Hagemann, Seifert, 
Gollwitzer, Naumann, & Bartussek, 2005).  
                                                
4 In this and the third phase of the experiment, the participants also completed other 
measures, which are not reported here.  
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Right after the clip, the participants again rated their state clarity and their level of 
anxiety. Third, there was a 3-min phase of recovery. During this phase of recovery, all 
participants were asked to solve easy anagrams with four letters. This was done to create a low 
cognitive load condition, which left the participants with enough resources for affect regulation 
(Park, Glaser, & Knowles, 2008).5 Right after the recovery phase, momentary clarity and level of 
anxiety were measured again. 
Measures 
Trait clarity. To measure trait clarity, we developed a 12-item questionnaire by taking 
items from various approved scales that measure emotional clarity. The items were taken from 
the clarity subscale of the German version of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 
1995; German version by Otto, Döring-Seipel, Grebe, & Lantermann, 2001), the scale 
“Difficulty identifying feelings” of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS; Taylor, Ryan, & 
Bagby, 1985; German version by Bach, Bach, Zwaan, Serim, & Böhmer, 1996), and the scale 
“Labeling” of the Mood Awareness Scale (MAS; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995). As Gohm and 
Clore (2000) pointed out, all these scales are good measures of clarity and map the same 
construct. Another item was taken from Lischetzke and Eid (2003).  
The reason that we did not use the widely used subscale clarity of the TMMS by Salovey 
et al. (1995) was that in our opinion it does not cover all aspects of emotional clarity. Based on 
the scales and ideas provided by Salovey et al. (1995; TMMS), Taylor et al. (1985; TAS), 
Swinkels and Giuliano (1995; MAS), Lischetzke et al. (2003; 2005), as well as Gohm and Clore 
                                                
5 In the experiment, a high cognitive load condition (anagrams with 6 letters) was 
realized as well. However, only the results for the low-cognitive-load group are reported here. 
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(2000), we view emotional clarity as comprising the following aspects: knowing how one feels 
even if one is upset, understanding how one feels and knowing the reasons for one’s own 
feelings, being able to label and to describe one’s own feelings, knowing one’s feelings about a 
matter. The subscale clarity of the TMMS explicitly covers only the aspects knowing how one 
feels and knowing one’s feelings about a matter.  
We chose the items so that all aspects of clarity were represented by at least one item. All 
items were translated (if necessary) and formulated so that they asked for experiences that 
happened “often” or “usually” or “almost always.” Some of the items were recoded so that half 
of the items were positively keyed and half were negatively keyed. All 12 items were 
randomized for presentation. A sample item is “I almost always know exactly how I am feeling.” 
Instructions asked respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement (cf. TMMS; Salovey et al, 1995). On a pretest, the scale 
had proven to be reliable with ! = .91. In the present study, the scale again showed adequate 
internal consistency with ! = .85. The items in their English translations can be found in the 
Appendix. 
State clarity. To measure state clarity, we adapted the subscale clarity of the Meta-Mood 
Experience Scale (MMES) by Mayer and Gaschke (1988) to meet our requirements. The MMES 
was developed to measure the meta-mood experience as a state variable. The subscale clarity 
covers a broader definition of clarity than the TMMS (Trait Meta-Mood Scale; Salovey et al., 
1995). We took the seven items that showed the highest and most distinct factor loadings (> .50) 
and added two items from other scales (the subscale “Labeling” of the MAS; Swinkels & 
Giuliano,, 1995; the subscale clarity of the German version of the TMMS; Otto et al., 2001) to 
be able to cover all postulated aspects of emotional clarity (see above). However, the aspect 
knowing how one feels even if one is upset could not be realized. The resulting nine items were 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
98 
 
translated (if necessary) and formulated so that they were similar in style to the items of the trait 
questionnaire. However, they asked for a person’s present experience rather than the person’s 
usual experience. Five of the items were positively keyed and four were negatively keyed. All 
nine items were randomized for presentation. A sample item is: “I know exactly how I’m 
feeling.” Instructions again asked respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with each statement. On the pretest, the scale proved to be 
reliable with ! = .94. In the present study, the scale again was internally consistent with ! = .87. 
The items in their English translations can be found in the Appendix. 
Anxiety. The momentary level of anxiety was measured with the subscale state anxiety 
of the German version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970; German version: State-Trait-Angstinventar by Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & 
Spielberger, 1981). The subscale state anxiety uses 20 items to measure how tense, nervous, and 
worried the participant is. A sample item is: “I am worried.” Respondents had to indicate on a 4-
point Likert scale the degree to which the statements matched their momentary feelings. The 
scale proved to be reliable with .89. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
The manipulation was successful: The level of state anxiety increased from M = 39.21 
(SD = 7.93) at the beginning of the experiment to M = 48.54 (SD = 10.24) after the presentation 
of the clip (cf. Table 1). This increase was significant, F(1, 51) = 40.42, p < .001, !2 = .44. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for State Clarity and Anxiety of the High versus Low Clarity Groups  
 Trait Clarity 
 Low Clarity group High Clarity group 
 M M M M 
Anxiety     
T1 43.37 7.67 34.72 5.43 
T2 51.85 10.06 44.96 9.34 
T3 45.48 9.18 36.08 6.00 
State clarity     
T1 3.66 0.66 4.27 0.54 
T2 3.84 0.69 4.19 0.70 
T3 3.60 0.72 4.31 0.50 
Note. Possible range of state clarity: 1 - 5. Possible range of anxiety: 20 - 80.  
Trait Clarity and Anxiety before Affect Induction 
For the following analyses, we formed two groups by median split: the High Clarity 
group consisted of 25 participants with a reported level of trait clarity above 3.92; the Low 
Clarity group covered 27 probands who indicated a level of dispositional clarity less than or 
equal to 3.92. An ANOVA indicated a significant difference between the two groups with 
respect to their level of anxiety at the beginning of the experiment, F(1, 50) = 21.71, p < .001, !2  
= .30. The Low Clarity group reported significantly more anxiety (M = 43.37, SD = 7.67) than 
the High Clarity group (M = 34.72, SD = 5.42).  
Trait Clarity and Anxiety after Affect Induction 
We found a significant difference between groups in anxiety after affect induction, F(1, 
50) = 6.52, p < .05, !2 = .12. The High Clarity group still reported less anxiety (M = 44.96, SD = 
9.35) than the Low Clarity group (M = 51.85, SD = 10.06). We conducted an ANCOVA with the 
level of anxiety at T1 as the covariate to control for baseline anxiety. When the level of anxiety 
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at the beginning of the experiment was taken into account, there were no significant differences 
between groups, F(1, 49) = 1.88, p > .10.  
Trait Clarity and Anxiety after the Recovery Phase 
We found a significant difference between groups in anxiety after the rest period, F(1, 
50) = 18.77, p < .001, !2 = .27. The High Clarity group still reported less anxiety (M = 36.08, SD 
= 6.00) than the Low Clarity group (M = 45.48, SD = 9.18). This effect held when the level of 
anxiety before the regulation phase was controlled, F(1, 49) = 11.09, p < .01, !2 = .19. As 
displayed in Figure 1, participants with high dispositional clarity reported a slightly greater 
decrease in anxiety during the recovering phase than those with low trait clarity.  
 
Figure 1. The level of anxiety at the three measurement points of the High versus Low Clarity 
groups. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
State Clarity  
The correlations between state clarity and anxiety varied from r = -.44 (p < .01) at the 
beginning of the experiment and r = -.27 (p < .05) after the affect induction to r = -.53 (p < .01) 
after the regulation phase. As displayed in Figures 2 and 3, the level of anxiety was affected by 
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the affect induction and returned to the baseline level at the end of the experiment, F(2, 102) = 
36.22, p < .001, !2 = .42, whereas state clarity was not influenced by the movie and hardly 
changed at all, F(2, 102) = 0.30, p > .10. 
  
Figure 2. The level of anxiety at the three measurement points averaged for all participants. 
Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
 
Figure 3. The level of state clarity at the three measurement points averaged for all participants. 
Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
As displayed in Figure 4, participants high in trait clarity reported more momentary 
clarity than those low in dispositional clarity at all three phases in the experiment. However, 
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ANOVAs demonstrated that only the differences at the beginning and the end of the experiment 
were significant, F(1, 50) = 12.96, p < .01, !2 = .21, and F(1, 50) = 17.02, p < .001, !2 = .25, 
respectively. Accordingly, the level of trait clarity was significantly correlated with momentary 
clarity at the beginning and the end of the experiment but not right after the affect induction (r1 = 
.56, p1 < .01; r2 = .26, p2 > .10; r3 = .54, p3 < .01).6  
 
Figure 4. The level of state clarity at the three measurement points of the High versus Low 
Clarity groups. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
Discussion 
The present research examined three main questions: (a) How does dispositional clarity 
relate to the level of anxiety at the beginning of an experiment, right after the induction of 
anxiety, and after a short recovery phase? (b) How does state clarity covary with anxiety over the 
                                                
6 For the correlational analyses, we took the original ratings of dispositional clarity. There 
was no classification of participants to the High Clarity or Low Clarity groups. 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
103 
 
course of the experiment? (c) What is the relation between trait and state clarity? We will discuss 
our findings one after the other. 
Trait Clarity and Anxiety 
Trait clarity and previous affective state. Only two previous studies have reported 
results concerning the relation of clarity and affect at the beginning of an experiment. In contrast 
to our finding that participants with high clarity reported significantly less anxiety, those studies 
found no effect of clarity on affective state in this phase of the experiment. However, as cited 
above, many correlational studies have found a negative relation between dispositional clarity 
and negative affect in general as well as anxiety in particular. In this sense, it is plausible that 
persons high and low in trait clarity already differ in their level of anxiety when arriving at the 
laboratory. In line with this idea, the High Clarity group reported significantly less anxiety at all 
phases of the experiment than the Low Clarity group.  
Trait clarity and reactivity. We found that the participants high in dispositional clarity 
did not report significantly more anxiety after the induction than those low in clarity when the 
level of anxiety at the beginning of the experiment was controlled. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
this is due to the fact that both groups reacted in a similar way to the video clip. This is in line 
with the results of Fernández-Berrocal et al. (2006) for the amusement and sadness condition and 
the finding of Salovey et al. (2002). However, other studies found a significant positive relation 
between clarity and negative affect after affect induction. We can only speculate about why this 
is. It might be due to different dependent measures that have been used or different affect 
variables that have been induced. However, the only factor that was manipulated in the study of 
Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera (2006) was the kind of affect that was induced. Still, they 
found inconsistent results. The studies and conditions that were associated with a significant 
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relation between clarity and negative affect had induced anger (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006) 
or stress when participants were faced with a performance test (Salovey et al., 2002). On the 
other hand, the studies that found no significant relation had induced amusement or sadness 
(Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006), distress (Salovey et al., 1995), or anxiety (the present study). 
Potentially, there are qualitative differences between anger and stress on the one hand and 
anxiety, sadness, amusement, and distress on the other. With regard to anger, for example, 
Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) pointed out that individuals are especially interested in 
regulating anger compared to other negative affective states. Furthermore, anger often arises 
gradually and therefore is very prone to antecedent-focused affect regulation strategies. 
Therefore, it is possible that the benefit from being clear arises in particular in the presence of 
anger. Future research has to show whether a consistent picture will arise.  
Trait clarity and recovery. We found that participants high in clarity were significantly 
less anxious than participants low in clarity after the recovery phase. This effect held when the 
prior anxiety rating (after the induction) was taken into account. Thus, during the short recovery 
phase of 3 min, the High Clarity group recovered to a greater degree from the induced anxiety 
than the Low Clarity group. This had been found consistently in previous research and is in line 
with the idea that emotional clarity promotes effective affect regulation because emotionally 
clear individuals do not need to engage in prolonged thinking about what they are feeling but can 
implement appropriate regulation strategies quickly (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Salovey et al., 
1995; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008).  
State Clarity 
Surprisingly, the level of state clarity hardly changed in the course of the experiment. Our 
result is contradictory to that of Lischetzke et al. (2005) who found a highly significant quadratic 
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trend indicating that momentary clarity decreased from before to after the film and increased 
again after the recovery phase. One reason for the inconsistent results could be that Lischetzke et 
al. (2005) used an indirect measure of state clarity, whereas we used self-reports. Lischetzke et 
al. (2005) point out that it is possible that self-report ratings are affected by a social desirability 
bias (Paulhus & John, 1998) or are not able to capture all aspects of emotional clarity that are 
relevant in the experimental situation (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006).  
One might also assume that the kind of induced affect was responsible for the different 
results. In the present research, one specific emotion was elicited, whereas Lischetzke et al. 
(2005) showed a tragicomical film, which induced mixed affect. They point out that clarity 
should decrease with an increase in the affective complexity of a situation. Accordingly, they 
found a strong relationship between momentary clarity and an index of mixed affect, indicating 
that participants who experienced more mixed affect were less clear than those who experienced 
more mixed affect. Hence, it is plausible that in our study the level of state clarity did not 
decrease after the anxiety induction because the situation was unambiguous and well-defined.  
However, it is surprising that momentary clarity hardly changed at all during the 
complete experiment with three points of measurement. It is therefore also possible that the 
measure of state clarity that was used here is insensitive to change. Future studies with at least 
two data points can test the ability of the measure to map changes in the level of state clarity.  
In line with the idea that the situation right after the induction was unambiguous and 
certain, the High and the Low Clarity groups differed significantly in their level of momentary 
clarity at the beginning and the end of the experiment but not after the presentation of the film. 
Whereas it should be rather difficult to become clear about one’s own feelings when the situation 
is affectively complex and therefore ambiguous (Lischetzke et al., 2005), it should be quite easy 
to be clear about one’s own emotional experience in a well-defined, unambiguous situation. 
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Thus, we would expect the benefit of usually being clear to become more relevant in ambiguous 
situations. It is possible that the situation after the anxiety-inducing film was so well-defined that 
the persons low in dispositional clarity were as clear about their feelings as the ones high in trait 
clarity. Future studies measuring state clarity can show whether further evidence for this idea 
can be found.  
The correlations between state and trait clarity varied from -.27 right after the induction 
to -.44 and -.53 at the beginning and the end of the experiment. The correlations at the beginning 
and the end of the experiment are in line with research that showed that convergent correlations 
between trait and state measures of the same construct are moderate to strong (e.g., for the Big 
Five: rs = .39 - .77, Schutte et al., 2003; for anger expression: rs = .37 - .48, Porter, Stone, & 
Schwartz, 1999; for self-regulation: rs = .53 - .69, Hong, 1995). The results indicate that the two 
measures tap common variance in self-report clarity and that there is some correspondence 
between how clear people report being about their feelings and how clear they actually are. On 
the other hand, enough discrepancy is left to suggest that the two types of measures are not 
interchangeable and that there is a great deal of variance in the measure of momentary clarity 
that is not explained by the trait measure. This is especially true for the relatively small 
correlation right after the film. 
As expected, state clarity and anxiety were correlated negatively at all three phases of the 
experiment. Thus, the clearer the participants currently were, the less anxious they were. This is 
in line with previous research, which found a significant negative relation between (trait) clarity 
and anxiety as well as momentary clarity and negative affect. So far, no study has investigated 
the relation of state clarity and anxiety. Thus, this research provides the first evidence for this 
expected relation.  
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The correlation of anxiety and momentary clarity was strong at the beginning of the 
experiment and after the recovery phase but less strong right after the induction. This is due to 
the fact that the level of anxiety increased after the induction and decreased after the recovery 
phase, whereas the level of clarity hardly changed at all. Thus, the level of anxiety—right after 
the induction in particular—is only partly related to state clarity. This is in line with the result 
that participants high and low in dispositional clarity did not react differently to the induction of 
anxiety. The reactivity to affect induction therefore seems to depend on variables other than 
emotional clarity. Promotion comes from Gohm (2003) who found that emotional reactivity after 
an induction was not a simple function of emotional clarity but depended on clarity, attention, 
and intensity. Therefore, future reserach should include additional appropriate measures.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has several limitations. First, the participants were almost exclusively 
female and most were psychology students. Thus, it is possible that the results are not valid for 
males, students of other subjects, or nonstudents. Second, we used only self-report measures. As 
we discussed above, they are prone to social desirability bias and tap only aspects that are 
accessible by self-insight (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Paulhus & John, 1998; Robinson & 
Neighbors, 2006). Therefore, future studies could include indirect measures of clarity (see 
Lischetzke et al., 2005, for an interesting approach for indirectly measuring momentary clarity) 
to get a better picture of participants’ emotional experience and regulation. Third, this study 
induced only one specific emotion to explore the differences in emotional experience and 
recovery between people with high and low clarity. Previous research has found inconsistent 
results in reactivity to affect induction for different affect variables; these inconsistencies have 
not yet been accounted for (cf. Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006). Therefore, future 
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studies should realize multiple conditions with various specific affective states as well as mixed 
affect in the same study to be able to explore the differences between the conditions. Finally, this 
research provides a good approach to a better understanding of the emotional experience and 
regulation of people with high and low clarity from a process perspective. Still, a lot of questions 
remain to be answered. Future research could benefit from measuring state clarity and affect 
more frequently to get a better picture of the variables’ variation and covariation. From a 
theoretical point of view, individuals should be (momentarily) clear about their feelings before 
they can regulate effectively. With several longitudinal data points measured close together in 
time, it could be possible to find support for this idea.  
Conclusion 
The present research confirms the relation between greater emotional clarity (trait clarity 
as well as state clarity) and reduced anxiety. Persons high and low in dispositional clarity did not 
differ in their reactivity to affect induction, but did differ in their level of anxiety before 
induction as well as in their recovery from the induced affect. Not surprisingly, the level of trait 
clarity was strongly related to the level of state clarity. Persons with high dispositional clarity 
reported significantly greater momentary clarity than those with low dispositional clarity at the 
beginning and the end of the experiment. Surprisingly, state clarity hardly changed in the course 
of the experiment. 
Taken together, this research provides a good approach to a better understanding of the 
emotional experience and regulation of people with high and low clarity from a process 
perspective. Still, a lot of questions remain to be answered. Future research should benefit from 
including sensitive measures of state clarity and measuring clarity as well as affect with several 
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data points measured close in time to get a better picture of the variables’ variation and 
covariation.  
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
110 
 
References 
Austin, E. J., Saklofske, D. H. & Egan, V. (2005). Personality, well-being and health correlates 
of trait emotional intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 38, 547-558. 
Bach, M., Bach, D., de Zwaan, M., Serim, M. & Böhmer, F. (1996). Validierung der Deutschen 
Version der 20-Item Toronto-Alexithymie-Skala bei Normalpersonen und psychiatrischen 
Patienten [Validation of the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale in normal persons and 
psychiatric patients]. Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik, Medizinische Psychologie, 46, 23-
28. 
Extremera, N. & Fernández-Berrocal, P. (2005). Perceived emotional intelligence and life 
satisfaction: Predictive and incremental validity using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 937-948. 
Extremera, N. & Fernández-Berrocal, P. (2006). Emotional intelligence as predictor of mental, 
social, and physical health in university students. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 9, 
45-51. 
Fernández-Berrocal, P. & Extremera, N. (2006). Emotional intelligence and emotional reactivity 
and recovery in laboratory context. Psicothema, 18, 72-78. 
Fernández-Berrocal, P., Alcaide, R., Extremera, N. & Pizarro, D. (2006). The role of emotional 
intelligence in anxiety and depression among adolescents. Individual Differences 
Research, 4, 16-27. 
Ghorbani, N., Bing, M. N., Watson, P. J, Davison, H. K. & Mack, D.A. (2002). Self-reported 
emotional intelligence: Construct similarity and functional dissimilarity of higher-order 
processing in Iran and the United States. International Journal of Psychology, 37, 297-308. 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
111 
 
Gohm, C. L. (2003). Mood regulation and emotional intelligence: Individual differences. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 594-607. 
Gohm, C. L., Baumann, M. R. & Sniezek, J. A. (2001). Personality in extreme situations: 
Thinking (or not) under acute stress. Journal of Research in Personality, 35, 388-399. 
Gohm, C. L. & Clore, G. L. (2000). Individual differences in emotional experience: Mapping 
available scales to processes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 679-697. 
Gohm, C. L. & Clore, G. L. (2002). Four latent traits of emotional experience and their 
involvement in well-being, coping, and attributional style. Cognition and Emotion, 16, 
495-518. 
Goldman, S.-L., Kraemer, D. T. & Salovey, P. (1996). Beliefs about mood moderate the 
relationship of stress to illness and symptom reporting. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 41, 115-128. 
Hewig, J., Hagemann, D., Seifert, J., Gollwitzer, M., Naumann, E. & Bartussek, D. (2005). A 
revised film set for the induction of basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 19, 1095-
1109. 
Hong, E. (1995). A structural comparison between state and trait self-regulation models. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 9, 333-349. 
Kokkonen, M. & Pulkkinen, L. (2001). Examination of the paths between personality, current 
mood, its evaluation, and emotion regulation. European Journal of Personality, 15, 83-
104. 
Larsen, R. J. (2000). Toward a science of mood regulation. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 129-141. 
Laux, L., Glanzmann, P., Schaffner, P. & Spielberger, C. D. (1981). Das State-Trait-
Angstinventar. Theoretische Grundlagen und Handanweisung [The State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory. Theoretical background and manual]. Weinheim: Beltz Test GmbH. 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
112 
 
Lischetzke, T., & Eid, M. (2003). Is attention to feelings beneficial or detrimental to affective 
well-being? Mood regulation as a moderator variable. Emotion, 3, 361-377. 
Lischetzke, T., Cuccodoro, G., Gauger, A., Todeschini, L. & Eid, M. (2005). Measuring 
affective clarity indirectly: Individual differences in response latencies of state affect 
ratings. Emotion, 5, 431-445. Mayer, J. D. & Gaschke, A. A. (1988). The experience and 
meta-experience of mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 102-111. 
Mayer, J. D. & Salovey, P. (1995). Emotional intelligence and the construction and regulation of 
feelings. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 4, 197-208. 
Mayer, J. D. & Stevens, A. A. (1994). An emerging understanding of the reflective (meta-) 
experience of mood. Journal of Research in Personality, 28, 351-373. 
Mennin, D. S., Heimberg, R. G., Turk, C. L. & Fresco, D. M. (2005). Preliminary evidence for 
an emotion dysregulation model of generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Theory, 43, 1281-1310. 
Otto, J.-H., Doering-Seipel, E., Grebe, M., & Lantermann, E.-D. (2001). Entwicklung eines 
Fragebogens zur Erfassung der wahrgenommenen emotionalen Intelligenz. 
Aufmerksamkeit auf, Klarheit und Beeinflussbarkeit von Emotionen [Development of a 
questionnaire for measuring perceived emotional intelligence: Attention to, clarity, and 
repair of emotions]. Diagnostica, 47(4), 178-187. 
Park, S. H., Glaser, J., & Knowles, E. D. (2008). Implicit motivation to control prejudice 
moderates the effect of cognitive depletion on unintended discrimination. Social 
Cognition, 26, 379-398. 
Palmer, B., Donaldson, C. & Stough, C. (2002). Emotional intelligence and life satisfaction. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 33, 1091-1100. 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
113 
 
Paulhus, D. L. & John, O. P. (1998). Egoistic and moralistic biases in self-perception: The 
interplay of self-deceptive styles with basic traits and motives. Journal of Personality, 66, 
1025-1060. 
Petrides, K. V. & Furnham, A. (2000). On the dimensional structure of emotional intelligence. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 312-320. 
Petrides, K. V. & Furnham, A. (2001). Trait emotional intelligence: Psychometric investigation 
with reference to established trait taxonomies. European Journal of Personality, 15, 425-
448. 
Porter, L. S., Stone, A. A. & Schwartz, J. E. (1999). Anger expression and ambulatory blood 
pressure: A comparison of state and trait measures. Psychosomatic Medicine, 61, 454-463. 
Ramos, N. S., Fernández-Berrocal, P. & Extremera, N. (2007). Perceived emotional intelligence 
facilitates cognitive-emotional processes of adaptation to an acute stressor. Cognition and 
Emotion, 21, 758-772. 
Robinson, M. D., & Neighbors, C. (2006). Catching the mind in action: Implicit methods in 
personality research and assessment. In M. Eid & E. Diener (Eds.), Handbook of 
multimethod measurement in psychology (pp. 115–125). Washington, DC: APA Press. 
Salovey, P., Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S. L., Turvey, C. & Palfai, T. P. (1995). Emotional 
attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the trait meta mood 
scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Ed.), Emotion, disclosure and health (pp. 125-154). 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
Salovey, P., Stroud, L. R., Woolery, A. & Epel, E. S. (2002). Perceived emotional intelligence, 
stress reactivity, and symptom reports: Further explorations using the trait meta-mood 
scale. Psychology and Health, 17, 611-627. 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
114 
 
Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Segrera, Wolf, A. & Rodgers, L. (2003). States reflecting the Big 
Five dimensions. Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 591– 603. 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L. &Lushene, R. E. (1970). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Swinkels, A. & Giuliano, T. A. (1995). The measurement and conceptualization of mood 
awareness: Monitoring and labeling one's mood states. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 21, 934-949.  
Taylor, G. J., Ryan, D. P. & Bagby, R. M. (1985). Towards the development of a new self-report 
alexithymia scale. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 44, 191–199. 
Wilkowski, B. M. & Robinson, M. D. (2008). Clear heads are cool heads: Emotional clarity and 
the down-regulation of antisocial affect. Cognition and Emotion, 22, 308-326. 
 
 
 
EMOTIONAL CLARITY AND THE REGULATION OF ANXIETY 
115 
 
Appendix 
Items of the Trait Clarity Scale (English translations) 
Trait Clarity Scale 
I almost always know exactly how I am feeling. 
I often have trouble explaining my feelings. (r) 
When I am upset, I usually know what I am feeling. 
I am usually very clear about my feelings. 
I often have trouble describing my feelings. (r) 
I usually know why I am feeling like I do. 
I usually know my feelings about a matter. 
When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry. (r) 
I often can’t make sense of my feelings. (r) 
Often, I am suddenly strained or in a bad mood apparently without reason. (r) 
Often, I can’t tell how I feel. (r) 
Usually, I have no problems labeling my feelings. 
Note. Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither nor, 4 = 
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree. (r) = Items are reverse scored.  
 
 
Items of the State Clarity Scale (English translations) 
State Clarity Scale 
I know exactly how I’m feeling. 
I am unable to describe how I’m feeling. (r) 
I am very clear about my present emotions. 
I have a hard time labeling my feelings. (r) 
I know my feelings about this current situation. 
I understand why I’m feeling the way I do. 
At the moment, I can’t tell what my emotions are. (r) 
I am able to describe my present mood. 
I don’t know why I’m feeling this way. (r) 
Note. Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither nor, 4 = 
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree. (r) = Items are reverse scored. 
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Abstract 
Objective: The present study explores the role of trait and state emotional clarity in affect 
regulation. Method: Altogether, 206 German subjects of averaged 26.67 years (SD = 6.41), 
thereof 66.5 % female, were classified as persons of high and low trait affective clarity. They 
completed scales of state emotional clarity and positive and negative affective state before 
and after the induction and re-induction of negative affect by an ostensible intelligence test 
with mostly unsolvable items. Results: Participants with high trait clarity significantly 
differed from those with low trait clarity in their levels of positive and negative affect at the 
beginning of the experiment and in their degree of recovery from induced negative affect. The 
groups did not react differently to the induction and the re-induction. As expected, greater 
state clarity was related to less negative and more positive affect; its correlation with trait 
clarity was strongly positive. Unexpectedly, the participants’ level of state clarity hardly 
changed in the course of the experiment. Conclusions: Future studies should profit from 
including state emotional clarity to investigate its role in affect regulation from a process 
perspective. Changes in state affective clarity might not be measured via self-report; future 
studies should consider indirect measures.  
Keywords: emotional clarity, emotional reactivity, emotional recovery, affect regulation, 
habituation 
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Emotional Clarity in Affect Regulation: Interindividual Differences in Emotional Reactivity, 
Recovery, and Habituation 
The clarity of emotions refers to the ability to identify, label, describe, and distinguish 
among one’s own emotions (Gohm & Clore, 2000; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & 
Palfai, 1995; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995). Because the concept has consistently been found to 
correlate with variables in the fields of health, well-being, and quality of life (Austin, 
Saklofske, & Egan, 2005; Gohm & Clore, 2002), it received growing interest with regard to 
its role in affect regulation. 
Emotional clarity is considered an important characteristic of meta-mood experience, 
that is, evaluative and regulative processes that accompany affective experience (Mayer & 
Gaschke, 1988; Salovey et al., 1995). Like Salovey and colleagues (1995), most researchers 
have concentrated on trait meta-moods. Only a few studies have examined state meta-moods, 
including state affective clarity (Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001; Lischetzke, Cuccodoro, 
Gauger, Todeschini, & Eid, 2005; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Mayer & Stevens, 1994). How 
state and trait clarity relate to each other was studied only by Lischetzke and colleagues 
(2005).1 In this respect, very little is known about emotional clarity as a state variable and its 
relation to trait clarity. Nevertheless, applying state measures of clarity is particularly 
important for learning more about the role of emotional clarity in affect regulation processes 
over time. 
                                                
11 They employed the terms momentary clarity and dispositional clarity for state and trait 
clarity. In the following, we will use state clarity as synonymous with momentary clarity and 
trait clarity as synonymous with dispositional clarity. 
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Research has consistently demonstrated a moderate to strong relation between 
emotional clarity and affect (for data regarding state clarity, see Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 
2001; Lischetzke et al., 2005; Mayer & Stevens, 1994; for data regarding trait clarity, see e.g., 
Ramos, Fernández-Berrocal, & Extremera, 2007; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002; 
Thompson, Waltz, Croyle, & Pepper, 2007). However, most studies have restricted their 
analyses to correlations. Only a few studies have implemented experimental settings and 
realized multiple time points to investigate the role of affective clarity in affect regulation 
more closely (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006; Ramos et al., 
2007; Salovey et al., 1995; Salovey et al., 2002). The few experimental studies typically 
collected data at the beginning of the experiment (Time 1), after some kind of affect induction 
(Time 2), and finally after a recovery period (Time 3). Only Salovey and colleagues (2002) 
and Ramos and collaborators (2007) investigated the relation between emotional clarity and 
affect at a fourth data point, that is, after having re-exposed their participants to the same or a 
comparable affect induction (Time 4). In the following, we want to outline the results of these 
studies with regard to positive and negative affect ordered by the experimental phases.1 
Emotional Clarity and Previous Affective State (Time 1) 
The results for this phase of the experiment have been inconsistent. At the beginning 
of the experiment, Fernández-Berrocal et al. (2006) and Salovey et al. (1995) found no 
relation between emotional clarity and affect. By contrast, we found in an earlier study (van 
                                                
1 Because there is only one study that assessed emotional clarity as a state variable 
(Lischetzke et al., 2005) the term emotional clarity usually refers to dispositional clarity. 
Deviations are indicated. 
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de Loo, Haas, Preckel, & Schmitz, 2011) that high clarity persons were less anxious than low 
clarity ones when they arrived at the laboratory. Lischetzke et al. (2005) found a significant 
positive correlation between momentary clarity and positive affect but no relation with 
negative affect. 
Emotional Clarity and Reactivity (Time 2) 
From a theoretical perspective, both a negative and a positive relation between 
emotional clarity and reactivity to affect induction are conceivable. A positive relation could 
result from an increased sensitivity to emotion-laden stimuli as suggested by Petrides and 
Furnham (2003). This idea was supported by their result that high emotionally intelligent 
probands were not only faster at identifying emotional expressions but also reacted to a 
greater degree to affect induction when compared to low EI individuals. The idea can 
probably be transferred to the EI component emotional clarity.  
A negative relation on the other hand is also possible. Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) 
based on Larsen (2000) suggest that emotionally clear persons should be able to detect 
undesirable affective states or even their precursors at a very low level and therefore to 
initiate antecedent-focused affect regulation strategies. Low clarity persons, by contrast, are 
seen to have a less sophisticated insight into their affective states and therefore should realize 
that affect regulation strategies are on duty somewhat later when the negative affect has 
already developed. In line with this idea, Wilkowski et al. (2008) found that high clarity 
persons were completely unaffected by antisocial affect priming, whereas participants with 
low clarity exhibited a pronounced priming effect.  
Finally, it is conceivable that the proposed mechanisms interact with each other and 
that, depending on the experimental procedure, affect induction results sometimes in greater, 
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sometimes in lower, and sometimes in comparable reactivity of the high clarity probands 
compared to the ones with low clarity.  
The empirical data present the following picture concerning negative affect: If 
baseline affect was controlled, the relation between emotional clarity and negative affect after 
some kind of affect induction was either positive (Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006, 
anger condition; Salovey et al., 2002) or nonsignificant (Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 
2006, sadness and amusement conditions; Salovey et al., 1995; van de Loo et al., 2011). Some 
studies did not control for baseline affect; in those cases, the relation between clarity and 
negative affect was negative (Ramos et al., 2007; Lischetzke et al., 2005).  
With regard to positive affect, both studies investigating this variable reported 
consistent results: Greater clarity was associated with more positive affect after induction, no 
matter whether baseline affect was controlled (Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006, all conditions) 
or not (Lischetzke et al., 2005).  
Emotional Clarity and Recovery (Time 3) 
From a theoretical point of view, emotional clarity should lay the foundation for 
effective regulation of affect (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Salovey et al., 1995; Wilkowski & 
Robinson, 2008) by permitting individuals to recognize an undesirable level or kind of 
affective state early and therefore to quickly turn their attentional resources toward effective 
affect management. In line with these ideas, previous research has consistently shown that 
emotional clarity is associated with less negative and more positive affect after a recovery 
period when baseline affect or baseline and prior affect are taken into account (NA: 
Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006; all conditions: Lischetzke et al., 2005; Salovey et al., 1995; 
PA: Fernández-Berrocal et al., 2006; sadness condition: Lischetzke et al., 2005). Only 
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Fernández-Berrocal et al. (2006) reported similar levels of PA for the anger and amusement 
conditions for high as well as for low clarity participants when prior PA was controlled. 
Emotional Clarity and Habituation (Time 4) 
When individuals face the same (or similar) stressful information for a second time, 
their response to it is usually decreased (habituation). From the completion perspective 
(Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000), the response to the repeated stressor should be less the more 
individuals have integrated the first experience into their cognitive schemata. Accordingly, 
Lepore et al. (2000) found that their participants’ decline in emotional response to re-exposure 
compared to the first exposure was fully mediated by intrusive thoughts. Thereby, intrusions 
are considered to be indicators of the discrepancy that remains between the cognitive 
schemata an individual starts with and the stressful information that the individual faces 
(Horowitz, 1997). 
Salovey and colleagues (1995) reported that their high clarity participants experienced 
a significant decline in ruminative thought during the recovery phase whereas the low clarity 
probands showed a near zero slope. Following the above considerations, high clarity persons 
therefore should respond to a lesser degree to a repeated stressor than persons with low 
clarity.  
However, research dealing with emotional clarity and habituation has not yet provided 
empirical proof for this idea. Ramos and colleagues (2007), who re-exposed their subjects to 
the same stressful film of a rape 48 hours after the first exposure, found that only Repair1 but 
not emotional clarity was associated with the change in emotional responses (Exposition 2 – 
                                                
1 Repair is one of the three subscales of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey et al., 1995).  
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Exposition 1). Likewise, Salovey and colleagues (2002), who exposed their participants to 
similar challenges (visio-spatial puzzles, serial subtraction, a videotaped speech task) on three 
consecutive days, found no significant correlation between habituation and emotional clarity. 
One should keep in mind though, that they did not measure affect but rather measured the 
total cortisol secreted during the complete experimental session (Day 1 – Day 2 – Day 3).  
Present Research 
In summary, very little is known yet about the relation between emotional clarity and 
affect when affect is manipulated. The small number of experimental studies has 
demonstrated inconsistent results with regard to the beginning of an experiment and the time 
after an affect induction. Hence, the present study further explores the relation between clarity 
and affect in these phases. So far, there is only one study dealing with emotional clarity and 
its relation to habituation to stressors. Here, we wanted to explore whether we could find 
empirical support for the idea that emotional clarity should promote adaptation to a stressor. 
Furthermore, this study aimed to contribute to the picture of the role of state clarity in affect 
regulation.  
Specifically, our hypotheses were: 
According to the results of van de Loo et al. (2011) and Lischetzke et al. (2005), we 
postulated that before the affect induction, the participants high in trait clarity would report 
higher levels of positive as well as lower levels of negative affect compared to those low in 
clarity. 
In accordance with the results of Fernández-Berrocal et al. (2006), Salovey et al. 
(1995), and van de Loo et al. (2011), we expected that after affect induction, the participants 
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with high clarity would report a similar level of negative affect and a higher level of positive 
affect than those low in clarity when baseline affect was controlled.  
As previous research consistently found, we hypothesized that after the recovery 
phase, participants high in dispositional clarity would report lower levels of negative affect 
but higher levels of positive affect than those low in clarity when affect at Time 2 was 
accounted for.  
Following the theoretical perspective, we postulated that after re-induction, the high 
clarity participants would report a lower level of reactivity (affect at Time 4 – affect at Time 
3) than those low in trait clarity when the reactivity to the first induction (affect at Time 2 – 
affect at Time 1) was taken into account.  
Based on the results of Lischetzke et al. (2005) regarding an indirect measure of state 
clarity and the results of our own earlier study (van de Loo et al., 2011), we expected state 
emotional clarity to be negatively related to negative affect and positively related to positive 
affect in all three phases of the experiment.  
Finally, in accordance with the results of van de Loo et al. (2011), we hypothesized 
that greater dispositional clarity would be positively related to greater momentary clarity at 
the beginning of both experimental sessions (Time 1 and Time 3). 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were acquired via placards and various mailing lists at a university in a 
midsize town in Germany. Altogether, 219 subjects finished both parts of this web-based 
study. Thirteen of them were excluded because their processing time suggested that they did 
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not work conscientiously.1 Thus, 206 persons remained for the analyses. The mean age was 
26.67 years (SD = 6.41); 66.5% were female. The psychology students were given course 
credit. 
Procedure 
Each participant completed the questionnaires and tests in two individual sessions at 
their place of choice at the computer. The sessions took place on two consecutive days at 
approximately the same time of day. Every participant received a link via email that started 
the investigation.  
In the first session, participants first rated their dispositonal clarity, their momentary 
clarity, as well as their negative and positive affective states.2 Second, they were asked to 
complete a test that was allegedly given to measure cognitive intelligence. In fact, most of the 
problems were unsolvable. Right after the induction, the participants again rated their 
negative and positive affective states as well as their momentary clarity.  
On the second day, the procedure was almost exactly the same. Once more, their 
actual level of momentary clarity as well as negative and positive affect was collected. 
Afterwards, the participants were given a test parallel to the one the day before. After the 
ostensible intelligence test, their momentary levels of positive and negative affect as well as 
emotional clarity were measured a fourth time.  
Induction of negative affect. After they had responded to the first set of 
questionnaires, the participants were informed that they would next be given an intelligence 
                                                
1 These probands needed less than 10 min or more than 1 h to finish one experimental session.  
2 The participants also completed other measures, which are not reported here.  
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test. In the first session, the subjects received a test sheet with sequences of symbols; in the 
second one, with sequences of digits. They were requested to indicate the digit or symbol that 
did not fit into the sequence. Instructions further informed participants that the items would be 
presented at different levels of difficulty, in a randomized order, and with a time limit for 
each. In sum, they were given 4 min to deal with the complete test sheet.  
In fact, most of the items were unsolvable. Test material was taken from Langens 
(2006; Study 2), who generated it by manipulating items from a common German intelligence 
inventory (Horn, 1962) so that they were unsolvable. Langens (2006) pointed out that subjects 
usually recognized whether they identified the right solution or whether they simply guessed. 
Dealing with this unsolvable test should therefore induce failure and hence result in negative 
affect. Concordantly, his participants reported in debriefings that they had failed when trying 
to complete the ostensible intelligence test items.  
Measures 
Trait clarity. We developed a self-report measure of trait clarity by taking items of 
various approved scales measuring emotional clarity (Gohm & Clore, 2000; scale Clarity of 
the Trait Meta-Mood Scale; Salovey et al., 1995; German version by Otto, Döring-Seipel, 
Grebe, & Lantermann, 2001; subscale Difficulty Identifying Feelings of the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale; TAS; Taylor, Ryan, & Bagby, 1985; German version by Bach, Bach, 
Zwaan, Serim, & Böhmer, 1996; subscale Labeling of the Mood Awareness Scale; MAS; 
Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995; scale Clarity of Feelings; Lischetzke & Eid, 2003). The 12 items 
were modified if necessary so that they all asked for the person’s usual experience. Some of 
the items were recoded so that half of the items were positively keyed and half were 
negatively keyed. Instructions informed respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the 
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extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement (cp. TMMS; Salovey et al., 
1995). A sample item is “I almost always know exactly how I am feeling.” The scale was 
internally consistent with ! = .90. The items’ English translations can be found in the 
Appendix. 
State clarity. To measure state clarity, from the subscale Clarity of the Meta-Mood 
Experience Scale (MMES) by Mayer and Gaschke (1988), which captures affective clarity as 
a state variable, we took the seven items that showed the highest and most distinct factor 
loadings (! .50) and added two items from other scales (the subscale Labeling of the MAS by 
Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995; the subscale Clarity of the German version of the TMMS by Otto 
et al., 2001). The items were modified if necessary so that they were similar in style to those 
of the trait questionnaire but asked for the person’s current experience instead of their usual 
experience. Five of the items were positively keyed and four were negatively keyed. In line 
with the trait scale, instructions informed respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement. A sample item is: “I know 
exactly how I’m feeling.” The scale was internally consistent with ! = .93. The items’ English 
translations can be found in the Appendix. 
Positive and negative affect. We used the German version of the Positive and 
Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; German version: 
Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996) to measure participants’ positive and negative 
affective states. The PANAS presents 20 affective states (in adjective form) to the 
respondents who have to indicate on a 5-point scale from “not at all” to “extremely” the 
extent to which they feel the respective affect at the present moment. Ten items measure 
positive affect (e.g., active, enthusiastic, strong); the other 10 adjectives refer to negative 
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affect (e.g., afraid, distressed, nervous). The scales PA and NA demonstrated adequate 
reliability for this sample (! = .88 and .86, respectively).  
Results 
First, the manipulation was tested with regard to its effects on positive and negative 
affect. Subsequently, we formed two groups by median split: the High Clarity group consisted 
of 102 participants with a reported level of trait clarity above 3.84; the Low Clarity group 
consisted of 104 probands who indicated a level of dispositional clarity equal to or less than 
3.84. We conducted covariance analyses to test for differences between these groups at each 
phase of the experiment. In each phase, prior affect ratings were included as covariates to 
control for their influence.  
Manipulation Check 
Both manipulations were successful. After the first induction of stress at Day 1, PA 
decreased significantly from M = 2.58 (SD = 0.76) before the manipulation to M = 2.31 (SD = 
0.74) after the manipulation, F(1, 205) = 56.98, p < .001, "2 = .22. NA increased from M = 
1.43 (SD = 0.52) to M = 1.74 (SD = 0.68), F(1, 205) = 42.19, p < .001, "2 = .17. The effect of 
the second stress induction (Day 2) on PA was somewhat smaller but still significant. PA 
decreased from M = 2.47 (SD = 0.79) before to M = 2.25 (SD = 0.81) after the induction, F(1, 
205) = 52.87, p < .001, "2 = .21. NA increased from M = 1.42 (SD = 0.56) to M = 1.53 (SD = 
0.60), F(1, 205) = 12.93, p < .001, "2 = .06. 
Trait Clarity and Affect before Induction 
ANOVAs indicated a highly significant difference between the two groups with 
respect to their affective states at the beginning of the experiment, F(1, 204) = 10.24, p < .01, 
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"2  = .05, for PA, and F(1, 204) = 14.52, p < .001, "2  = .07, for NA. As displayed in Table 1, 
the High Clarity group reported significantly more positive and less negative affect than the 
Low Clarity group.  
Table 1 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Affect and State Clarity Measures 
 
Time point Scale High Clarity group Low Clarity group 
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Time 1 PA 2.75 (.72) 2.42 (.75) 
 
NA 1.30 (.38) 1.56 (.60) 
 
State clarity 4.70 (.40) 3.78 (.79) 
Time 2 PA 2.47 (.75) 2.14 (.70) 
 
NA 1.69 (.70) 1.78 (.65) 
 
State clarity 4.60 (.44) 3.82 (.76) 
Time 3 PA 2.62 (.79) 2.33 (.77) 
 
NA 1.32 (.47) 1.53 (.63) 
 
State clarity 4.59 (.50) 3.85 (.72) 
Time 4 PA 2.39 (.85) 2.12 (.75) 
 
NA 1.45 (.55) 1.61 (.65) 
 
State clarity 4.54 (.55) 3.96 (.66) 
Note.  PA = Positive affect; NA = Negative affect; Possible range of all scales: 1-5.  
 
Trait Clarity and Affect after Induction 
When the baseline level at the beginning of the experiment was taken into account, 
there were no significant differences between groups with regard to positive or negative 
affect, F(1, 203) = 1.74, p > .10, and F(1, 203) = 0.28, p > .10, respectively.  
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Trait Clarity and Affect after the Recovery Phase 
When affect before the recovery phase was controlled, there were no significant 
differences between high and low clarity subjects with regard to positive affect, F(1, 203) = 
0.87, p > .10. By contrast, the High Clarity group reported significantly less negative affect 
than the Low Clarity group when prior NA ratings were controlled, F(1, 203) = 6.32, p < .05, 
"2  = .03. As displayed in Figure 1, participants with high dispositional clarity reported a 
slightly greater decrease in negative affect during the recovery phase than those with low 
dispositional clarity. 
 
Figure 1. Levels of negative affect at the four measurement points for the High versus Low 
Clarity groups. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
Trait Clarity and Habituation  
We found no significant differences between groups in their reactivity (affect at Time 
4 – affect at Time 3) to the repeated induction with regard to positive or negative affect when 
the reactivity to the first induction was taken into account (affect at Time 2 – affect at Time 
1), F(1, 203) = 0.03, p > .10, and F(1, 203) = 0.03, p > .10, respectively.  
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State Clarity  
The correlations between momentary clarity and positive affect were significant and 
positive at all four measurement points; they ranged from .28 (T2) and .33 (T3 and T4) to .40 
(T1). The relation between state clarity and negative affect was expectedly negative at all time 
points. However, only the correlations at time points 1 and 2 reached significance. Whereas 
the correlation at the beginning of the experiment was moderate with r = -.38, the correlation 
right after the first induction was small with r = -.15.   
As displayed in Figure 2, participants high in trait clarity reported significantly more 
momentary clarity than those low in trait clarity at all four time points in the experiment (all 
ps < .001, "2s ranging from .19 at T1 to .35 at T4). Accordingly, the level of dispositional 
clarity was highly positively correlated with momentary clarity at all measurement points (r1 
= .71, r2 = .65, r3 = .57, r4 = .50, all ps < .01).1 
However, the two groups’ momentary clarity developed differently in the course of the 
experiment: Whereas the High Clarity group’s momentary clarity decreased slightly at each 
subsequent measurement point in the course of the experiment, the Low Clarity group’s state 
clarity slightly but steadily increased. A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that this 
differential development (interaction of group and time) was significant, F(3, 612) = 6.21, p < 
.001, "2  = .03.  
                                                
1 For the correlational analyses, we used the original ratings of dispositional clarity. There 
was no classification of participants to the High or Low Clarity groups. 
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Figure 2. Levels of state clarity at the four measurement points for the High versus Low 
Clarity groups. Error bars represent standard deviations. 
 
Discussion 
The present research examined three main questions: (a) How does dispositional 
clarity relate to positive and negative affect at the beginning of the experiment, right after the 
induction of affect, after a recovery phase, and after re-induction? (b) How does state clarity 
covary with affect in the course of the experiment? (c) What is the relation between trait and 
state clarity? We will discuss our findings one after the other. 
Trait Clarity and Affect 
Trait clarity and previous affective state. In line with our finding from a previous 
study (van de Loo et al., 2011), the High Clarity group reported significantly less negative 
affect than the Low Clarity group at the beginning of the experiment. Because a lot of 
correlational studies have documented that greater emotional clarity is associated with less 
negative affect, we think it makes sense that this relation would also be found at the beginning 
of an experiment.  
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In line with the results for negative affect, the High Clarity group differed significantly 
from the Low Clarity group with regard to positive affect at the beginning of the experiment. 
This agrees with the finding of Lischetzke and colleagues (2005) that greater momentary 
clarity was associated with more joy at this phase of the experiment.  
Trait clarity and reactivity. We found no significant differences between the High 
and Low Clarity groups with regard to positive or negative affect after the induction when 
baseline affect was controlled. The two groups reacted in a similar way to the induction.  
With regard to positive affect, our result is in conflict with that of Fernández-Berrocal 
and Extremera (2006), who found that greater clarity was associated with more positive affect 
after induction when baseline affect was controlled. This result was found in all of their 
experimental conditions, that is, after the induction of amusement, of sadness, and of anger.  
With regard to negative affect, our results are in line with Fernández-Berrocal and 
colleague (2006) for the amusement and sadness conditions, the findings of Salovey and 
collaborators (2002), as well as our own results from a former study (van de Loo et al., 2011). 
However, there are also results demonstrating a significant positive relation between clarity 
and negative affect after affect induction (Fernández-Berrocal & Extremera, 2006, anger 
condition). Thus, an interesting question for future research would be to investigate the 
conditions under which this relation is found and when it is not. The study by Fernández-
Berrocal and Extremera (2006) can serve as an interesting starting point. They found a 
significant relation for the anger condition but not for the amusement and sadness conditions, 
although in all conditions, affect was induced by film and changes in affect were assessed 
with the same dependent measure.  
Trait clarity and recovery. We found that participants with high clarity were in a 
significantly less negative affective state than low clarity participants after the recovery phase 
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when NA after the induction was taken into account. This has been found consistently in 
previous research and is in line with the idea that emotional clarity promotes effective affect 
regulation (Lischetzke et al., 2005; Salovey et al., 1995; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008).  
With regard to positive affect, there were no siginifcant differences between the 
groups when controlling for affect that occurred directly after the induction. This is in line 
with the findings of Fernández-Berrocal and Extremera (2006) for the anger and amusement 
conditions. On the other hand, our finding contradicts their results for the sadness condition as 
well as the results of Lischetzke and colleagues (2005). Again, we think that future research 
has to show how different kinds of induced affect and different methods are relevant to these 
inconsistencies. 
However, one has to keep in mind that in the present study, the recovery phase was 
one day long in contrast to a few minutes in comparable studies. It is therefore possible that 
we captured the affective state at the beginning of a second experimental session rather than 
the state after the recovery phase.  
Trait clarity and habituation. Our high clarity and low clarity participants did not 
react differently to the second induction when the reactivity to the first one was taken into 
account. Like Ramos and colleagues (2007) as well as Salovey and collaborators (2002), the 
present study therefore found no hints that a relation between emotional clarity and 
habituation to affect induction exists, although the theoretical considerations suggest that it 
would. A possible explanation is the relatively long time between the two experimental 
sessions in all relevant studies. In the study by Salovey and collaborators (2002) as well as in 
the present paper, one day lay between the first and second manipulations; in the study by 
Ramos and colleagues (2007), the second exposition even took place 48 hours after the first 
one. Probably, this was enough time for the low clarity persons to reach a comparable level of 
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integration to that of the high clarity individuals. Therefore, it would be interesting to realize a 
relatively short time between exposition and re-exposition in future studies, hence making it 
more likely to find interindividual differences. We consider a distance of 15 – 30 min to be 
the most promising because this is the period in which Salovey and colleagues (1995) found 
significant differences in the decline of ruminative thought between persons with high and 
low clarity. Moreover, future studies should include ruminative thought as a dependent 
variable to get the full picture of what is happening between the first and second exposures. It 
would also be interesting to include the subscale Repair (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995) in 
future research because Ramos and colleagues (2007) found Repair instead of emotional 
clarity to be the relevant variable in the context of habituation to a stressor.  
State Clarity 
Expectedly, we found a significant positive relation between momentary and 
dispositional clarity at all four measurement points. The correlations ranged from .71 at the 
beginning of experimental day one to .50 at the end of experimental session two. Thereby, 
they are in line with other convergent correlations between trait and state measures of the 
same concept (e.g., for the Big Five, rs = .39 - .77: Schutte, Malouff, Segrera, Wolf, & 
Rodgers, 2003; for anger expression, rs = .37 - .48: Porter, Stone, & Schwartz, 1999; for self-
regulation, rs = .53 - .69: Hong, 1995). Thus, the instruments catch common variance in self-
report clarity but cover unique variance as well.  
In accordance with the correlations, the Low Clarity group reported significantly less 
momentary clarity than the High Clarity group at all four measurement points. Interestingly, 
we found that the two groups developed differently in the course of the experiment. Whereas 
the persons with high clarity reported slightly decreased state clarity with every measurement, 
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the low clarity subjects indicated a slight but steady increase in state clarity from the 
beginning until the end of the experiment. However, the change in state clarity within groups 
was very small and so was the effect size. Therefore, this result should not be overestimated. 
Moreover, a ceiling effect was evident. At all measurement points, the means of the High 
Clarity group were less than one standard deviation away from the maximum value of the 
scale. Finally, it is possible that regression to the mean is at hand. For future studies, the 
measure of state clarity should be revised and aimed at better capturing the variability 
between as well as within participants.  
Momentary clarity was correlated in the expected way with positive as well as 
negative affect. Whereas the relation between state clarity and positive affect was 
significantly positive at all measurement points, independent of any experimental 
manipulation, the negative relation of state clarity and negative affect was significant only at 
data points 1 and 2. However, this variability in correlations should not be overestimated with 
regard to the fact that the state emotional clarity hardly changed in the course of the 
experiment. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has a number of limitations. First, most of the participants were 
students, mainly psychology students. Thus, it is possible that the results are not valid for 
students of other subjects or non-students. Second, we exclusively used self-report measures. 
As these are prone to social desirability bias and dependent upon the participant’s self-insight 
(Lischetzke et al., 2005; Robinson & Neighbors, 2006), future studies could profit from 
including indirect measures of clarity (see Lischetzke et al., 2005, for an interesting 
approach). Third, we measured only a few dependent variables. Subsequent studies could 
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benefit from including additional measures as discussed above. Fourth, this research realized 
four points of measurement. Although we consider this approach very promising, even more 
data points would have been eligible, especially between the first and second experimental 
day.  
Conclusion 
The present study contributes to a better understanding of emotional clarity and its role 
in affect regulation from a process perspective by realizing a quasi-experimental design with 
four data points including measures of trait as well as state clarity. In line with previous 
research, it confirms the positive association of affective clarity with positive affect and the 
negative association of affective clarity with negative affect. Furthermore, it confirms that 
persons with high dispositional clarity compared to those with low clarity report less negative 
affect after a recovery phase when prior affect is controlled, indicating that high clarity 
individuals have advantages when recovering from induced affect. No support was found for 
greater reactivity or greater habituation for high trait clarity persons. Expectedly, persons high 
and low in trait clarity differed significantly in their level of state clarity. The relation between 
state and trait clarity was significant and positive. However, an unexpected result was that 
high as well as low trait clarity persons hardly changed their level of state clarity in the course 
of the experiment. Thus, future studies should consider alternative instruments to assess state 
clarity (see e.g., Lischetzke et al., 2005, for an indirect approach). Additionally, it seems 
promising to realize even more data points to measure state affect and state clarity in shorter 
intervals than was done in this study to get a better picture of what is happening after the 
induction and during the recovery phase. Such studies could further profit from the utilization 
of time series analyses (e.g., Schmitz, 1989).  
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Appendix 
Items of the Trait Clarity Scale 
English translations 
I almost always know exactly how I am feeling. 
I often have trouble explaining my feelings. (r) 
When I am upset, I usually know what I am feeling. 
I am usually very clear about my feelings. 
I often have trouble describing my feelings. (r) 
I usually know why I feel like I do. 
I usually know my feelings about a matter. 
When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry. (r) 
I often can’t make sense of my feelings. (r) 
Often, I am suddenly strained or in a bad mood apparently without reason. (r) 
Often, I can’t tell how I feel. (r) 
Ususally, I have no problems labeling my feelings. 
Note. Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither nor, 4 = 
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree. (r) = Items are reverse scored.  
 
 
Items of the State Clarity Scale 
English translations 
I know exactly how I’m feeling. 
I am unable to describe how I’m feeling. (r) 
I am very clear about my present emotions. 
I have a hard time labeling my feelings. (r) 
I know my feelings about this current situation. 
I understand why I’m feeling the way I do. 
At the moment, I can’t tell what my emotions are. (r) 
I am able to describe my present mood. 
I don’t know why I’m feeling this way. (r) 
Note. Response categories: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = neither nor, 4 = 
somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree. (r) = Items are reverse scored. 
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Appendix A: Self-developed instruments 
 
A1. Self-report Measure of State Emotional Clarity, deployed in Study 1  
 
A2. Indirect Measure of Emotional Clarity and Certainty Measure, deployed in Study 1 
 
A3. Self-report Measure of Trait Emotional Clarity, deployed in Studies 2-4 
 
A4. Self-report Measure of State Emotional Clarity, deployed in Studies 2-4 
 
A5. Indirect Measure of Emotional Clarity and Certainty Measure, deployed in Study 2  
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B1. Study 1: Agenda of Clarity Intervention 
 
B2. Study 1: Agenda of Mindfulness Intervention 
 
B3. Study 2: Agenda of Mindfulness Intervention 
 
B4. Study 2: Agenda of Self-Regulation Intervention 
Appendix A: Instruments 
 
Appendix A: Instruments 
 
A1. Self-report Measure of State Emotional Clarity, deployed in Study 1 
 
 
 
 
Liebe/r Teilnehmer/in, 
Hier finden Sie einige Reihe von Aussagen zu Meinungen und Erlebensweisen. Bitte lesen Sie 
jede Aussage durch und geben Sie an, ob Sie ihr widersprechen oder zustimmen. Es gibt 
keine falschen Antworten; überlegen Sie bitte deshalb nicht lange, sondern kreuzen Sie 
diejenige Antwortalternative an, die den Grad ihrer Zustimmung am besten ausdrückt. 
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Im Moment kann ich gar nicht sagen, was meine Gefühle 
sind. ! ! ! ! ! 
Im Moment bin ich im Unklaren darüber, wie ich mich fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
Im Moment kann ich mir keinen Reim auf meine Gefühle 
machen. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich bin mir im Moment über meine Gefühle sehr im Klaren. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kenne meine Gefühle gegenüber der vorliegenden 
Situation. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich weiß im Moment genau, wie ich mich fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
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A2. Indirect Measure of Emotional Clarity and Certainty Measure, deployed in Study 1 
 
Indirect measure of emotional clarity: self-developed 
Certainty measure: based on Otto et al., 2001; Lischetzke, Cuccodoro, Gauger, Todeschini, & 
Eid, 2005 
 
 
 
 
Liebe/r Teilnehmer/in, 
Beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen zu Ihrem aktuellen Befinden so, dass es Ihnen am 
besten entspricht. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. 
 
 
1. Wie fühlen Sie sich jetzt? 
Beschreiben Sie bitte Ihren Gefühlszustand mit Hilfe der vorgegebenen Wörter. Jedes Wort 
steht für einen Bereich von Gefühlen. Es schließt also ähnliche Gefühle ein, für die man auch 
ein anderes Wort verwenden könnte. 
Kreuzen Sie nun an ("), wie intensiv Sie jedes Gefühl erleben! Je stärker das Gefühl ist, 
desto weiter rechts machen Sie das Kreuz. 
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1. Freude ! ! ! ! ! ! 
2. Angst ! ! ! ! ! ! 
3. Ekel/Abscheu ! ! ! ! ! ! 
4. Überraschung ! ! ! ! ! ! 
5. Wut/Ärger ! ! ! ! ! ! 
6. Trauer/Traurigkeit ! ! ! ! ! ! 
7. Verachtung ! ! ! ! ! ! 
8. Sonstiges Gefühl: _________________________ ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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2. Wie sicher sind Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 – 100, dass Ihre Angaben Ihrer aktuellen 
Gefühlslage tatsächlich entsprechen? Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
Unsicher  Sicher 
 
 
0 50 100 
 
 
3. Beschreiben Sie nun Ihre aktuelle Gefühlslage. Beschreiben Sie stichpunktartig, 
aber so detailliert und genau wie möglich, wie Sie sich fühlen und welche Auswirkungen das 
auf Sie (z.B. Ihr inneres Erleben, Ihren Körper und Ihre Gedanken) hat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Wie sicher sind Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 – 100, dass Sie Ihre Gefühlslage treffend 
beschrieben haben? Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
Unsicher  Sicher 
 
 
0 50 100 
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5. Wissen Sie, warum Sie sich so fühlen? Kennen Sie den Auslöser für Ihr Befinden? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
# ja 
# nein 
# weiß nicht 
 
 
 
 
6. Warum fühlen Sie sich so? Auf welchen Auslöser führen Sie Ihre Gefühlslage zurück?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Wie sicher sind Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 – 100, dass die von Ihnen beschriebene 
Ursache tatsächlich der Grund für Ihre aktuelle Gefühlslage ist? Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
Unsicher  Sicher 
 
 
0 50 100 
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A3. Self-report Measure of Trait Emotional Clarity, deployed in Studies 2-4 
 
 
 
Liebe/r Teilnehmer/in, 
Im folgenden finden Sie eine Reihe von Aussagen zu Meinungen und Erlebensweisen. Bitte 
lesen Sie jede Aussage durch und geben Sie an, ob Sie ihr widersprechen oder zustimmen. 
Es gibt keine „falschen“ und „richtigen“ Antworten; überlegen Sie bitte deshalb nicht lange, 
sondern kreuzen Sie spontan diejenige Antwortalternative an, die den Grad ihrer 
Zustimmung am besten ausdrückt. 
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Ich weiß fast immer genau, wie ich mich fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich habe häufig Schwierigkeiten meine Gefühle zu 
verstehen.  ! ! ! ! ! 
Auch wenn ich sehr aufgeregt bin, weiß ich 
meistens genau, was ich fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich bin mir gewöhnlich über meine Gefühle sehr im 
klaren. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich habe häufig Schwierigkeiten meine Gefühle zu 
beschreiben. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich weiß in der Regel, was der Grund für meine 
Gefühle ist.  ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kenne gewöhnlich meine Gefühle gegenüber 
einem Sachverhalt. ! ! ! ! ! 
Wenn mich etwas aus der Fassung gebracht hat, 
weiß ich oft nicht, ob ich traurig, ängstlich oder 
wütend bin.   
! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kann mir oft keinen Reim auf meine Gefühle 
machen. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich bin häufig scheinbar grundlos plötzlich 
angespannt oder schlecht gelaunt. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kann oft nicht sagen, wie ich mich fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich habe in der Regel keine Schwierigkeiten meine 
Gefühlen zu benennen. ! ! ! ! ! 
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A4. Self-report Measure of State Emotional Clarity, deployed in Studies 2-4 
 
 
 
 
Liebe/r Teilnehmer/in, 
Hier finden Sie einige Reihe von Aussagen zu Meinungen und Erlebensweisen. Bitte lesen Sie 
jede Aussage durch und geben Sie an, ob Sie ihr widersprechen oder zustimmen. Es gibt 
keine „falschen“ oder „richtigen“ Antworten; überlegen Sie bitte deshalb nicht lange, sondern 
kreuzen Sie spontan diejenige Antwortalternative an, die den Grad ihrer Zustimmung am 
besten ausdrückt. 
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Ich weiß genau, wie ich mich im Moment fühle.  ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kann nicht beschreiben, wie ich mich gerade fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich bin mir über meine aktuellen Gefühle sehr im 
Klaren. ! ! ! ! ! 
Es fällt mir schwer, meine aktuellen Gefühle zu 
benennen. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kenne meine Gefühle gegenüber der aktuellen 
Situation. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich verstehe, warum ich mich fühle, wie ich es in 
diesem Moment tue. ! ! ! ! ! 
Im Moment kann ich nicht sagen, was meine Gefühle 
sind. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich kann meine aktuellen Gefühle beschreiben. ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich weiß nicht, warum ich mich im Moment so fühle. ! ! ! ! ! 
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A5. Indirect Measure of Emotional Clarity and Certainty Measure, deployed in Study 2 
 
Indirect measure of emotional clarity: self-developed, optimized version compared to study 1 
Certainty measure: unchanged version compared to study 1 
 
 
Liebe/r Teilnehmer/in, 
Beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen zu Ihrem aktuellen Befinden so, dass es Ihnen 
am besten entspricht. Es gibt keine „richtigen“ oder „falschen“ Antworten. 
 
 
1. Wie fühlen Sie sich im Moment? Bitte benennen Sie Ihr Gefühl.  
Falls Sie nicht sagen können, was Sie fühlen, schreiben Sie bitte einen entsprechenden 
Kommentar in das Textfeld.  
 
 
 
 
2. Wie sicher sind Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 – 100, dass Ihre Angaben Ihren 
aktuellen Gefühlen tatsächlich entsprechen? Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
Unsicher  Sicher 
 
 
0  100 
 
 
 
3.  Beschreiben Sie nun bitte, was Sie im Moment fühlen. Beschreiben Sie 
stichpunktartig, aber so detailliert und genau wie möglich, wie Sie sich fühlen. Welche 
(körperlichen) Empfindungen haben Sie, welche Gedanken gehen Ihnen durch 
den Kopf, welche Impulse, etwas zu sagen oder zu tun, verspüren Sie, ...?  
Worin drückt sich das Gefühl, das Sie oben benannt haben, aus? 
Falls Sie nicht sagen können, was Sie fühlen, schreiben Sie bitte einen entsprechenden 
Kommentar in das Textfeld. 
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4. Wie sicher sind Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 – 100, dass Sie Ihre aktuellen Gefühle 
treffend beschrieben haben? Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
Unsicher  Sicher 
 
 
0  100 
 
 
5. Warum fühlen Sie sich so? Worauf führen Sie Ihre Gefühlslage zurück? Bitte 
beschreiben Sie den Grund so präzise und detailliert wie möglich. Wodurch wurde das 
Gefühl ausgelöst? Welche Ihrer Einstellungen und inneren Überzeugungen, 
welche Ihrer Erinnerungen und welche Ansichten über sich selbst wurden 
vielleicht durch irgendeinen Auslöser angesprochen? Welchen wurde vielleicht 
widersprochen? Was war dieser Auslöser? 
Falls Sie nicht sagen können, was der Grund für Ihre aktuellen Gefühle ist, schreiben Sie 
bitte einen entsprechenden Kommentar in das Textfeld. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Wie sicher sind Sie sich auf einer Skala von 0 – 100, dass die von Ihnen beschriebene 
Ursache tatsächlich der Grund für Ihre aktuelle Gefühlslage ist? Bitte kreuzen Sie an: 
 
Unsicher  Sicher 
 
 
0  100 
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-  
3´
 
am
us
in
g 
ga
m
e 
a 
re
la
xi
ng
 b
re
ak
 
pl
en
um
 
ga
m
e 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s p
la
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
 c
la
p 
ga
m
e.
 
- 
8´
 
ex
er
ci
se
: 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
an
d 
de
sc
rib
e 
an
ge
r 
a 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
a 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
em
ot
io
n,
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
fe
el
in
gs
, s
en
sa
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
fo
rm
s o
f e
xp
re
ss
io
n 
th
at
 
w
er
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 it
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Sa
m
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
as
 in
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
2 
(e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
de
sc
rib
e 
an
xi
et
y)
 
w
or
ks
he
et
s 
3´
 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
ge
r 
an
d 
an
xi
et
y 
p 
le
ar
n 
to
 d
is
tin
gu
is
h 
be
tw
ee
n 
an
ge
r a
nd
 a
nx
ie
ty
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 st
re
ss
es
 th
e 
m
os
t 
im
po
rta
nt
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s b
et
w
ee
n 
an
xi
et
y 
an
d 
an
ge
r. 
fc
 
“d
iff
er
en
ce
s
” 
3´
 
ho
m
ew
or
k 
p 
tra
ns
fe
r t
o 
ev
er
yd
ay
 li
fe
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Fo
r h
om
ew
or
k 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
ar
e 
as
ke
d 
to
 p
ay
 a
tte
nt
io
n 
to
 
th
ei
r e
m
ot
io
ns
, e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 to
 
an
ge
r a
nd
 a
nx
ie
ty
. I
f t
he
y 
re
al
is
e 
a 
fe
el
in
g,
 th
ey
 a
re
 a
sk
ed
 
to
 p
au
se
 fo
r a
 m
om
en
t a
nd
 to
 
ex
am
in
e 
th
ei
r f
ee
lin
gs
, 
se
ns
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 e
xp
re
ss
io
ns
.  
 
- 
1´
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
p 
 
pl
en
um
 
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s t
ha
nk
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
B
 2
.  
 St
ud
y 
1:
 A
ge
nd
a 
of
 M
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p4
 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
1´
 
w
el
co
m
in
g 
 
p 
 
pl
en
um
 
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s w
el
co
m
e 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
 
 
3´
 
w
ar
m
 u
p 
a 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r 
pl
en
um
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Ev
er
y 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 g
et
s a
 “
fe
el
 
pi
llo
w
” 
an
d 
is
 a
sk
ed
 to
 fi
nd
 o
ut
 
w
ha
t’s
 in
 th
er
e.
 T
he
n 
al
l 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s i
nt
ro
du
ce
 
th
em
se
lv
es
 a
nd
 te
ll 
th
e 
ot
he
rs
 
w
ha
t’s
 in
 th
ei
r p
ill
ow
. 
Sm
al
l 
pi
llo
w
s 
fil
le
d 
w
ith
 
ric
e,
 v
ar
io
us
 
se
ed
s e
tc
., 
ca
lle
d 
“f
ee
l 
sa
ck
s”
 
3´
 
go
al
s, 
ag
en
da
 
p 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n,
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
 
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s i
nt
ro
du
ce
 th
e 
go
al
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ag
en
da
 o
f t
he
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 
to
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
 
fc
5  “
go
al
s”
 
fc
 “
ag
en
da
” 
13
´ 
co
nc
ep
t a
nd
 
be
ne
fit
 o
f 
em
ot
io
na
l c
la
rit
y 
an
d 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
p 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
ts
 
an
d 
be
ne
fit
s o
f e
m
ot
io
na
l 
cl
ar
ity
 a
nd
 m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
  
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 e
xp
la
in
s t
he
 
co
nc
ep
t a
nd
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
 o
f 
em
ot
io
na
l c
la
rit
y.
 T
he
n 
th
ey
 
pr
es
en
t t
ha
t m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 c
an
 
fo
st
er
 c
la
rit
y 
an
d 
de
sc
rib
e 
th
e 
id
ea
 a
nd
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
 o
f 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
. 
sl
id
es
 
4´
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
-
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
, 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
au
to
m
at
ic
 a
nd
 
m
in
df
ul
 b
eh
av
io
ur
 
pl
en
um
/in
di
vi
-
du
al
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 in
st
ru
ct
ed
 
to
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
ei
r f
ee
l p
ill
ow
 
ag
ai
n 
in
 a
 n
ow
 m
in
df
ul
 w
ay
 
an
d 
w
ith
 a
ll 
se
ns
es
. 
“f
ee
l 
pi
llo
w
s”
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
4  a
 =
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 a
ct
iv
e,
 p
 =
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 p
as
si
ve
 
5  f
c 
= 
fli
p 
ch
ar
t 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
2 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
5´
 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
 
pl
en
um
 
fla
sh
lig
ht
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s f
or
 th
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 
an
d 
ho
w
 th
ey
 fe
el
 n
ow
. 
- 
4´
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
-
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
pl
en
um
/in
di
vi
-
du
al
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 in
st
ru
ct
ed
 
to
 w
al
k 
in
 a
 m
in
df
ul
 w
ay
. 
- 
5´
 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
pl
en
um
 
fla
sh
lig
ht
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s f
or
 th
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 
an
d 
ho
w
 th
ey
 fe
el
 n
ow
. 
- 
4´
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
-
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
pl
en
um
/in
di
vi
-
du
al
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 in
st
ru
ct
ed
 
to
 w
at
ch
 th
ei
r t
ho
ug
ht
s l
ik
e 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
pa
ss
in
g 
by
 o
n 
a 
co
nv
ey
or
 b
el
t. 
If
 a
 th
ou
gh
t w
as
 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 in
te
re
st
in
g 
th
ey
 w
er
e 
as
ke
d 
to
 ta
ke
 it
 fr
om
 th
e 
be
lt 
an
d 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
it 
in
 a
 m
in
df
ul
 
w
ay
 (W
ha
t f
ee
lin
gs
, o
th
er
 
th
ou
gh
ts
, s
en
sa
tio
ns
,…
 a
re
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 it
?)
 a
nd
 p
ut
 it
 
ba
ck
 a
fte
r t
ha
t. 
 
- 
5´
 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
pl
en
um
 
fla
sh
lig
ht
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s f
or
 th
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
es
 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 
an
d 
ho
w
 th
ey
 fe
el
 n
ow
. 
- 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
2 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
7´
 
ho
m
ew
or
k 
a 
tra
ns
fe
r t
o 
ev
er
yd
ay
 li
fe
 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Fo
r h
om
ew
or
k 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
ar
e 
as
ke
d 
to
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 in
 th
ei
r e
ve
ry
da
y 
lif
e.
 T
he
 tr
ai
ne
r d
is
cu
ss
es
 w
ith
 
th
em
 h
ow
 a
nd
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 c
ou
ld
 
in
te
gr
at
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
. 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s w
er
e 
ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
en
co
ur
ag
ed
 to
 c
ho
os
e 
at
 le
as
t 
on
e 
ac
tiv
ity
 th
at
 th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 d
o 
m
in
df
ul
ly
 e
ve
ry
 d
ay
. 
sl
id
e 
5´
 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 to
 
cl
ar
ity
 
a 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 th
e 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
of
 m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 a
nd
 c
la
rit
y 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s w
ha
t t
he
y 
th
in
k 
ho
w
 m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 c
an
 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 g
re
at
er
 e
m
ot
io
na
l 
cl
ar
ity
. T
he
 tr
ai
ne
r a
dd
s o
r 
co
rr
ec
ts
 id
ea
s i
f n
ec
es
sa
ry
.  
sl
id
es
 
1´
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
p 
 
pl
en
um
 
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s t
ha
nk
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
B
3.
  
 St
ud
y 
2:
 A
ge
nd
a 
of
 M
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p6
 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
1s
t t
ra
in
in
g 
se
ss
io
n 
7´
 
w
el
co
m
in
g,
 
go
al
s, 
ag
en
da
 
p 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n,
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
, 
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s w
el
co
m
e 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
nd
 in
tro
du
ce
 th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
go
al
s a
nd
 th
e 
ag
en
da
 to
 
th
em
. 
fc
7  “
go
al
s”
 
fc
 „
ag
en
da
“ 
15
´ 
w
ar
m
 u
p 
a 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r 
pl
en
um
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s c
ho
os
e 
on
e 
of
 
va
rio
us
 o
bj
ec
ts
 e
ac
h.
 T
he
n 
th
ey
 
in
tro
du
ce
 th
em
se
lv
es
 a
nd
 e
xp
la
in
 
w
hy
 th
ey
 c
ho
se
 th
is
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
ob
je
ct
. 
va
rio
us
 
ob
je
ct
s o
f 
ev
er
yd
ay
 
lif
e 
10
´ 
co
nc
ep
t o
f 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
p,
 (a
) 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 th
e 
ba
si
cs
 o
f 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
(p
ar
tly
 
in
te
ra
ct
iv
e)
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
w
ha
t t
he
y 
al
re
ad
y 
kn
ow
 a
bo
ut
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 a
nd
 w
ha
t e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 it
. T
he
n 
th
e 
tra
in
er
 
ex
pl
ai
ns
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
t o
f a
nd
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
 fr
om
 m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
. 
sl
id
es
 
10
´ 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
- 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 a
sk
ed
 to
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
ei
r o
bj
ec
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
w
ar
m
 u
p 
as
 if
 
th
ey
 c
am
e 
fr
om
 a
no
th
er
 p
la
ne
t a
nd
 
di
d 
ne
ve
r s
ee
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 li
ke
 th
is
. 
Th
ey
 a
re
 in
st
ru
ct
ed
 to
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
ob
je
ct
 m
in
df
ul
ly
 a
nd
 w
ith
 a
ll 
se
ns
es
 
w
ith
ou
t v
al
ua
tin
g 
it.
 
ob
je
ct
 fr
om
 
th
e 
w
ar
m
 
up
, 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
6  a
 =
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ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 a
ct
iv
e,
 p
 =
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ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 p
as
si
ve
 
7  f
c 
= 
fli
p 
ch
ar
t 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
3 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
5´
 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
on
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
pl
en
um
 
fla
sh
lig
ht
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
ab
ou
t t
he
ir 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 th
is
 
ex
er
ci
se
 a
nd
 h
ow
 th
ey
 fe
el
. 
-  
10
´ 
br
ea
k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
´ 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 a
s 
st
ra
te
gy
 to
 a
vo
id
 
an
d 
re
du
ce
 
di
st
re
ss
 
a/
p 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 th
e 
be
ne
fit
 o
f 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 
di
st
re
ss
 
pl
en
um
 
in
te
ra
ct
iv
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
nd
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
di
sc
us
s a
bo
ut
 w
hy
 a
nd
 h
ow
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 h
el
ps
 w
ith
 d
is
tre
ss
. 
 
sl
id
es
 
10
´ 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
-
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
  
pl
en
um
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Ev
er
y 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 g
et
s a
 
ta
ng
er
in
e.
 T
he
 tr
ai
ne
r i
ns
tru
ct
s 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s t
o 
ex
am
in
e 
it 
m
in
df
ul
ly
.  
ta
ng
er
in
es
 
10
´ 
ho
m
ew
or
k 
a/
p 
tra
ns
fe
r t
o 
ev
er
yd
ay
 li
fe
 
pl
en
um
 
in
te
ra
ct
iv
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Fo
r h
om
ew
or
k 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
ar
e 
as
ke
d 
to
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 in
 e
ve
ry
da
y 
lif
e.
 
Th
ey
 a
re
 in
st
ru
ct
ed
 to
 w
rit
e 
do
w
n 
da
ily
 in
 a
 st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 d
ia
ry
 
w
he
n 
an
d 
fo
r h
ow
 lo
ng
 th
ey
’v
e 
be
en
 m
in
df
ul
 a
nd
 w
hi
ch
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
by
 b
ei
ng
 
m
in
df
ul
. B
ef
or
e 
th
e 
di
ar
y 
is
 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
to
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s t
he
 
tra
in
er
 d
is
cu
ss
es
 w
ith
 th
em
 h
ow
 
an
d 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 c
ou
ld
 in
te
gr
at
e 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
, w
hi
ch
 o
bs
ta
cl
es
 
th
ey
 c
ou
ld
 m
ee
t a
nd
 h
ow
 th
os
e 
co
ul
d 
be
 o
ve
rc
om
e.
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
, 
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 
di
ar
y 
 
 
A
pp
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di
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B
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nd
a 
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 T
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in
g 
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te
rv
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tio
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C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
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ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
3´
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
p 
 
pl
en
um
 
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s t
ha
nk
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
 
2n
d 
tra
in
in
g 
se
ss
io
n 
(o
ne
 w
ee
k 
la
te
r)
 
3´
 
w
el
co
m
in
g,
 
go
al
s, 
ag
en
da
, 
re
ca
pi
tu
la
tio
n 
p 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n,
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s w
el
co
m
e 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
nd
 in
tro
du
ce
 th
em
 
to
 th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
go
al
s a
nd
 a
ge
nd
a.
 
Th
ey
 g
iv
e 
a 
sh
or
t r
ec
ap
itu
la
tio
n 
of
 w
ha
t w
as
 le
ar
ne
d 
la
st
 w
ee
k.
 
fc
 “
go
al
s”
 
fc
 “
ag
en
da
” 
15
´ 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
ho
m
ew
or
k 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
w
ith
 m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s d
is
cu
ss
 w
hi
ch
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 in
 th
ei
r e
ve
ry
da
y 
lif
e.
 C
ou
ld
 th
ey
 u
se
 it
? 
D
id
 th
ey
 
pr
of
it 
fr
om
 it
? 
W
ha
t i
s m
ay
be
 
di
ff
er
en
t n
ow
? 
- 
20
´ 
ca
se
 st
ud
y 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
a 
us
in
g 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 in
 a
 
ev
er
yd
ay
 si
tu
at
io
n 
Te
am
 w
or
k 
(á
 4
) 
ca
se
 st
ud
y 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 a
sk
ed
 to
 th
in
k 
ab
ou
t e
ve
ry
da
y 
si
tu
at
io
ns
 –
 h
ow
 
th
ey
 th
in
k 
an
d 
(r
e)
ac
t u
su
al
ly
 
an
d 
– 
 h
ow
 m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 c
ou
ld
 
he
lp
 to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
us
ua
l f
ee
lin
g 
an
d 
ac
tin
g.
  
w
or
ks
he
et
 
10
´ 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
f 
ca
se
 st
ud
y 
a 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
f r
es
ul
ts
  
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s p
re
se
nt
 th
ei
r r
es
ul
ts
 
an
d 
di
sc
us
s a
bo
ut
 th
em
. 
- 
5´
 
br
ea
k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
´ 
bo
dy
sc
an
 
a 
pr
ac
tic
in
g 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 in
 a
 
fo
rm
al
 w
ay
 
pl
en
um
/in
di
vi
-
du
al
 w
or
k 
fo
rm
al
 
m
in
df
ul
ne
ss
 
m
ed
ita
tio
n 
A
fte
r a
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
bo
dy
sc
an
 a
 
tra
in
er
 in
st
ru
ct
s t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
to
 a
tte
nd
 to
 se
le
ct
ed
 p
ar
ts
 o
f t
he
 
bo
dy
 o
ne
 a
fte
r t
he
 o
th
er
.  
 
- 
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
3 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
10
´ 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
bo
dy
sc
an
 
a 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s d
is
cu
ss
 h
ow
 th
ey
 
fe
lt 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
bo
dy
sc
an
. 
- 
12
´ 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
tra
in
in
g 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
p/
a 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 fo
r t
ra
in
er
s 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s t
ha
nk
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 
as
ke
d 
fo
r t
he
ir 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 o
n 
th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n.
 
- 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
B
 4
.  
 St
ud
y 
2:
 A
ge
nd
a 
of
 S
el
f-r
ef
le
ct
io
n 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p8
 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
1s
t t
ra
in
in
g 
se
ss
io
n 
3´
 
w
el
co
m
in
g,
 
go
al
s, 
ag
en
da
 
p 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n,
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s w
el
co
m
e 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
nd
 in
tro
du
ce
 th
e 
go
al
s a
nd
 th
e 
ag
en
da
 o
f t
he
 
tra
in
in
g 
to
 th
em
.  
fc
9  “
go
al
s”
 
fc
 “
ag
en
da
” 
10
´ 
w
ar
m
 u
p 
a 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r 
pl
en
um
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s c
ho
os
e 
on
e 
of
 
va
rio
us
 e
m
ot
io
n 
ca
rd
s e
ac
h.
 
Th
en
 th
ey
 in
tro
du
ce
 
th
em
se
lv
es
 a
nd
 w
hy
 th
ey
 c
ho
se
 
th
is
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
ca
rd
. 
em
ot
io
n 
ca
rd
s 
10
´ 
sr
10
-e
xe
rc
is
e 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 in
st
ru
ct
ed
 
to
 re
fle
ct
 o
n 
th
ei
r e
m
ot
io
n 
ca
rd
. 
W
hi
ch
 th
ou
gh
ts
 a
nd
 fe
el
in
gs
 
ar
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
ca
rd
? 
W
ha
t h
as
 it
 g
ot
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 th
e 
se
lf,
 w
ith
 p
as
t e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 o
r 
fu
tu
re
 c
on
ce
rn
s?
 
em
ot
io
n 
ca
rd
s f
ro
m
 
pr
ev
io
us
 
ex
er
ci
se
, 
w
or
ks
he
et
 
5´
 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
on
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
pl
en
um
 
fla
sh
lig
ht
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 a
sk
s t
he
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s f
or
 th
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 
an
d 
ho
w
 th
ey
 fe
el
 n
ow
. 
- 
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
8  a
 =
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 a
ct
iv
e,
 p
 =
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 p
as
si
ve
 
9  f
c 
= 
fli
p 
ch
ar
t 
10
 sr
 =
 se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
4 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
15
´ 
cl
ar
ity
 o
f s
el
f-
co
nc
ep
t 
a 
cl
ar
ity
 o
f o
w
n 
id
ea
l a
nd
 
re
al
 se
lf-
co
nc
ep
t 
pa
rtn
er
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Fi
rs
tly
, p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 a
re
 
in
st
ru
ct
ed
 to
 re
fle
ct
 o
n 
th
ei
r r
ea
l 
an
d 
id
ea
l s
el
f-
co
nc
ep
t f
or
 
th
em
se
lv
es
. T
he
n 
th
ey
 a
sk
 th
ei
r 
pa
rtn
er
s f
or
 th
ei
r s
po
nt
an
eo
us
 
ex
te
rn
al
 v
ie
w
 o
f t
he
m
.  
w
or
ks
he
et
 
5´
 
br
ea
k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
´ 
de
fin
iti
on
, 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
nd
 
be
ne
fit
 o
f s
r, 
di
sc
rim
in
at
io
n 
fr
om
 ru
m
in
at
io
n 
a 
kn
ow
in
g 
co
nc
ep
t, 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
nd
 b
en
ef
it 
of
 
so
lu
tio
n-
fo
cu
se
d 
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
te
am
 w
or
k 
(à
 4
) 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s g
et
 a
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ee
t o
n 
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
an
d 
ru
m
in
at
io
n.
 E
ve
ry
 g
ro
up
 h
as
 to
 
an
sw
er
 o
ne
 q
ue
st
io
n 
an
d 
w
rit
e 
do
w
n 
th
ei
r r
es
ul
ts
 o
n 
a 
FC
.  
G
ro
up
 1
: W
ha
t i
s s
el
f-
re
fle
ct
io
n?
 
G
ro
up
 2
: H
ow
 d
oe
s s
el
f-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
w
or
ks
? 
G
ro
up
 3
: W
ha
t i
s r
um
in
at
io
n?
 
G
ro
up
 4
: W
ha
t’s
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 w
h-
qu
es
tio
ns
?1
1  
G
ro
up
 5
: H
ow
 d
oe
s s
el
f-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
he
lp
 in
 st
re
ss
fu
l 
si
tu
at
io
ns
? 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
, 
pl
ai
n 
fc
s 
15
´ 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
re
su
lts
 
a 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f g
ai
ne
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
A
ll 
gr
ou
ps
 p
re
se
nt
 th
ei
r r
es
ul
ts
 
to
 th
e 
pl
en
um
. T
he
 re
su
lts
 a
re
 
di
sc
us
se
d 
by
 th
e 
pl
en
um
. T
he
 
tra
in
er
s c
or
re
ct
 st
at
em
en
ts
 if
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y.
 
fc
s o
f t
he
 
gr
ou
ps
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
11
 w
h-
qu
es
tio
ns
: w
he
n,
 w
he
re
, w
ha
t, 
w
ho
, w
hy
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
ra
in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
le
 B
4 
 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
5´
 
ho
m
ew
or
k 
p 
tra
ns
fe
r t
o 
ev
er
yd
ay
 li
fe
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Fo
r h
om
ew
or
k 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
ar
e 
as
ke
d 
to
 c
ho
os
e 
ev
er
y 
da
y 
on
e 
em
ot
io
na
l s
itu
at
io
n 
an
d 
to
 
re
fle
ct
 o
n 
it.
 T
he
y 
ar
e 
in
st
ru
ct
ed
 
to
 w
rit
e 
do
w
n 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
in
 a
 
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 d
ia
ry
 a
nd
 to
 re
fle
ct
 
w
ith
 th
e 
gu
id
in
g 
qu
es
tio
ns
 o
n 
th
is
 si
tu
at
io
n.
  
st
ru
ct
ur
ed
 
di
ar
y,
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 
2´
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
p 
 
pl
en
um
 
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s t
ha
nk
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
 
2n
d 
tra
in
in
g 
se
ss
io
n 
(o
ne
 w
ee
k 
la
te
r)
 
3´
 
w
el
co
m
in
g,
 
go
al
s, 
ag
en
da
, 
re
ca
pi
tu
la
tio
n 
p 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n,
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s w
el
co
m
e 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
nd
 in
tro
du
ce
 to
 
th
em
 th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
go
al
s a
nd
 th
e 
ag
en
da
. T
he
y 
gi
ve
 a
 sh
or
t 
re
ca
pi
tu
la
tio
n 
of
 w
ha
t w
as
 
le
ar
ne
d 
la
st
 w
ee
k.
 
fc
 “
go
al
s”
 
fc
 “
ag
en
da
” 
15
´ 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
ho
m
ew
or
k 
a 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
pl
en
um
, 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s d
is
cu
ss
 th
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
w
ith
 se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
in
 th
ei
r e
ve
ry
da
y 
lif
e.
 
C
ou
ld
 th
ey
 u
se
 it
? 
D
id
 th
ey
 
pr
of
it 
fr
om
 it
? 
W
ha
t i
s m
ay
be
 
di
ff
er
en
t n
ow
? 
 
10
´ 
be
ne
fit
 o
f s
el
f-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
p 
be
ne
fit
 o
f s
el
f-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
pl
en
um
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
 in
tro
du
ce
s s
om
e 
em
pi
ric
al
 re
su
lts
 h
ow
 se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
he
lp
s. 
 
sl
id
es
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B
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C
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ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
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ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
10
´ 
br
ea
k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
´ 
sr
-e
xe
rc
is
e 
a 
pr
ac
tic
e 
sr
 a
fte
r a
 
di
st
re
ss
in
g 
ev
en
t 
pl
en
um
/in
di
vi
-
du
al
 w
or
k 
ex
er
ci
se
 
1)
 In
du
ct
io
n 
of
 d
is
tre
ss
: 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s f
or
m
 a
 c
irc
le
 a
nd
 
cl
os
e 
th
ei
r e
ye
s. 
Th
ey
 a
re
 to
ld
 
th
at
 th
e 
tra
in
er
 is
 g
oi
ng
 to
 
ch
oo
se
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
m
 fo
r a
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ex
er
ci
se
 b
y 
ta
bb
in
g 
on
 
th
ei
r s
ho
ul
de
r. 
 
2)
 P
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 a
re
 a
sk
ed
 n
ow
 to
 
re
fle
ct
 o
n 
th
ei
r a
ff
ec
tiv
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
an
d 
th
e 
un
de
rly
in
g 
m
ot
iv
es
.  
3)
 T
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 g
et
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
an
no
un
ce
d 
ex
er
ci
se
 is
 n
ot
 g
oi
ng
 to
 ta
ke
 
pl
ac
e 
an
d 
th
at
 th
e 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t 
ra
th
er
 a
im
ed
 a
t t
he
 in
du
ce
m
en
t 
of
 d
is
tre
ss
. 
     w
or
ks
he
et
 
10
´ 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
a 
ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s d
is
cu
ss
 a
bo
ut
 th
ei
r 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 th
is
 e
xe
rc
is
e.
 H
ow
 
di
d 
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
he
lp
ed
 in
 th
is
 
sp
ec
ia
l s
itu
at
io
n?
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A
pp
en
di
x 
B
: A
ge
nd
a 
of
 T
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in
in
g 
In
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 
 
C
on
tin
ua
tio
n 
of
 T
ab
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 B
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 d
ur
a-
 
tio
n 
se
qu
en
ce
 
a/
p 
pu
rp
os
e 
ar
ra
ng
e-
 
m
en
t 
m
et
ho
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
m
at
er
ia
l 
10
´ 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
of
 
st
re
ss
 re
du
ct
io
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
a 
ge
t t
o 
kn
ow
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 fo
r 
st
re
ss
 re
du
ct
io
n 
pl
en
um
 
ex
er
ci
se
 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 a
sk
ed
 to
 w
rit
e 
st
re
ss
 re
du
ct
io
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 th
at
 
th
ey
 c
an
 u
se
 b
ef
or
e 
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
on
 m
od
er
at
io
n 
ca
rd
s.1
2  
C
ar
ds
 a
re
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 a
t t
he
 
m
od
er
at
io
n 
bo
ar
d.
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
, 
pl
ai
n 
m
od
er
at
io
n 
ca
rd
s 
12
´ 
co
nc
lu
si
on
, 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
of
 
tra
in
in
g 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
p/
a 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 fo
r t
ra
in
er
s 
pl
en
um
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 
Th
e 
tra
in
er
s t
ha
nk
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s a
re
 
as
ke
d 
fo
r t
he
ir 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 o
n 
th
e 
tra
in
in
g 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n.
 
- 
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
12
 A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
PS
I-
Th
eo
rie
, i
t i
s n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 in
hi
bi
t s
tro
ng
 p
os
iti
ve
 a
nd
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
af
fe
ct
 b
ef
or
e 
se
lf-
re
fle
ct
io
n 
in
 a
n 
ex
te
ns
iv
e 
an
d 
ho
lis
tic
 w
ay
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
(G
re
if,
 2
00
8;
 K
uh
l, 
20
01
). 
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